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PREFACE 
Great rivers hold an intriguing ~llurement to the author. Like 
people, their personalities are changeable; however, unlike people, a 
river can be radically different at the same time, depending on the po-
sition from which one views it. Cold hearted indeed is the individual 
who can gaze at a mighty river wending across the earth without feeling 
twinges of wanderlust. Certainly the author can claim no such grasp of 
reality. 
Of all the rivers which grace the North American continent, few 
have had as varied and significant a history as the Red River. Although 
less well known than others, such as the Mississippi and the Missouri, 
the Red has enjoyed a central position in the history of the American 
West. From the time of the arrival of Redmen in North America to the 
present, some nation, state, or tribe has cherished the river for its 
advantages, claimed ownership of it, tried to discover the secrets it 
held, or tried to change it.. From the beginning of the Franco-.Spanish 
conflict in the Southwest to the end of the dispute between Texas and 
Oklahoma in the 1920s, the river was the center of controversy. 
The idea of writing the history of a river is not new; myriad 
streams have served as the focal point for historical works. However, 
the approach utilized in this study is somewhat unique. Whereas previous 
studies have used the river to give unity to diverse events, this study 
is the history of a river; only events which took place beca,use of the 
river's presence are chronicled. For example, narration of the Red 
iii 
River War of the 1870s is omitted because that campaign was incidental 
to the stream. It received the river's name only because it took place 
near its course. Conversely, the Red River Campaign of the Civil War, 
the various missions of Athanse de M~zi~res, and the journey of Pedro 
Vial are included because the Red played a vital role in these events. 
In this manner I have not tried to write the his·tory of a region, but 
rather to write the story of how this river has had great economic, po-
litical, and social significance in a vast region of the American West. 
A list of the debts which I owe to Professor Odie B. Faulk, who 
served as director of this work, would fill more pages than the manu-
script itself. Without his patience, encouragement, and admonitions, 
this account would not have been possible. Often he ignored his own 
work in order to assist with mine. Also, I am indebted to other members 
of my connnittee: Professors LeRoy H. Fischer, Joseph A. Stout, Jr., 
Neil Hackett, and Peter C. Rollins; each has suffered, contributed, and 
helped during the preparation of this work. In addition, I wish to 
thank three members of the faculty of Wichita State University, Profes-
sors Ross M. Taylor, Jimmy M. Skaggs, and William E. Unrau, for leading 
me to history. Several of my fellow graduate students at Oklahoma State 
University have aided in the writing of this work, but a special thanks 
goes to my friend James Thomas. The staff of the Oklahoma State Univer-
sity Library has responded to seemingly unreasonable requests with 
calmness and cooperation and Vicki Withers has repeatedly lend a helpful 
hand and sympathetic ear. 
Finally, my wife Toni and my son Jon have miraculously maintained 
their love for a grumpy husband and father, and have suffered through 
iv 
long days of solitude and long evenings when my typewriter invaded 
the domain of the television set. To them I owe the greatest debt. 
v 
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THE RIVER AND ITS PEO~LE 
To the weary pilgrim wending his way westward across scores of 
miles of changeless plains, the Rocky Mountains were a welcome change. 
Their massive peaks thrust skyward, some capped with eternal snow. 
These peaks are a continental divide, separating the water that falls 
there and making it flow in two directions. On the western slope are 
two major rivers, the Colorado and the Columbia, while on the eastern 
side the Missouri, the Arkansas, and the Red have their headwaters. 
Of these the Red is the most southerly--and the one which spans the arid 
plains of the Southwest. 
The Red River has no single source. Rather it is born in the foot-
hills of the Rockies from a thousand tiny rivulets. These come together 
on the Staked Plains--or, as the Spaniards named this region, the Llano 
Estacada; the semi-arid high plains slope gradually away from the 
Rockies, decreasing in altitude as they progress eastward. Although 
this land now is so flat that one can see for miles, its soil once was 
part of the peaks of the mountains, washed down by the rains of centur-
ies past to form an alluvial plain. In the spring the short gramma 
grass bursts into growth; as the ceaseless winds of summer blow, this 
grass tosses and tumbles like a green ocean. An occasional cottonwood 
tree dots the landscape to denote some small stream bed that wends its 
way toward the Red River, while dwarf red cedars indicate the underground 
1 
1 water near the surface. 
The Red crosses this Staked Plain that marks the Panhandle of 
2 
Texas. As it gathers strength from the tiny streams that flow into it, 
the river becomes broader and more stately, but everywhere its course 
winds and curves like the path of some giant snake. Because· the Red has 
flowed through the plains for so long, it has cut deeply into the sur-
face--five to eight hundred feet in places--to form the Palo Duro Can-
yon; this is a place of canyon walls carved into myriad portraits and 
escarpments. From the bed of the river, these walls seem to merge as 
they rise, creating the illusion that the river lies beneath a canopy 
2 of rock and sand. 
As the Red leaves the Llano Estacada, it flows into lower, broken 
country, eight hundred feet below the Staked Plains. Although animals 
and plants, such as the prairie dog and the cottonwood, inhabit both 
areas, the plants and animals of the high plains are more numerous and 
varied. Here the cottonwood is joined by the mesquite and dwarf oak 
near surface water, and the prairie dog competes with jack rabbits and 
ground squirrels for available food. Larger beasts such as the cougar 
(or puma) and coyotes wandered the land, searching for food and scat-
tering smaller creatures in their wake. Here too roamed the American 
bison, a hold~over from the days of saber-tooth tigers and mammoths. 
Wooly and tenacious, the Buffalo had few enemies for its size, strength 
and ill-temper discouraged all but the most determined predator. Only 
an occasional black bear could match the buffalo, and then only if the 
wooly bovine was alone. 3 
The buffalo inhabited the plains from the Canadian border to the 
Rio Grande, moving with the weather and seeking fresh pasturage. 
3 
Because the herds had no natural predators and because the land was 
plentiful, the buffalo multiplied quickly. When the first white men 
came to the American West, there were an estimated 6,000,000 of these 
shaggy beasts in the southern herd. This herd grazed the plains of 
present-day Texas and Oklahoma, with the Red River providing a reliable 
4 
water supply. 
These buffalo did not stay exclusively on the High Plains wandering 
to the east in their eternal quest for grass. In this. reg~on the river 
changed as it flowed off the Llano Estacada. There the land is broken 
and sandy. No longer does the river cut deep and jagged banks; here it 
meanders across the land, seeking the course of least resistance. With 
each freshing of the waters, the river floods the surrounding country, 
widening its channel and eroding its banks. Because the land is flat 
and soft, the river often forms "cut offs" and rechannels its waters. 
The sandy bottom quickly becomes saturated with moisture, creating a 
5 
deadly trap for any unsuspecting intruder. 
Some hundred miles after it leaves the Llano Estacada, the Red re-
ceives its first major tributary, the North Fork. This stream rises on 
the northeastern edge of the Staked Plains, on the southern side of the 
Canadian River's watershed. It runs parallel to the Canadian before 
turning southward, making a long, gentle arc in reaching the Red. The 
North Fork is equal in size to the main stream, doubling the Red's bur-
den at this confluence. 6 
A few miles above the juncture of the two bri;inches, the North Fork 
flows through the southwestern tip of the Wichita Mountains. These 
mountains rise three thousand feet from the plains and are rich in 
minerals. Gigantic quartz deposits convinced early explorers that the 
4 
mountains held riches of precious minerals, but the gold and silver 
which fortune hunters sought was there only in small amounts and would 
not be found until the 20th century--and then not in paying quantities. 
Miners, seeking copper, iron, and other useful metals, would find scant 
success in the Wichitas. However, the minerals of the Wichitas served 
another purpose; for centuries water and wind eroded the earth in the 
hills, and the deposits were carried into the Red by Otter Creek, 
coloring the river. As a result, the water was of a brownish, rusty 
tint; for this reason Spanish explorers named it "el Rio Rojo" (Red 
River). 7 
Ten miles before the North Fork enters, the river curves southward 
to cross the prairie which stretches from the Wichitas southward into 
central Texas. Moisture is abundant here and the land is dotted with 
stands of cottonwood, oak, and various other plants. Beaver dams once 
gave silent evidence of their builders' presence. In the lush foliage 
which grows along the banks of the Red and its many tributaries in this 
region, myriad animals made their homes and sought shelter from the 
elements and predators. Raccoons, foxes, and opossums burrow into the 
banks, waiting for darkness and their nightly hunts. Cottonmouth moc~ 
cassins lay deadly in the grass by the waters, silently and patiently 
watching for an unwary frog. Overhead many species of multi-colored 
birds chatter and screech their way through the branches and the sky. 
In the countryside a covering of grass and bushes conceal a dart~ 
ing and scurrying world of cottontail rabbits, field mice, and other 
small creatures. Across the prairies once stalked predators of varying 
sizes and appetites, searching the land for food. Far above, lordly 
eagles and wary hawks soared, waiting for an incautious movement below 
5 
to bring them plummeting to earth. A blundering visitor might be 
startled by the fluttering explosion of a disturbed covey of quail, or 
. 8 awed by the beauty and grace of a fleeing antelope. 
After its junction with the North Forks, the Red River flows almost 
due south, turning eastward at the mouth of the Pease River, which 
enters from the south. The Pease rises on the prairies of the lower 
Texas Panhandle on the southeastern rim of the Llano Estacado. After 
gaining strength from the Pease, the Red then cuts eastward, reaching a 
confluence with Cache Creek near the ninety-eighth meridian. The latter 
stream rises. on the southeastern slopes of the Wichita mountains. Thus 
the Red collects the moisture from both sides of the Wichitas via North 
Fork and Cache Creek. Ten miles below the mouth of Cache Creek, the 
Wichita River marries with the Red. The waters from these tributaries 
increase the river's burden greatly, creating a broad, turgid stream 
which later would support steamboat navigation. 9 
Twenty miles downstream the Red receives two additional major trib-
utaries, Beaver Creek from the north and the Little Wichita River from 
' the south. From here the Red continues eastward, gathering water of 
smaller stre~s such as Belknap, Farmers, Mud, and Walnut creeks. As it 
moves eastward from the ninety-eighth to the ninety-seventh meridians, 
the Red cuts a zigzag course, flowing north after its confluence with the 
Little Wichita, then dropping south, only to turn northward again to 
meet Walnut Creek. Near the mouth of Walnut Creek the Red River leaves 
the prairies and enters the Western Cross Timbers, a botanic and geo-
graphic phenomenon. In the midst of open country, this massive stretch 
of trees and brush signals the beginning of a rough, broken country run-
ning from central Oklahoma southward to central Texas. In this area 
6 
rolling hills and minor sandstone outcroppings give evidence of the 
Comanchean and Pennsylvanian formations on which it rests. Here the 
river changes also, reverting to a narrow channel with a sandy bottom. 
The river's course is better defined in this area, owing to the land's 
resistance to erosion and the inability of the river to cut new channels 
with each freshing of the water. 
As the Red enters the Western Cross Timbers, it turns southward, 
flowing in a south-easterly direction for some twenty miles before turn ... 
ing once again toward the east. At this point the river enters the 
eastern Cross Timbers, which run along the ninety-seventh meridian. 
Similar to its western counterpart, the Eastern Cross Timbers consist of 
blackjack and post oak intermingled with mesquite and smaller shrubbery; 
however, the eastern stand of trees is generally taller and larger be-
cause of the more fertile land and greater rainfall. East of the Cross 
Timbers and land again is open prairie. Here the Black Prairie begins, 
so named because of the dark, rich tint of the heavy loam soil in the 
. 10 
region. 
After leaving the Cross Timbers, the Red again becomes a broad, 
turgid stream, widening its bed with each new high water and creating 
new channels known as "cut-offs." Because the soil is loosely packed 
and easily eroded, the river often flows into low areas during high 
water, cutting away the top soil. This frequently results in the forma-
tion of multi-channels, dividing the river's waters among several 
courses. At times high water washes away sufficient amounts of soil to 
create entirely new channels, a tendency that created myriad problems 
for later-day surveyors and boundary commissioners. 11 
On the Black Prairie the Red receives its largest tributary, the 
Washita River. This stream also rises on the high plains of the Texas 
Panhandle to the south of the Canadian's water-shed; indeed, the head-
waters of the Washita are less than twenty miles from the bed of the 
Canadian. From this source the Washita cuts a rough and meandering 
course to the southeast, entering the Red midway between the ninety-
seventh and ninety-sixth meridians. 12 
7 
East of the ninety-sixth meridian the land becomes broken and 
hilly. Long avenues of grassland are intermingled with patches of roll-
ing hills. The land is fertile and green, and expansive stretches of 
timber denote a sharp increase in rainfall. Long~leaf pines jut sky-
ward into the moist air, casting their outsized cones into the breeze, 
thereby spreading their breed. Giant live and white oaks stand majesti-
cally over the thickets of wild dew berries and poison ivy. Along the 
banks of the Red and its many tributaries in this region, wild flowers 
grow in abundance. Bluebonnets, Indian paint-brushes, and sunflowers 
s~rout from the sandy soil, tinting the terrain with bright blues, red, 
and yellows; delicate honeysuckle hangs serpent-like across the shrub-
bery, scenting the breeze with sweetness and filling the mind with soft 
thoughts. Droopy willows bow demurly near surf ace water, and stately 
sycamores drop armored seed-pods into the tall grasses beneath. 
In this garden many animals made their home. Wood bison, smaller 
cousins of the buffalo~ grazed among the forests, pentulant squirrels 
chattered in the branches, and mailed armadillos skittered warily about. 
The air is filled with unaccountable thousands of bothersome gnats and 
thirsty mosquitos. The coo of feeding doves and the wail of the whip-
poor-will echo across the land. 
For almost two hundred miles past the mouth of the Washita, the 
Red courses eastward, gathering tributaries such as Blue and Kiamichi 
rivers from the north and Bois D'Arc and Pine creeks from the south. 
Near the ninety-fourth meridian the river turns northward, starting 
its "Great Bend" to form a rough semi-circle. On the northern arc of 
this halfmoon the Little Red River enters. At the end of the bend the 
8 
river flows southwest for some ten miles, joining with Sulphur Fork 
near the boundary of the present-day states of Arkansas and Louisiana. 
From there the river flows southward for more than fifty miles to re~ 
ceive the run-off from Caddo L?ke, a naturaJ shallow lake. The lake is 
fed by several streams which drain a large part of present-day East 
Texas. Because of the heavy rainfall in this area, the contribution of 
these streams is considerable, increasing the Red's burden measurably. 
The Red turns after passing Caddo Lake, flowing at roughly forty-
fi ve degree angle to the southeast toward the Mississippi. This land is 
almost tropical in climate. Huge cypress trees stand stately among the 
bayous along the river, with musky clumps of Spanish moss hanging among 
their branches. Rainfall is plentiful. Much of the land is inundated 
after spring and fall showers, drying only during the sunnner months. 
Winters are generally mild and short, with the rest of the year invari-
ably hot. During the wet months the air is oppressive with moisture and 
heat. 13 
As the Red flows through this area, it gathers water to form hun-
dreds of swamps and bayous. The water in these is usually dark and 
brackish, providing an excellent breeding ground for mosquitos. Snakes 
of every size and color glide through the waters. Fat bull-frogs croak 
in the lush grasses, and turtles sun themselves on logs or poke their 
heads periscope-like from the water. Eel-like gars roll to the surface, 
showing their yellow undersides and scattering smaller fish in their 
wake. On the sandy banks of the Red, lazy alligators once lounged in 
the sun or searched for anything edible. 
Three hundred miles from the Gulf of Mexico the Red River reaches 
9 
its destination--the Mississipp.i River. Here it empties its rusty con-
tents into the greatest river of the North American continent, mingling 
its moisture with water from the Northern Rockies and the Appalachians--
in short, with water from every state west of the Cumberland gap and 
east of the continental divide. From the Llano Estacado to the Missis-
sippi the Red River flows, traveling more than twelve hundred miles and 
draining roughly one-tenth of the continent. 14 
This was the Red River as the white men found it, flowing ever 
toward the sea, moving for thousands of years. before the Europeans ven-
tured inland. But it did not flow unseen or unnoticed. Redmen knew the 
benefit of living near an unfailing source of water. They also knew the 
advantage of water-borne transportation. Therefore they settled along 
the river, enjoying its bounty 11nd sometimes suffering its ill-.temper. 
The lower Red River below the mouth of the Washita River, was the 
home of Caddo Indians. This group included several different confeder-
ations which were related by common language and tradition. These were 
the Natchitoches, in present-day Louisiana; the Adai, just below the 
great bend of the river; the Eyeish and the Cadohadacho Confederacy, 
along the river above the bend; and the Hasinai, to the west and south 
of the Eyeish. The Caddoes were woodland Indians, supporting themselves 
by hunting and cultivation. They tended various plants--muskmelons, 
plums, cherries, white grapes, and mulberries--all of which produced 
bountifully with little or no care; and they killed the game which 
10 
inhabited the forests. 15 
The name Caddo was a contraction of the word Cadohadacho, meaning 
"real chiefs." Among the various tribes of the Confederation, the term 
Caddo was not applied by the Indians as meaning all the different groups, 
but was later broadened by white men as a convenient term for all the 
f d . 16 con e eraci.es. 
The first contact between the Caddoan Tribes and white men oc~ 
, 
curred during the march of Luis de Moscoso's column from Arkansas to 
Mexico. Moscoso found a group called the Amaye near the Red River in 
June of 1542. The next contact with white men was in 1687 during 
Robert Rene Cavelier, Sieur de la Salle, made his abortive journey to~ 
ward Canada from South Texas. La Salle's attempt to settle Texas re-
sulted in Spanish expansion into the area, and in the 1690's mission-
aries were sent from Mexico to the Caddos. However, instead of spawning 
friendly relations between Spaniards and Caddos, the missionaries served 
only to alienate the Indians and drive them into the camp of the French. 
The Caddos were unwilling to accept the teachings of the padres, and the 
soldiers who accompanied the fathers continually molested Indian women. 
This was the beginning of an unfriendly relationship between Spaniards 
and Caddos which would last through the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
. 17 turi.es. 
About 1700 the Caddos came under the influence of the French. At 
this time sons of France were expanding their colony of Louisiana up the 
Red River. In 1714 Louis Juchereau de St. Denis established a trading 
post on the Red River near the location of present-day Natchitoches, 
Louisiana. From there he conducted his expeditions into Spanish Texas. 
This was the beginning of friendship between the French and the Caddos 
11 
which would last until 1763, and the end of the Seven Years War. This 
friendship would also play a vital role in French domination in the area 
until Spain gained ownership of it. 
Upriver the Wichita Indians moved into the area west of the Kia-
michi River and east of the Washita about the turn of the eighteenth 
century. This group, including the Toavaya, Tawakoni, Yscani, Waco, and 
Kichai, had lived along the Arkansas River previously, but had fled 
southward to escape the more war-like Comanche and Osage tribes who in-
vaded the region. The Wichita lived in permanent villages of grass huts 
11 d . k' 18 ca e wic iups. 
Like the Caddos, the Wichita economy was based on hunting and agri-
culture. The Caddo and Wichita generally maintained friendly relations 
because neither relied on conquest or looting for economic gain. The 
first contact with the Wichita by white men probably was the expedition 
of Francisco vfsquez de Coronado in 1541 when the tribe was living along 
the Arkansas. In 1719 Bernard de la Harpe visited a group of Wichita 
living near the mouth of the Canadian River in present-day Oklahoma. 
From La Harpe's visit and subsequent trading between the French and the 
Wichita tribes, the sons of France gained the loyalty of the Wichitas, 
. 19 
aiding in their struggle with Spain for dominance of the region. 
East of the Wichita lived the Lipan Apache, an eastern branch of 
the large group of southern Athapaskans who inhabited much of the South-
west. Nomadic and fierce, the Lipan warred with the Wichita and Caddo, 
enlarging their domain with each successful campaign. By the time of 
the coming of Europeans to the region, the Lipan Apache had secured a 
stronghold which extended from the Arkansas River southward through cen-
tral Texas. This group lived along the upper Red River until they would 
12 
be driven southward by the Comanche in the first half of the eighteenth 
century. During this time the Lipan Apache warred on three fronts: with 
the Comanche to the northwest, the Wichita and Caddo to the east, and 
20 
Spaniards to the south. 
Unlike the Caddo or the Wichita, the Apache were not farmers. They 
were buffalo hunters, following· the herds and living in temporary shel"\ 
ters. Because they followed the buffalo and based their economy on 
raiding, the Apache were constantly at war with their neighbors; they 
needed room to stalk the buffalo and enemies to raid. 21 
To the west and north of the Lipan Apache lived several tribes of 
the Comanche nation. The Comanche were the southernmost of the Shosho"\ 
nean groups, having migrated from their ancient home in the present-day 
state of Wyoming in the early part of the eighteenth century. The vari-
ous Comanche tribes were s.emi-independent, banding together during wars. 
The principal sub"\tribes along the Red River were the Nokoni (or wan-
ders) who ranged from the Big Wichita River to the Llano Estacado, and 
the Quahadi (or Antelope People) who lived on the Llano Estacado. Mem-
hers of another sub-tribe, the Kostsoteka (or Buff alo"\eaters) sometimes 
ventured into the vicinity of the Red River from their homes along the 
. 22 Canadian. 
The Comanche, like the Apache, lived by hunting buffalo and raiding 
other groups. For the most part the Comache limited their hostilities 
to the Apache and to Spaniards, choosing to ally themselves with the 
Kiowa to the north and the Wichita to the east. Through their alliance 
with the Wichita and because of their hatred for Spaniards, the Comanche 
were natural allies of the French who came into their territory from 
L . . 23 ouisiana. 
13 
The Comanche were a proud and dignified people, looking at Span-
iards as inferior. This was partially the result of the Spanish policy 
of attempting to missionize, educate, and Europeanize the natives. The 
Comanche in turn believed that Spaniards had little to teach them and 
that their own way of life was infinitely superior. The result was a 
conflict of culture and arms, in both of which the Spaniards. fared 
badly. However, the French made no attempts to change the Indians, 
24 
merely using them as allies against the Spaniards. 
When the white men c~e to the Southwest in the early part of the 
sixteenth century, they found the natives along the Red River living in 
harmony with nature, and the river flowing wild and unfettered. Almost 
immediately the Europeans began to alter the way of life of the natives, 
to attempt to tame the great river and to discover its s.ecrets. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE 
The firs.t Europeans to view the Red River were members of the ex .. 
/ 
pedition which Francisco Vasquez de Coronado led into West Texas in 
1541. This group probably crossed the headwaters of the Red sometime in 
, 
the early summer of that year on their way to conquer the Gran Quivira. 
During the return trip, the disappointed conquistadors undoubtedly re .. 
crossed the stream; however, these men were searching for gold and sil .. 
ver, not geographical knowledge. Thus the presence of the Red made 
little or no difference to them, other than as a supply of potable 
w.ater .... and as yet another obstacle to surmount. A year after Coronado 
crossed the Red, another Spaniard, Luis de Moscoso, led his party of 
fortune .. hunters to the banks of the Red from the east. This group also 
had little interest in the river, but it made its presence felt by de .. 
1 
laying their march for a week because of high waters. 
Although neither Coronado nor Moscoso had any interes.t in the re .. 
gion of the Red River, their reports influenced the history of the area 
for centuries. Both parties h;:id been in search of wealth- .. the Gran 
, , 
Quivira and the Seven Cities of Cibola .... and their failure to find riches 
pervaded their reports. To gold .. hungry Spaniards the region was barren 
and worthless. Thus officials in Mexico and Spain found no reason to 
finance or organize further expeditions into the interior of North 
America. As a result the land along the Red River lay open and unclaimed 
16 
17 
except for the Spanish assertion that the entire continent belonged to 
their king. Only the Indians walked the land for one hundred and fifty 
years after the first Spanish explorations. Then, in the 1680's an-
other country began to covet the region. 2 
In 1674 Pere Marquette and Henri Joilet descended the Mississippi 
River to the mouth of the Arkansas, turning back to Canada after as-
suring themselves that the Mississippi flowed into the Gulf of Mexico. 
Their reports sparked a dream in the mind of a fellow Frenchman--Ren' 
Robert Cavalier, Sieur de la Salle. La Salle envisioned a French post 
astride the mouth of the Mississippi River, dominating the trade of the 
inland and the commerce of the Gulf of Mexico. His dream was suffi-
ciently strong for him to convince the King of France,. Louis XIV, that 
it could be made a reality, and in 1684 La Salle set out with a floatilla 
of four ships and about 300 c.olonists to build his dream. Unfortunately 
La Salle and his colonists did not disembark at the mouth of the Missis~ 
sippi; either because of poor navigation or by La Salle's design, the 
party landed on the coast of present-day Texas, coming ashore in Janu-
ary, 1685 at Matagorda Bay. Whether La Salle intended to land there or 
not, his endeavors were ill-fated from the beginning. One ship was 
sent back to France, another had been lost to Spanish corsairs during 
the voyage, another was lost entering the bay to unload cargo, and the 
other returned posthaste to France. Thus the colony was left without 
. 3 
transportation--in an unfriendly land. 
Because of the loss of one vessel to the Spaniards, La Salle knew 
that Spanish officials would send parties to locate and destroy his 
colony. Therefore he moved his settlement away from the shore six 
miles up a tributary of the Lavaca River, probably Garcitas Creek. 
18 
There he founded Fort St. Louis, hidden away from the searching eyes of 
Spaniards. While the colonists began construction of a settlement, La 
Salle explored the countryside, causing some latter-day observers to 
theorize that the Frenchman had purposefully missed the Mississippi, 
perhaps to gain information about the Spaniards in Mexico, perhaps to 
4 
be near the silver mines of Durango. 
Whatever La Salle's intent, his colony fared badly. Although the 
Indians in the area at first were friendly, they soon grew hostile t~ 
the Europeans. A war of attrition began, with the Indians the invari .... 
able winners. Meanwhile La Salle continued to explore the country. In 
all he made three exploratory journeys, one to the west, one to the 
north, and a third in search of the Mississippi. Finally, in January, 
1687, La Salle decided that the colony needed succor. Supplies had 
been exhausted, efforts to gather food had proven futile and dangerous, 
and the number of colonists had grown ever smaller because of the 
India.us. On January 12, 1687, La Salle and a small party of men set 
out for Canada. They would, he hoped, reach Canada in time to send 
5 
back aid to the colonists who had been left at Fort St. Louis. 
Members of this party did, after many days of hardship and priva.., 
tion, reach Canad?, but the Sieur de la Salle was not among them. He 
lay dead in the wilderneas of East Texas, murdered by two of his own 
men, his dreams crushed by bad management, the elements, and poor plan-
ning. The survivors, led by Henri Joutel, La Salle's second-in-cotmnand, 
told of the plight of the colony and its founder, but the French 
government and Louis XIV were more interested in their affairs in 
Europe than with the fate of a small and seemingly worthless settlement 
in far-off North America. 6 
19 
The Spaniards, however, were not too busy to worry about La Salle. 
Innnediately after word reached Mexico City of French colonization on 
the north shore of the Gulf of Mexico, which the Spaniards considered a 
Spanish private lake, expeditions were sent to destroy the settlement. 
However, La Salle had hidden his colony well. All attempts failed un ... 
" til 1789 when Alonso de Leon located the fort with the aid of Jean 
Henri, a Frenchman who had left La Salle's settlement to become ruler 
of an Indian village in the area. The Spaniards found the fort in ruins 
and most of the settlers dead. They did hear rumors that most of the 
Frenchmen had been taken by the Indians but only two were discovered. 
Thus ended the French attempt to settle the coast of Texas, but the 
S . d . f" d 7 paniar s were not satis ie • 
The viceroy of Mexico, the Conde de Galve, realized that La Salle's 
colony in Texas might later be used to support a French claim to the 
area; he also knew that the colony could have been successful but for 
ill ... fortune. Spaniards either had to expand into Texas or chance a 
second French intrusion. The Viceroy chose the former course. His task 
was made easier by the desire 
/ 
of a Spanish missionary, Father Damian 
Massanet, to missionize the Indians of East Texas. Massanet had ac ... , 
companied Alonso de Leon during the search for La Salle's post, and 
there he had met several Tejas Indians who appeared receptive to Chris .. 
tianity. Thus, when Galve ordered De Le~n back to Texas to destroy all 
remnants of the French post, Father Massanet was sent to build a perma ... 
nent mission for the Tejas. This was done in the Spring of 1690. 
Father Massanet personally burned the remains of Fort Saint Louis, and 
Mission San Francisco de los Tejos was constructed on the banks of the 
Trinity River. Three Franciscan missionaries, including Massanet, were 




However, the Viceroy was. not. satisfied. He sti 11 feared that the 
French might successfully colonize Texas, threatening New Spain. In a 
class.ic .. example of defensive expansionism, Galve ordered the province 
of Texas formally settled. Captains Domingo Terln de los Rios was ap-
pointed governor of the region, and Father Massanet was appointed 
superintendent of the missions of Texas. The result of these orders 
was disappointing. De los Rios discovered that the Indians had turned 
hostile to Spaniards at San Francisco de los Tejas, and that the mis-
sionaries had made little if any progress. He returned to Mexico in 
early 1692, leaving Massanet yet at the mission with a small company of 
s.oldiers. 9 
The situation at the mission turned rapidly worse. Droughts and 
epidemics, which the Indians blamed on the Spaniards, created overt hos-
tilities between Europeans and natives. Late in 1693 the Viceroy de-
cided to abandon the miss.ion,; .however, the missionaries, seeing a con• 
flict between the work of God and their own welfare, had already de-
cided to flee the mission. In October of 1693 the fathers buried their 
sacred ornaments. and fled to Mexico. Once more Texas was left to the 
I d . 10 n ians. 
Shortly after Mission San Francisco de los Tejas was abandoned, 
Viceroy Galve 1 s fear that the French would encroach on Spanish territory 
was made reality. During the period between 1693 and 1713 the French 
were busy. In 1699, Biloxi was founded in present~day Mississippi, and 
in 1702 Mobile was established in Alabama. By 1713 the French were 
ready to fulfill La Salle's dream of a French colony along the 
21 
Mississippi. That year Louis XIV granted a monopoly for the colony of 
Louisiana to Antoine Crozat. Crozat acted quickly naming Sieur Antione 
de la Mothe Cadillac as governor of the colony. Cadillac was instructed 
to establish trade with the natives of the region and, if possible, 
with Spaniards in Mexico. Although early attempts to trade with Mexico 
were rebuffed because of Spanish mercantile l.;tws, Cadillac soon re., 
id . ""i h dll ce ve an opportunity to init ate sue tra e. 
Early in 1713 he received a letter from a Franciscan missionary, 
Father Francisco Hidalgo, who years before had been one of the padres 
at San Francisco de los Tejas. The Father longed to return to Texas; 
however, his requests had been denied repeatedly. In 1711 the padre 
turned to the French for help, writi.ng to the governor of Louisiana to 
suggest that a joint missionizing project might successfully Christian-
ize the natives of Texas. For Cadillac, Hidalgo's letter was a gift 
from heaven; he now had a.reason to send a French agent into Spanish 
12 
territory. 
All that was needed to begin Cadillac's pli:m was a talented and ad-
venturous leader for his expedition into Mexico. The governor found an 
excellent individual in Louis Juchereau de St. Denis, his commander at 
Biloxi. Cadillac decided that St. Denis should travel to the Rio 
Grande to visit the Spanish outpost of San Juan Bautista where Father -~ 
Hidalgo resided. All that was needed then was a route, a route that 
would provide easy access to Texas and also take the Frenchmen among 
the Indian tribes along the way. The Red River filled both require-
ments. This stream was a natural choice for the French because of pre-
13 
vious explorations of the river by their countrymen. 
In 1686 Henri de Tonty (or Tonti), who had been a member of La 
22 
Salle 1 s early expeditions down the Mississippi and iri Canada, had sailed 
down the Mississippi from the French colonies in Canada to search for 
La Salle. Tonty had been left in Canada when La Salle went to France to 
organize his expedition to colonize the mouth of the Mississippi, and 
was to join the colonists. after their arrival from France. However, 
his plans were changed when he learned that the colonizing expedition 
had not landed at the Mississippi 1 s mouth.. On finding the colony ab-
sent, Tonty returned to Canada. But he had not given up hope of finding 
the errant colony. Three years later he f,igain had voyaged down the 
Father of Waters~ this time he sailed up the Red River, questioning the 
natives along its banks about the presence of other Frenchmen in the 
area. Tonty's se~rch carried far up the Red beyond the Caddo settle-
ment near present-day Bayou Pierre; he then turned s.outhward, reaching 
the Tejas Indians, who reported that Spanish soldiers had visited the 
area recently. " These were the men of Alonso de Leon, who also were 
looking for La Salle. Because of rumors of Spaniards nearby and be-
cause of his failure to find any trace of his leader, Tonty had re-
traced his path to the Red and down it, disappointed and discouraged. 
On returning to the Illinois country, he found Henri Joutel and the sad 
news of La Salle's murder. However, Tonty's voyages had not been 
wasted; he had gained valuable information about the country along the 
Mississippi and Red rivers. Also, he had contacted many Indians along 
the Red River, beginning a friendly relationship with the natives that 
would last until the end of French Louisiana, one which would prove in-
1 bl h F h . h . fl" . h s . . h . 14 va ua e to t e renc in t eir con ict wit pain in t e region. 
Eleven years after Tonty's voyage, Jean Baptiste le Mayne, Sieur 
I 
de Bienville, governor of Louisiana and a brother of the colony's 
23 
founder, Pierre le Moyne, Sieur d'Iberville, explored the Red River, 
pushing across the entire breadth of present-day Louisiana. Bienville 
had attempted to reach the area of La Salle's death, but spring rains 
and cold weather had forced him to turn back. Although Bienville 
failed to reach his original go~l, his trip was of importance. He had 
rekindled friendly relations with the natives along the Red River, en-
hanced French knowledge of the region, and given important experience 
to a young Canadian who had accompanied. him--Louis Juchereau de St. 
D • 15 enis. 
After returning from his explorations with Bienville, St. Denis 
had conunanded a post on the lower Mississippi from. 1702 to 1705. He 
then had led several expeditions into the Indian country, including an-
other visit in 1710 to the Indiqns along the Red River, during which 
he traded with the Natchitoches and s.everal tribes of present-day East 
Texas. In 1712, St. Denis had been ~ppointed conunander of the French 
settlement at Biloxi, and was in that office when Governor Cadillac 
chose him to lead the expedition into Spanish territory to discuss the 
possibility of a joint effort to missionize the natives of East Texas--
and, in the process, to open trade between Louisiana and Mexico. 16 
In late September of 1713, St. Denis and a small group of traders 
left Mobile with a large amount of trade goods. This party spent the 
winter of 1713-1714 trading with natives along the Red River and in 
East Texas. St. Denis realized that if trade between the Spanish and 
French colonies was ever to become frequent and steady, a post was 
needed somewhere midway between the Sp~nish settlements along the Rio 
Grande and the French settlements along the Mississippi. Accordingly 
he ordered a trading station constructed on the Red River, naming it 
24 
Natchitoches in honor of the Caddoan Indians who inhabited the surround-
ing area. Having won the allegiance of the natives with gifts and his 
personal charm, and having established a headquarters for his travels, 
St. Denis set out for San Juan Bautista late in the spring of 1714. He 
and his party arrived at the Spanish settlement on the Rio Grande early 
in the fall of the same year; there he presented his papers, including 
Father Hidalgo's letter, to the presidal commander, Captain Diego Ram~n. 
Also, he inquired about the possibilities of commercial contact between 
the colonies of France and Spain, whereupon Captain Ramon immediately 
arrested St. Denis and confiscated his trade goods as his orders speci-
fied he should do. Unsure of his next action, Ram~n forwarded St. 
Denis' documents to the viceroy, the Duke de Linaries, in Mexico City, 
and placed the affable Frenchman under house arrest. While Ram6n and 
St. Denis waited for a decision on the Frenchman's future to be made in 
Mexico City, the latter enjoyed the freedom usually granted a house 
guest rather than the restrictions of a prisoner. Never one to miss an 
opportunity, St. Denis utilized the time it took for the viceroy to re-
spond to Ram6n 1 s questions to win the respect of the captors--and the 
heart of the commander's granddaughter, Mar!a Ram~n. The Spaniards came _). 
to admire the gentle Frenchman for his gracious manners and sincere 
17 
warmth. 
Six months after the Frenchman had arrived at San Juan Bautista, 
Captain Ram~n was informed that the viceroy wished St. Denis brought to 
Mexico City for questioning and appraisal. St. Denis left the Spanish 
outpost with a detachment of soldiers, ordering his men to return to 
Natchitoches and promising his new-found love that he soon would return. 
On St. Denis' arrival in Mexico City, he was questioned at length about 
25 
the motives of the French toward Texas and the reasons behind his visit 
to Mexico. To these queries the adroit Frenchman replied that the sole 
interest of his country in the area west of Louisiana was the missioni-
zation of the natives and that his objective had been only to further 
this project. The viceroy remained suspicious of French intentions, 
however, and convened a council of war to decide what the Spanish re-
action to this new threat of French encroachment should be. The coun-
cil, reasoning that the French would not risk overt intrustion into 
territory which had already been settled, determined that a series of 
four missions, the primary aim of Spanish expansion, should be con-
structed in East Texas to serve the Tejas Indians. Once more Spain 
ld h . T d h T · lB wou reac into exas an attempt to tame t e eJas., 
Once the decision was made to expand into East Texas, the Spaniards 
moved quickly. L\lte in September of 1715 Domingo Ramgn, the son of St.> 
Denis 1 orig.inal captor and the uncle of Marfa, was appointed to lead 
the expedition. Ever enterprising and invariably alert, St. Denis was 
able to secure an appointment as guide for this missionizing party by 
taking Spanish citizenship. St. Denis and the party then returned to 
San Juan Bautista, where he married Mar!a. Early in 1716 the party, 
numbering sixty-five persons, left the Spanish province of Coahuila. 
In addition to the soldiers, priests, and other official members of the 
expedition, Marfa St. Denis journeyed northward into the wilderness 
with her new husband. 19 
With St. Denis acting as an interpreter and guide, the party 
reached the site of the abandoned Mission San Francisco de los Tejas in~ 
June of 1716. Nearby a new mission, Nuestro Padre de San Francisco de / 
los Tejas, was built. Father Francisco Hidalgo was appointed to oversee 
the new mission, fulfilling the desire he had expressed in his letter 
to the governor of Louisiana, but not stopping the change of events 
20 
which his letter had begun. 
Leaving Hidalgo, his group of padres, and two soldiers at the 
mission, Ramon's party traveled northward, meeting several groups of 
Tejas to which St. Denis gave gifts. These natives received the 
Spaniards cordially and declared themselves subjects of the King of 
26 
Spain. " .~ , Three more missions, Purisima Concepcion, Sa~ Jose, and Nuestra 
Senora de Guadalupe, were constructed among the Tejas. Having fulfilled 
their orders, Ram~n and St. Denis then visited the French post at 
Natchitoches, where St. Denis was greeted by many of the men who had 
accompanied him to Mexico. . From the post on the Red River, the two men 
then went to Mobile to discuss recent events with the governor of 
Louisiana. At Mobile Ramon informed the Governor Cadillac that because 
Spaniards had undertaken to missionize the Indians of East Texas, there 
would be no need for further discussion of a joint effort by the two 
Catholic powers. Furthermore, because Spanish law prohibited trade be-
tween Louisiana and Mexico, officials in Mexico City could see no reason 
for future c.ontact between the two colonies. As far as ,Spaniards were 
21 
concerned, the matter had ended. 
Despite the assertions and protestations of Ram~n, the French re-
mained hopeful that officials in Mexico would permit commerce between 
the colonies. While Ram6n was explaining to the governor that such a 
hope was futile, St. Denis was replacing the trade goods which had been 
confiscated two years previously. Because of his recently gained 
Spanish citizenship and his newly obtained family connections in 
Mexico, the Frenchman believed that he could overcome the legal 
27 
obstacles which existed to such trade. Their respective tasks com-
pleted, Ramon and St. Denis set out for East Texas, one seeking an end 
to his ordeal, the other looking forward to the beginning of a great 
enterprise. Both were disappointed by subsequent events. 22 
On reaching East Texas, they learned that two more religious es-
tablishments had been completed. To St. Denis' dismay, San Miguel de 
Linares do los Adaes had been located only twenty-one miles from his 
post at Natchitoches. Spaniards wishing to insure against further 
French encroachment, had built an establishment that would allow them 
to maintain a careful watch on their wiley neighbors. Los Adaes marked 
the fartherest advance by the Spanish into Texas, leaving the two na-
tions facing one another across the Red River as a connnon border. 
Despite this setback, St. Denis returned to San Juan Bautista, 
still hoping to sell or trade the goods he had acquired in Louisiana. 
The Spaniards, he theorized, might see things differently if he could 
demonstrate to them the advantages--and comforts--that trading with the 
French would bring. However, on reaching San Juan Bautista, he once 
more was arrested by Diego Ramtn, now his grandfather-in-law. He was 
told that it equally was illegal for Spanish citizens to bring foreign 
goods into Spanish colonies, and, for the second time, his goods were 
confiscated, Once more he was taken to Mexico City for questioning. 
There he pleaded ignorance of the law he had offended, and, in comple-
tion of his repeat performance, St. Denis was released from custody. 
His request to be allowed to return to Texas was denied, but he was 
given the money which had been gained from a public auction of his con-
fiscated goods. Twice St. Denis had violated Spanish law, and twice he 
had talked his way to freedom. However, he longed for his countrymen; 
28 
on September 5, 1718, he slipped away from Mexico City and returned tci 
Natchitoches, taking his bride with him. It had been five years since 
his journey to Mexico had begun; during that time he had acquired a 
wife, changed his nationality, and been arrested twice. His actions 
had set off a chain of events which culminated in the formation of a 
Franco-Spanish border along the Red River. And he had triggered a con-
flict over control of the territory along that river which would last 
for more than four decades--for within a year of his return another re-
markable Frenchman began trading along the waters of the Red River. 23 
FOOTNOTES 
1see George P. Hammond and Agapito Rey, eds., Narratives of the 
Coronado Expedition, 1540-1542, 2 vols. (Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, 1940), passim.; Richard Hakluyt, trans., The Discovery 
and Conquest of Terra Florida .£1. Don Ferdinando De Soto and Six Hundred 
Spaniards ~Followers, edited by William B. Rye (New York: Burt 
Franklin, 1963), Reprint of edition of 1611, pp. 131-135. 
2 
Robert c. Clark, "The Beginnings of Texas," Quarterly of the Texas 
State Historical Association, V, No. 3 (January, 1902), pp. 171-175; 
Odie B. Faulk, A Successful Failure (Austin: Steck-Vaughn Company, 
1965)' pp. 39-59. 
3Melville B. Anderson, ed., Joutel 1 s Journal of La Salle's Last 
Voyage (New York: Burt Franklin Publishers, 1968) ,--p."""7ff; for L-a~~ 
Salle's life see Francis Parkman, La Salle and the Discovery of the 
Great West, third part of France and England in North America (Boston: 
Little-;-Brown, and Company, 1927); see also Robert S. Weddle, Wilder-
~ Manhunt: The Spanish Search for La Salle (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1972), passim. 
4 
Joutel's Journal, pp. 15-22. 
5 
Ibid., passim; William E. Dunn, Spanish and French Rivalry in the 
Gulf Region of the United States, 1678-1702 (Austin: University of Texas 
Bulletin No. 1705, January 20, 1917, Studies in History No. 1, pp. 31-
48. 
6 . Ibid., pp. 51-58. 
7 
Ibid., pp. 59-109; Weddle, Wilderness Manhunt, p. 62ff; Clark, 
"Beginnings of Texas," Quarterly of the Te.xas State Historical Associa-
tion, pp. 175-176; Elizabeth H. West, "De Le~n's Expedition of 1689," 
Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association, VIII, No. 3 (Janu-
ary, 1905), pp. 199-224. 
8 . Ibid., pp. 176-180; Dunn, Spanish and French Rivalry, pp. 111-
129; "Carta De Don Damic{n Manzanet a Don Carlos de Siquienza Sabre El 
Descubrimiento de la Bahi~ Del Espiritu Santo," Quarterly of the Texas 
State Historical Association, II, No. 4 (April, 1899), pp. 254-280; 
English translation by Lilia A. Casis, pp. 281-312. 
9 
Ibid.; Dunn, Spanish and French Rivalry, pp. 110-144; Bethel 
Coopwood, "Notes on the History of La Bahi~ Del Espirita Santo," 
Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association, II, No. 2 (October, 




Dunn, Spanish and French Rivalry, pp. 140-144. 
11Ibid., pp. 185-215; Isaac J. Cox, "The Louisiana-Texas Frontier," 
Quarterly of the Texas St?te Historical Association, X, No. 1 (July, · 
1906), pp. 1-75; Charles B. Reed, The First Great Canadian: The Story 
of Pierre Le Moyne, ~D'Iberville (Chicago: A. C. McClurg and Co., 
1910), p. 186ff. 
12 
Clark, "The Beginnings of Texas," Quarterly of the Texas State 
Historical Association, pp. 175-178; Pierre Margry, ed., Decouvertes 
~ Etablissements des Francais dans L'Quest et ~ L 1Amerigue Septen-
trionale, 6 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie De D. Jouaust et Sigaux, 1879-
1888), iv, pp. 430-437. 
13 . 
Robert C. Clark, "Louis Juchereau de Saint-Denis and· the Re-
establishment of the Tejas Missions," Quarterly of the Texas State His-
torical Association, VI, No. 1 (July, 1902), pp. 1026; Ch~rmoin C. 
Shelby, "St. Denis' Declaration Concerning Texas in 1717," Southwestern 
Historical. Quarterly, XXVI, No. 3 (January, 1923), pp. 165-168; Lester 
G. Bugbee, "The Real Saint-Denis," Quarterly of the Texas State Histor-
ical Associq.tion, I, No. 4 (April, 1898), pp. 216-281; E. J. P~ .Schmitt, 
"Who was Juchereau de Saint-Denis!?, 11 ibid., I, No~ 3 (January, 1898), 
pp. 204-215. 
14 
Edmund R. Murphy, Henry de Tonty: Fur Trader of the Mississippi 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1941), p. 64ff. 
15 
Reed, ~ First Canadian, pp. 196-208. 
·16ibid. 
17 
Robert C. Clark, ''Louis Juchereau de S-aint-Denis and the Re-
establishment of the Tejas Missions,"· Quarterly of the Texas State HiS-
torical Association, pp. 6-9;_Margry, Descouvertes, IV, pp. 487-539; 
ibid., V, pp. 420-422; · Ross Phares; Cavalier of the Wilderness (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952>:" P:-23ff; Margry, 
Descouvertes, v, p. 498; Clark, "Saint-Denis," Quarterly of the Texas 
State Historical Association, pp. 10-20. 
18Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
19Ibid., pp. 15-17; Ch.;irmion C,; Shelby, "-St. Denis," D-eclaration 
Concerning Texas in 1717, 11 Quarterly of the Texas State Historical 
Association, pp. 165-171; Milton Dunn, "History of Natchitoches," 
Louisiana Historical Quarterly, III, No. 1 (January, 1920), pp 26-56; 
Phares, Cavalier .2f ~Wilderness, pp. 52-58. 
20c lark, "Saint-Denis," Quarterly of the Texas ·State Historical 
Association, pp. 20-25. 
21 
Ibid., pp. 25-31. 
31 
22 
Charmion c. Shelby, "St. Denis's Declaration," Quarterly of the 
Texas State Historical Association, pp. 168-174; Herbert E. Bolton, "The 
Native Tribes About the East Texas Missions," Quarterly of the Texas 
State Historical Association, XI, No. 4 (April; 1908), pp~ 249-276. 
23charmoin c. Shelby, "St. Denis' s Second Expedition to the Rio 
Grande, 1716-1719, 11 Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XXVII, No. 3 
(January, 1924), pp. 190-216; Margry, Descouvertes, V, pp. 527-532; 
Bugbee, "Saint-Denis," Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Associa-
tion, p. 27 5. 
CHAPTER III 
THE CONFLICT CONTINUES 
Louis Jucherean de St. Denis returned to Natichotches, completing 
his journeys to Mexico, but the talented Frenchman's career was far 
from ended. After visiting the governor in Mobile and reporting the re-
sults of his escapades, St. Denis was appointed commander of the post 
which he had founded on the Red River. He remained there for the rest 
I of his life with his wife Maria, who joined him soon after his escape 
for Mexico. Although the Spanish at Los Adaes attempted to thwart his 
trading excursions into Texas thereafter, he exercised considerable in-
fluence over the local Indians, continued to trade freely with them, 
1 
and extended the area controlled by his country. 
While St. Denis had been in Mexico, the official makeup of Louisi-
ana had undergone radical change. Antoine Crozat, having lost more 
than two million livres while holding the commercial monopoly for 
Louisiana, returned the grant to the crown in August of 1717. The new 
king, Louis XV, who had taken the purple on the death of his. great 
grandfather in 1715 had been placed under the Regency of his cousin, 
Philippe, Duke of Orleans, a brilliant and meteoric nobleman. On the 
return of the charter to Louisiana, Philippe was approached by his close 
friend, John Law, with a scheme for the future of this territory in the 
2 
New World. 
John Law had fled to France from England, where he was wanted for 
32 
33 
killing a man in a duel over an affair of the heart. This exiled 
Englishman was a skilled promoter, a mathematical genius, and an in-
veterate gambler. Already while in France, he had organized a highly 
successful bank, with Philippe's blessings, and had .endeared himself to 
the regent. Law proposed that he be allowed to create a company for 
the administration of Louisiana, a company which he would control. On 
September 6, 1717, the Company of the West was chartered, holding a 
monopoly for trade and colonization in Louisiana. The charter was for 
twenty-five years and included all the privileges which Crozat previous-
ly had enjoyed. In return, Law's company promised to send six thousand 
white settlers and three thousand black slaves to the colony within ten 
years. The Company of the West was capitalized at the fantastic amount 
of one hundred million livres. After arranging for this charter, John 
Law then went to work promoting the sale of stock--at five hundred livres 
each. A master of promotion, Law promised the people of France that 
within a matter of months the riches of Louisiana would swamp the entire 
nation with gold and silver from the mines and streams of the colony. 
France went speculation mad. 3 
As the first shares sold, Law then declared dividends--and the 
price per share was raised. Soon people were forming lines in the 
streets, demanding an opportunity to invest funds in Law's get-rich~ 
quick company. Philippe d 10rleans was highly pleased with his friend's 
accomplishments, arranging for Law's private bank to serve as the 
Royal Bank of France. Through this bank, Philippe made France a partner 
in the Company of the West. 4 
In the New World, the Sieur de Bienville was appointed governor of 
Louisiana, a position he had held before Crozat's monopoly. Also, Law's 
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company decided that a city should be built astride the Mississippi 
near its mouth to make· it forever a French stream. In September of 
1717 orders were approved for the founding of New Orleans, a name chosen 
to honor the helpful regent. To facilitate this colonization plan, 
three hundred concessionaires were named, each granted huge estates in 
Louisiana. In return for the grants the concessionaires would gain 
control of the area and extend French domain. Among the concession-
aires who came in 1718 was Bernard de la Harpe. 5 
La Harpe had served in the French coast guard for more than five 
years before he received his concession in Louisiana. He was known as 
talented, loyal, and brash--in short the type of man who attracted the 
attention of John Law and who complimented that great speculator's plan 
for Louisiana. Therefore, La Harpe had little trouble securing a grant 
from the Company of the West. Because of La Harpe's energetic and am-
bitious personality, his concession was located in the contested ter-
titory~-on the Red River. 6 
La Harpe arrived in New Orleans late in the fall of 1718. Although 
the city was little more than a few log buildings, the colony's govern-
ment already had been located there. The Council of Louisiana, seeing 
an opportunity to spread French influence, detennined to appoint La 
Harpe commandant of the Nassonites, Cadodachos, Nadocos, and Natchi-
toches Indians. All of these were Caddoan groups inhabiting the area 
around La Harpe's grant. His task was to secure the loyalty and trade 
of these tribes. He also was ordered to explore the Red River and its 
tributaries, making contact with any natives in the area and bringing 
them under French influence. A trading post was to be established on 
the Red River, northwest of St. Denis' post. Finally, he was to renew 
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his efforts to open commercial routes with the Spaniards. His instruc~ 
tions in hand, La Harpe departed for the Red River in December of 1718. 
With him went more than fifty traders, soldiers, and laborers, traveling 
in a pair of large boats and a trio of smaller canoes. The trip to 
Natchitoches was unpleasant. High waters made movement upriver tedious 
and back breaking, while cold weather made the travelers uncomfortable 
and ill. However, the party persevered, reaching the mouth of the Red 
early in January of 1719 and Natchitoches later the same month. There 
La Harpe met St. Denis, and the two adventurers discussed the possi-
bilities of opening trade with the Spaniards. 8 
Soon after his arrival La Harpe received disturbing news that the 
/ / 
Spanish governor of Texas, Don Martin de Alarcon, had ordered the es-
tablishment of a post on the Red River in the area of La Harpe's con-
cession. La Harpe responded by notifying Alarc'n of his presence and 
intentions, after which he left for his grant. The Indians under La 
Harpe 1 s command were living along the Great Bend of the Red River; he 
arrived in this area early in the spring of 1718, picking a location in 
present-day Red River County, Texas, because the "• •• spot seemed to me 
very beautiful, having a beautiful coast spread toward the river." The 
site was approximately two leagues above a Nassonite village on the 
river. Title to the location was obtained from a Nassonite chief for 
thirty pistols and a small amount of merchandise. La Harpe immediately 
ordered construction of a log house to serve as a warehouse for the 
9 
goods he had brought and as a center for his future activities. 
Having established a headquarters on the Red, La Harpe began the 
task of gaining the trust ~nd loyalty of the neighboring natives. Be-
cause he had brought great quantities of merchandise as gifts including 
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firearms, which the Spanish refused the natives he easily was able to 
gain the friendship of the Indians. At a massive meeting with the Nas-
sonites, Cadodaquions, Natsos, and Natchitoches, La Harpe gave gifts 
and promised to supply all their needs in the future. Sacred songs were 
sung and vows of allegiance were exchanged during the festival, which 
lasted twenty-four hours. Afterwards La Harpe caused a block house for 
trade goods to be built at the Nassonites' village. 
Following his orders, La Harpe initiated contact with the Spaniards 
in East Texas, hoping to open trade. He wrote Father Margil, a Francis-
can missionary who was in charge of the Spanish missions of East Texas, 
suggesting that the friar cooperate with the French in securing illegal 
trade with the Indians and Spaniards in Texas in return for a liberal 
connnission on sales made through the priest's cooperation. Margil re-
sponded favorably. Thereby French commercial influence was extended 
. 11 into the lands under Spanish occupation. 
In May of 1719 La Harpe received a reply to his correspondence with 
Governor Alarc~n of Texas. The Spaniard noted that he was somewhat 
surprised by the presence of Frenchmen among the Nassonites; surely La 
Harpe must realize that they and their lands belonged to Spai.n, he 
wrote. The Nassonites, Alcarc6n asserted, were under Spanish control 
as an extension from settlements in New Mexico. Oddly, Alarcon did not 
/ note the explorations of Captain Teran de los Rios in the 1690s or the 
missionary activities in East Texas as points which supported Spanish 
claims. La Harpe replied that the governor was mistaken, delineating 
the foundation of French claims to the Nassonites. Because the post was 
located on the Red River, a tributary of the Mississippi, it belonged 
to France, he asserted. Frenchmen had explored and settled the 
> 
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Mississippi, and it and all its tributaries were French domain. Thus 
rather than the French encroaching on Spanish territory, it was the 
Spaniards who were usurpers. The province of Texas was part of Louisi~ 
ana because of Sieur de la Salle's settlement, and because of other 
actions which La Harpe noted but failed to specify. Finally, the 
Frenclunan res.ponded to Alarc~n 1 s warning that La Harpe should vacate 
Spanish territory or face physical expulsion by sugges.ting that the 
Spaniard come and try. Understandably the undermanned Spaniard declined 
12 
to accept La Harpe 1 s off er. 
Having secured the friendship of the local natives, opening trade 
with them and with Spaniards in East Texas, and having established 
French dominion over the Great Bend of the Red River, La Harpe set out 
to explore the territory upriver from his post. Because he wished per~ 
sonally to explore the region north of the Red, he sent the Sieur du 
Rivage with an expedition westward on the Red. He instructed Du Rivage 
to contact the "roving bands" who lived along the river's course. To 
insure ready friendship, Du Rivage carried with him a larger number of 
gifts for the natives he hoped to meet. He was to learn the location 
of the nearest Spanish settlement, the distance to New Mexico, and all 
information concerning neighboring natives. If possible Du Rivage also 
was to make an alliance with these roving nations. These tribes, La 
Harpe perceived, would make excellent allies because of their proximity 
13 
to New Mexico. Early in the summer of 1719 Du Rivage set out. 
With Du Rivage went four soldiers, six French traders, and eight 
Indian warriors. The latter were to serve as interpreters. and guides. 
Traveling along the banks of the Red River, Du Riv?ge encountered 
several groups of "roving nations," including the Quidehais, Naouydiches, 
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Joyuan, Huanchane, Ruane, and Taovaya, tribes that were branches of the 
Wichita. The Frenchmen were greeted cordially by these Wichitan groups, 
who declared their friendship for the Europeans. They were happy to re-
ceive the French because of the continuing hostilities between them-
selves and the Lipan Apache who lived on the river to the west. Du 
Rivage learned that the Wichita recently had returned from a clash with 
the Apaches, whom he called the "Cancys. 11 This recent battle had ended 
in victory for the Wichita, but the Apache were receiving aid from the 
S . d 14 paniar s. 
Du Rivage learned that for seventy leagues west of the Nassonite 
the various bands of Wichita Indians were masters of the land. However, 
the Apache had been expanding continually eastward. At that time the 
Apache had accepted aid from Spaniards because of the invasion of their 
lands by the Comanche. Unwisely the Spaniards had allied themselves 
with the Apache against the Comanche. For this they later would pay 
dearly. Although the Spaniards had refrained from giving the Apache 
firearms, they had given them good horses, swords, and other equipment 
which allowed them the advantage over the Wichita. 15 
Du Rivage learned that sixty leagues west of the Quidehai village, >rJ\~ 
a sub-tribe of Wichita, whe:-:-::::~::::::e various Wichita 
chiefs, the Spaniards had mined some type of precious metal. He also ,.._ _________________ ... ____. 
was told that the Lipan-Apache were heavy populated along the Red River. 
The Wichita had pursued the Apache as far as their villages on the Red, 
but the Spaniards had forced a retreat by using cannon in the affair. 
Having completed his task, Du Rivage returned to La Harpe 1 s. post, taking 
two Quidehai warriors with him to act as guides for La Harpe's journeys 
north of the Red 
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Before La Harpe was ready to depart on his explorations, he re-
ceived the disturbing news that war had begun between Spain and France. 
"Seeing that the war was an obstacle to connnerce that had attempted to 
make with the Spanish [sic] and that I had nothing to fear from them 
f th t t t d th ht l.• t ld b f • t t II l 7 or e presen a my pos , an oug wou e o in eres •••• 
La Harpe decided, to explore the region north of the Red River and set 
out. His travels carried him to the mouth of the Canadian River where 
he was told that Spanish settlements in New Mexico could be reached via 
h A k R. 18 t e r ansas i.ver. 
The war which precipitated La Harpe' s excursion had begun in 
France. A quarrel between the Bourbon monarchs over the island of 
Sardinia had turned to open conflict. Although the conflict ended 
quickly and undecisively in Europe, it changed the course of events in 
the New World. The French at Natchitoches received word of the conflict 
before their Spanish counterparts at Los Adaes. The military connnander 
at the French post, Corporal M. Blondel, led a small party across the 
Red toward Los Adaes, hoping to extend French influence. The Spaniards, 
hearing the news of war and a French advance, beat a hasty retreat from 
their posts in East Texas. Blondel, in one movement, had secured East 
19 
Texas for France. 
Although Blondel's coup appeared to swing the advantage to France, 
there were many in Louisiana who disapproved of his action. Spaniards 
almost certainly would attempt to reassert themselves in East Texas; 
also, French control of the area was not entirely advantageous to the 
Frenchmen of Louisiana. Indeed, when Bernard de la Harpe returned from 
his explorations, he was shocked when told of Blondel's forceful ac-
tions. The removal of the Spaniards from Los Adaes would decrease his 
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prophets! If Spaniards remained in San Antonio, La Harpe's contraband 
trade would cease. The unfortunate Blondel was forced to write an hum-
ble letter to the frightened friars, asking their gracious forgiveness 
for his most inappropriate actions and begging them to reestablish their 
20 missions in East Texas. 
Despite the restoration of peace between Spain and France, along 
with Blondel's act of contrition, Spanish officials in Mexico were de-
termined to prevent a recurrence of the fiasco. They decided that East 
Texas had to be resettled with a sufficient force to preclude any future 
French intrusion. A willing leader for the expedition was found in the 
Marques de Aguayo, a resident of the province of Coahuila. Previously 
this wealthy Marques had sought the opportunity of settling Texas. Of-
ficials in Mexico had not found Aguayo's plan suitable; however, after 
. 21 the affair of 1719, the Marques was granted his request. 
In 1720 Aguayo led five hundred men into East Texas. The missions 
and their presidial partners were to be reoccupied. Any resistance, 
French or Indian, was to be crushed. Such a large force was entirely 
unnecessary. The French sincerely desired a Spanish return to the mis-
sions around Los Adaes--at least for the present. St. Denis met the 
Spaniards at the Neches River, greeting them as old friends. The 
French, St. Denis reported, had withdrawn from East Texas to Natchi-
toches. Also, the Frenchmen had asserted his influence over the na-
tives, smoothing the Spaniards' return to Los Adaes. Nonetheless, the 
Spaniards remained unconvinced of the Frenchman 1 s sincerity. Well 
h . h 22 t ey mig t. 
After greeting the Spaniards, St. Denis journeyed to Mobile to re-
port their arrival to Governor Bienville. The latter had opposed the 
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return of Spaniards, but had been overruled by officials of the Company 
of the West, who were more desirous of commercial profits than control-
ling territory. In accordance with his orders, Aguayo rebuilt the 
missions and presidios of East Texas. By 1721 his task was completed. 
Los Adaes was reestablished, and once again Spaniards and Frenchmen 
faced each other across the Red River. 23 
That year, when Spanish officers visited the French settlement at 
Natchitoches, they were received cordially. They asserted that the re-
occupation of Los Adaes was merely a return to the status quo of 1719, 
not an act of aggression. In turn the French promised to refrain from 
any overt act of war. Bernard de la Harpe, having argued in writing in 
1718 that the boundary of Louisiana extended to the Rio Grande and New 
Mexico, acknowledged the right of Spaniards west of the Red River, bow~ 
. . 1 . 24 ing to commercia pr~gmatism. 
In 1720, while Spaniards and Frenchmen juggled the boundary along 
the Red River, the Company of the West collapsed. Its founder and di-
rector, John Law, fled France, for his bubble had burst. Although the 
Company conti.nued for nine years after its financial crumble, Louisiana 
was divided into nine judicial districts, ranging from New Orleans to 
Illinois, from Arkansas to Mobile. A council was created to oversee the 
affairs of the colony. Thus the efforts of La Harpe and St. Denis to 
reap the benefits of commerce for the Company were ended. However, the 
25 
conflict along the Texas-Louisiana frontier continued. 
Spaniards had accepted the presence of Frenchmen in Louisiana, but 
they had not admitted any French right to the province. Following the 
war of Spanish Succession in 1713, Spain's policy had been to permit a 
French presence as a buffer to the English colonies along the Atlantic 
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seaboard. This policy of winking at French encroachment in Louisiana 
extended only to existing settlements. The policy in Madrid and Paris 
was to ignore each other's New World colonies. However, this was not 
the policy in Mexico City or New Orleans. Certainly it was not the 
26 
policy along the Red River. 
The year following the failure of the Company of the West, Bernard 
de la Harpe traveled again into the region north of the Red River, at-
tempting to open a route to New Mexico. However, the frontier remained 
relatively quiet for several years. Indeed in 1727 Don Pedro de Rivera 
made an inspection of the East Texas. missions and presidios. A briga-
<lier in the Spanish army, Rivera was to inspect the area and make sug-
gestions. Apparently he believed Spaniards were secure on this northern 
frontier, for he decreased sharply the number of soldiers in the re-
gion. In 1735~ however, the frontier ag.ain became unsettled when the 
French moved Natchitoches a small distance westward. This was done to 
escape the flooding of the Red River, which frequently inundated the 
settlement. In carrying out this move, St. Denis believed the French 
to be entirely within their rights. The area, which lay along the 
Arroyo Hondo, a small tributary of the Red, had for many years been con-
sidered French domain because that nation had controlled the several 
ranches which dotted the region. The Spanish reaction was surprisingly 
firm. 
, 
Jose Gonzales, the lieutenant governor of Texas, declared that 
the move was a breach of the unspoken contract which had regulated the 
frontier since the confusion of 1720. Accordingly he voiced his pro-
test to St. Denis, and he informed his superior, Governor Juan Manuel 
Sandoval, of the seeming French aggression. The governor, evidently 
feeling the time had come for a hard policy, ordered his aide to command 
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the French to remove their off ending post. Gonzales was to repeat the 
demand thrice. If the French ignored this admonition, they were to be 
expelled forcibly. 27 
St. Denis was neither terrorized by Gonzales' threats nor impressed 
by the Spanish claim to the area west of the Red River. He knew that 
the limited number of Spanish soldiers in Texas precluded physical ex-
pulsion. The talented Frenchman hq.d answers. both for Spanish threats 
and claims. He informed Governor Sandoval that neither country legiti-
mately could claim the area between Los Adaes and Natchitoches. When 
Governor Sandoval realized that St. Denis would not evacuate to the 
original location of Natchitoches. short of overt hostilities, he re-
ferred the affair to officials in Mexico City. This action effectively 
ended the dispute; questions asked in Texas rarely brought answers from 
Mexico City. Natchitoches remained at its new location. 28 
Although the dispute between St. Denis and Sandoval ended in a 
tactical victory for the Frenchman, the Spaniard had the final word. 
Either out of anger at St. Denis' obstinancy or because of his determi-
nation to stop French commercial encroachment, the governor decreed that 
all trade between Texas and Louisiana should cease. Clanes.dine com ... 
merce continued after Sandoval's proclamation, but overt trading was 
discontinued, creating severe shortages in Natchitoches. Spanish en-
forcement had become so lax that the French had become dependent on Los 
Adaes for supplies! Another result to the affair was of more long-
lasting importance. In recognition of an accomplished fact, the two 
commanders thereafter observed the Arroyo Hondo as the boundary of their 
. 29 colonies. 
While St. Denis and Sandoval had been arguing over the boundary 
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between Louisiana and Texas, another struggle had been taking place, 
one for control of the various Indian tribes who lived along the con-
tested border and the Red River. The natives of the region were the 
key to controlling the country. Neither the French nor Spaniards were 
able or willing to garrison a sufficient number of men along the Red 
River or in the surrounding area to dominate the other; also, neither 
was able to colonize the area along the common border and overwhelm the 
other. Thus each was forced to rely on the ,In,dians as allies, attempt-
ing to create alliances strong enough to compel the opposing nation to 
. h 1 30 give up t e strugg e. 
While the Spaniards were striving to break Caddoan allegiance to 
France, the latter were moving to bolster their position. The same year 
that Margil was sent to East Texas, a group of Caddoan Indians, the 
Yatasi, was moved down the Red and settled among the Natchitoches. This 
move further enhanced the French position and precluded any Spanish ef-
forts among these tribes. The establishment of Nassonite Post among 
the Indians of that name by Bernard de la Harpe was the final act in the 
struggle for the allegiance of the Caddos. This effectively ended any 
Spanish expansion into the area along the Red River from its Great Bend 
31 
to its mouth. This length of the river was French. 
With La Harpe among the upper Caddoan tribes and St. Denis among 
their counterparts downriver, there was no question of Spanish encroach-
ment after 1719. This situation was continued by the presence of St. 
Denis at Natchitoches from his return from Mexico in 1719 until his 
death in 1744. Like a father, St. Denis watched over the Caddo and in- > 
. . 32 sured their allegiance to France. 
West of the Caddo the Wichita Indians remained aloof from the 
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struggle unti 1 the coming of Bernard de la Harpe to the Great Bend of 
the Red River in 1719. The first visitor to the Wichita by a European 
was probably Sieur du Rivage; he came during the explorations which had 
been ordered by La Harpe. Du Rivp.ge established friendly relations with 
the Wichita by a liberal distribution of gifts. He found several of the 
Wichitan tribes living on or near the Red River; also, he found them at 
war with the Lipan Apache. Further French contact with the Wichitan 
tribes was made that same year by La Harpe. He traveled northward into 
present-day Oklahoma, meeting several sub ... tribes of the Wichita at a 
great convocation near the mouth of the C~nadian River. There La Harpe 
presented many gifts to the natives and promised to return often with 
trade goods. Because these Indians needed firearms and because they 
cherished the shiny manufactured goods. which La Harpe showed them, they 
quickly proclaimed their love for France. Sacred songs were sung, and 
the peace pipe was passed. In return for the presents which La Harpe 
brought and in demonstration of their friendship, the natives treated 
La Harpe as a king and made him pres.ents of salt, ultra-marine, and a 
slave, an Apache. Although the Indians were leaving for their annual 
hunt, ending La Harpe's plan to establish a trading post at the site of 
the gathering, the Frenchman did raise the royal ensignia of France 
there to remind the natives of their French friends. 
Two years after his original trip to the Wichita, La Harpe at-
tempted to ascend the Arkansas River to the location of the Wichita 
villages near the site of present-day Muskogee, Oklahoma. Although he 
was prevented from attp.ining his goal by low water and illness among his 
men, he did meet several Wichitan Indians and rekindled his friendship 
with them. Thus the French had laid the basis for a strong friendship 
· h h w· h' 34 wit t e ic ita. 
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However, all the activities of the French among the Wichitas were 
needless. The Spaniards in Texas and New Mexico virtually forced the 
Wichita to become allies of the French, although Spanish contact with 
this tribe was almost nonexistent. The reasons for this were twofold. 
Primarily, the Wichitas were shielded from the Spaniards in Texas by 
their enemies the Lipan Apache, and from the Spaniards in New Mexico by 
the Comanches. Second, Spaniards appeared to ally themselves frequently 
with the Apache. As demonstrated by the events during Du Rivage's and 
La Harpe's explorations, the Apache and Wichita were constant and bitter 
enemies. Thus the Spanish alliance with the Apaches forced the Wichitas 
to turn to the French for aid. 35 
After the early visits to the Wichita by La Harpe and Du Rivage, 
trade between the natives and the French continued unabated until the 
cession of Louisiana to Spain in 1762. The extent of French influence 
over the Wichita was indicated in 1753 by Governor Kerlerec of Louisiana 
who wrote concerning the Wichitas and the Caddos, " .•• they all agree un-
animously in recognizing the French Governor of Louisiana as their 
father, and they never deny his wishes in the least •••• " Also, as 
early as the 1720s the fleur-di-lis was flying over Wichita villages 
along the Red and Arkansas rivers as symbols of the solidarity between 
the French and the Wichita. 36 
This alliance with the Wichita was highly useful to the French. It 
negated any chance of Spanish encroachment, and it provided a reliable 
and profitable source of raw products, such as furs, salt, and ultra-
marine. However, the most important aspect of the alliance was the 
contact which it provided between the French and the Comanche. The 
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Comanche were the most powerful nation along the Red River and were a 
nominal ally of the Wichitas because of their mutual hatred of the Lipan 
Apache. Through the Wichita, the French were introduced to the Comanche 
tribes that lived on the upper Red. The result was a triple alliance, 
the Wichita in the middle holding the other two together. Through this 
alliance the French were able to dominate the entire length of the Red 
River with the exception of a short stretch between the Wichita and the 
Comanche which the Lipan-Apaches controlled. 37 
The friendship of Comanche and the Wichita enhanced the value of 
the Wichita as a source of trade goods. During the years after 1720, 
the French supplied the Wichita with firearms--which the Wichita then 
traded to the Comanche, heightening their already aw,esome military 
prowess. In return for these weapons the Comanche traded articles 
which they had taken from Spaniards in New Mexico and Texas. These in-
cluded horses, mules, and gold. Also the Comanche exchanged Indian 
slaves, mostly Lipan Apaches, to the Wichita. The Wichita then traded 
these horses, mules, and slaves to the French in Louisiana for more 
firearms and other supplies, ending one cycle of the trading circuit and 
beginning another. This commercial alliance was beneficial to all 
three groups involved; however, it was highly detrimental to the Span~ 
iards and the Apache. 38 
In addition to the advantages of commerce, the Wichita and Comanche 
were strong military allies to the French, as demonstrated by events in 
the late 1750s. For many years the Comanche had been pressuring the 
Apache from the north, driving them southward into the settled areas 
of Spanish Texas. The Apache in turn had raided isolated Spanish towns. 
The Spaniards had reacted by attempting to missionize the Apache, and 
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bring them under Spanish influence. These attempts had been futile un-
til 1757 when the Apache asked for a mission to be built for them on the 
San Saba River in present-day West Texas. Hard pressed by the Comanche, 
the Apache hoped to secure some relief by diverting Comanche attention 
to the Europeans. The Spaniards, for their part, believed this mission 
would prevent a French expansion toward New Mexico, stop Apache raids 
on Spanish settlements, and create a buffer area between themselves and 
the Comanche. "' In the spring of 1757 Mission San Saba de Santa Cruz was 
constructed on the San Saba River (near the present Menard, Texas). 
Father Alsonso Giraldo de Terreros was placed in charge. An accompany-
ing presidia, under the command of Colonel Diego Ortfz de Parrilla, was 
built about two miles upriver from the mission. However, the Apache 
did not settle at the mission; in June three thousand of them passed by 
the establishment, saying they had to hunt the buffalo but promising to 
return afterward. The Apache realized that the Spaniards had announced 
their friendship to them by constructing the mission; in doing this they 
thereby incurred the enmity of the Comanche and their allies. The 
Apache were waiting to see what the Comanche reaction to the mission 
would be. The answer came in March of 1758. 39 
, 
During the winter of 1757-1758 the padres at Mission San Sabe 
heard rumors that the Comanche planned to destroy the settlement. On 
March 2, the presidial herd was stolen, and Colonel Parrilla attempted 
to persuade the fathers to flee to the presidia for safety. However, 
the padres refused. Two weeks later, on the morning of March 16, two 
thousand Comanche warriors arrived at the mission, demanding a letter 
from Father Terreros that would give them admittance to the presidio. 
The father understandably complied, and the Indians rode off in the 
49 
direction of the presidio. 40 
Reaching the fort at mid-morning, the Indians presented the letter 
to Colonel Parrilla--who, not surprisingly, refused to admit the na ... 
tives. Thwarted in this plan, the natives returned to the mission to 
avenge their setback. With the exception of nine Spaniards who barri-
caded themselves inside a room at the mission, the entire company at 
the mission was. murdered. The Comanche then left, taking what they 
could carry as loot. and setting fire to the religious establishment. 
That night Parrilla sent a scouting party which found four of the men 
who had hidden inside the mission still alive. Parrilla immediately 
reported the mas.s~cre to the viceroy in Mexico City. 
The viceroy called a council of war after he received Parrilla's 
report, and in the latter part of June, 1758, the council determined 
that the Comanche could not go unpunished for their transgression. 
, 
Mission San Saba was to be re-established, and a force under command of 
Colonel Parrilla was to march northward to chastise the offending na-
tives. However, the reasons behind this expedition went deeper than 
merely punishing the Comanche; Spanish honor had been offended, true, 
but failure to punish the Comanches would embolden other natives to 
rise up in rebellion. No Spaniard would be safe on the northern fron ... 
tier. Therefore, Colonel Parrilla was ordered to raise a fo~ce suf-
ficient to defeat the Comanche in armed conflict. 41 
By August of 1769 Parrilla was at San Antonio with a force of more 
than five hundred men, having recruited where possible. Among the men 
he had gathered were a few trained soldiers. However, most were mer-
chants, tradesmen, and laborers, hardly a force capable of overwhelming 
the war-wise Comanche. Parrilla hoped that numbers would bring him 
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victory. In addition he had more than one hundred Apache volunteers 
accompanying him; they hoped to gain vengeance on their hated enemy. 
Leaving San Antonio in August, the party marched northward in 
search of the enemy. For more than three hundred miles Parrilla pushed 
northward with no sight of the Comanche until he reached the Red River 
(near the location of present-day Ri.nggold, Texas). There at a Wichita 
village, Parrilla found the enemy-~in a palisaded fort with a moat 
. 42 around its perimeter and the French flag flying above! 
At this time Spain and France were allies in Europe, fighting 
against England. However, along the Red River they were enemies. With 
the aid of French advisers, the Comanche and their ?llies, the Wichita, 
had constructed a European-style fort. Although surprised and dismayed 
by this turn of events, Parrilla ordered his force to attack. The can-
non which had been brought by the expedition were called into play. 
However, the natives had constructed their fortress well. The cannon 
had little effect. Parrilla later reported that the Indians greeted 
each blast with shouts of laughter. Dutifully Parrilla ordered a charge, 
hoping to overwhelm the natives inside. The Comanche, armed with modern 
weapons, easily rebuffed the assault. Parrilla then encamped for the 
night, hoping some miracle would bring him victory. That evening the 
colonel learned that the enemy was attempting to encircle his position, 
cutting off his route of retreat. Also, the garrison inside the fort 
was. growing in number as more Indians arrived. Some Spaniards already 
were deserting, as had the entire force of Apache volunteers. His only 
recourse was to retreat to San Antonio, leaving the cannon behind. The 
march southward was marked by repeated Comanche attacks on stragglers 
and the main body. The expedition to avenge Spanish honor had ended 
with another blemish on Colonel Parrilla's record. 43 
/ 
The defeats at San Saba and Spanish Fort, as the Wichita village 
on the Red became known, were never avenged. Four years later news 
reached the area that the whole of French Louisiana had been ceded to 
51 
Spain during the settlement of the Seven Years War. That conflict had 
ended in tragedy for the Spaniards and French. France had lost most of 
its possessions in North America, while Spain had lost Florida to the 
English. In payment for the loss of Florida and to preclude a British 
seizure, France gave the Louisiana territory to Spain. The Red River no 
longer was a boundary; the Mississippi now separated Spanish and foreign 
. 44 
territory. 
During the years of French ownership of Louisiana, the Red River 
had played an important role in their domination of the region. Not 
only had it served as an international boundary, but also it had given 
the French the upper~hand in their struggle to open trade with Spaniards. 
Because it stretched from the Mississippi, in the heart of Louisiana, to 
the country of the Caddo, Wichita, and Comanche, the Red acted to tie 
these natives to the French. The river was a natural highway for com-
merce between them and French Louisiana. The Spaniards in Texas were 
connected with the Indians on the plains by endless miles of hostile 
country, discouraging all but the most determined travelers. Commerce 
between the natives and Spaniards had proven expensive and sporatic. 
Thus the Red River had helped the French to win the loyalty of the 
Indians of the region. Yet France had lost Louisiana on the battle-
fields of Europe and the Atlantic seaboard, not along the Red River. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SPAIN AND THE RED RIVER 
The province of Louisiana, French for more than six decades, sud-
denly had become Spanish in 1763. From Mobile to Natchitoches, from 
New Orleans to Chicksaw Bluffs, loyal citizens of France were changed 
into subjects of Spain by the signing of a treaty in Europe. Thousands 
of Indians scattered across the extensive territory were suddenly made 
allies of Spain. Many of these natives for years had been taught by the 
French that Spaniards were the enemy--an enemy to be used, cheated, and 
sometimes fought. The new owners of Louisiana inherited the task of 
pacifying both Frenchman and Indian. 
Most Frenchmen in Louisiana cared little what nation called itself 
master of the province. They were more interested in their connnercial 
ventures than in national loyalties; yet the citizens of New Orleans in 
1768 forced the first Spanish Governor, Antonio de Ullola, to flee the 
city because of armed insurrection for reasons that had little to do 
with mere national loyalty. Although the Spaniards re-conquered New 
Orleans with an army under Alexandro O'Reilly in 1769, they found taming 
the Indians of Louisiana, especially the tribes along the Red River, a 
far more difficult problem. 
Fortunately for the Spaniards, many of the Frenchmen in Louisiana 
not only were apathetic about the ownership of the land they inhabited, 
but also were willing to aid their former enemies. Because the French 
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frontiersmen had dealt with the Indians for many years, their aid was 
considerable. And because the Indians along the Red River were located 
between the valuable connnercial outpost of Natchitoches. and the Spanish 
city of Santa Fe, relations with these natives were crucial. These 
tribes--the Caddo, Wichita, and Comanche--were traditional enemies of 
Spaniards. Luckily the Spaniards found a man both capable and willing 
to pacify the natives--Athanase de M~zi~res. 1 
When Louisiana was ceded to Spain, Christophe Athanase Fortunat de 
M{zieres was a captain at Natchitoches Post. The son of a well-to-do 
couple, Louis Christopher de M~zi~res and Marie Antoinette Clugny, he 
had come to Louisiana in 1733 and had established himself as a talented 
soldier and Indian agent, as well as becoming successful in various com-
mercial ventures. About 1740 he had moved to Natchitoches where he 
would spend the rest of his life. During the years between 1740 and 
1763 De M~z i~res had risen steadily through the ranks. Under Governors 
Bienville, Vaudreuil, and Kerlerec, he had maintained the favor of the 
government. Also, he had won the respect and friendship of Louis 
Juchereau de St. Denis. In 1746, two years after the legendary figure's 
death, De Mlzi~res had married Marie Petronille Feliciana Juchereau de 
St. Denis, the daughter of Louis and Mar~a St. Denis, the couple that 
had fled San Juan Bautista almost three decades previously. Unhappily, 
Marie had died in 1748. 2 
By 1763 De M~zi~res had shown himself a valuable asset to the gar-
rison at Natchitoches. However, the advent of Spanish ownership pre-
cipitated his premature retirement; he was discharged on September 15, 
1763. Little is known of De M'zi~res' activities after his retirement 





and planting his crops. He must have been restless, however, for in 
1769 he was agreeable to an offer of service in the Spanish army. A 
replacement was needed for Baltazar de Villieis, another Frenchman who 
had been retained as commander of Natchitoches by the Spaniards. To 
fill this gap Governor Alejandro O'Reilly chose Athanse de M~zi~res. 
The Frenchman was appointed lieutenant-governor of Natchitoches, be-
coming once more an official of the state. It matter little that the 
French lilies had been replaced by the Spanish castle and lion; Anthanse 
de M'zi~res would utilize his considerable skills and experience to in-
sure a smooth administration in Louisiana and amicable relations with 
the natives along the Red River. 3 
The Spaniards realized that the Indian policies which they had em-
ployed west of the Red River were not applicable in Louisiana. They 
also realized that maintaining the French policy of trading and allying 
with the natives of Louisiana was advisable. However, certain changes 
were necessary--even mandatory--for the welfare of Spanish Texas and New 
Mexico. Most important was an end to the trade in mules, horses, and 
slaves along the Red River. This trade had aided the French by supplying 
a demand for these articles in Louisiana and by creating ties between 
them and the natives. Only Spaniards, from whom the Indians stole these 
articles, had been injured by the trade. However, stopping this trade 
and keeping the natives content seemed impossible. When De M'zi~res 
was enlisted in the service of Spain, the task fell to him. 
4 
Alejandro O'Reilly, himself an alien in the service of Spain, 
evidently believed De M~zi~res was equal to the job. On September 23, 
1769, he wrote, "I know that you are better able than anyone else to 
give me correct information regarding everything relating to your 
.~.8 
d . . 115 1str1ct •••• Innnediately after accepting O'Reilly's appointment at 
Natchitoches, De Mlzi~res began making plans for a meeting with the na-
tives on the Red River. He hoped the proposed conference would provide 
him a chance to settle all matters of dispute. However, Governor Luis 
de Unzaga y Amezaga, who replaced O'Reilly in 1770, was tardy in grant-
ing permission for the gathering. After almost four months of admoni-
,. \ 
tions from De Mezieres, Unzaga y Amezaga agreed on September 20, 1770, 
but warned the Frenchman that he should "· •• make sure that the peace 
which they [the Indians] ask is single-minded, pure, and free from any 
6 I \ 
criminal machinations." A week later De Mezieres replied that several 
chiefs of the Caddoan tribes had visited him and that he was traveling 
to the Caddocho village on the Red River to attend a meeting with these 
tribes. 7 
After the cession of Louisiana to Spain, the Caddoan and Wichita 
tribes had adopted a policy of raiding Spanish outposts. Spaniards had 
stopped the French traders whom the Caddos had come to rely on for 
European goods. Although attempts. had been made to placate them by al-
lowing the traders to resume their business., the Caddo had remained 
troublesome. De M'zi~res, during their visit, vowed to them that he 
would listen to their grievances and establish an equitable peace. 8 
Early in the fall of 1770, De M~zi~res left for the Caddocho vil-
lage located on the Red River one hundred leagues above Natchitoches. 
He was guided by the leaders of the Caddocho. With him went several 
individuals from the Spanish posts at Los Adaes and Natchitoches, a 
delegation which he had chosen purposefully. From Natchitoches six 
soldiers were selected, and from Los Adaes came five soldiers. The mix-
ture w?s made in order to demonstrate the solidarity of the two 
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provinces of Texas and Louisiana. Additionally, the Franciscan super-
ii' ~ 
intendent of the Los Adaes missions, Fray Miguel Santa Maria y Silva, 
accompanied the expedition. The padre was selected for the mission be-
cause, as De Mtzi~res later reported to Unzaga y Amezaga, "• •• it offered 
the opportunity to impress upon the barbarian Indians with whom I pro-
posed to treat--who had sacrilegiously killed ••• when the mission of San 
Sab: was. sacked by them [1758], two ministers of the same habit 
[Franciscan], ••• by showing my respect for that worthy religion, the 
respect with which they ought to regard all of his seraphic order ••• in 
h f 119 t e uture •••• De M~zi~res, a naturalized Spaniard, realized that he 
needed to demonstrate his loyalty to Spain not only to the natives, but 
also to his Spanish superiors who at times voiced their mistrust of the 
10 
former Frenchman. 
The party traveled up the Red River through the country of the 
Adaes, Yatassi, and Peticado (or Lower Caddo). These natives, situated 
in the midst of an area that had been under the control of Spain and 
France for almost a century, had remained friendly after the cession of 
Louisiana. They demonstrated their friendship to the party by raising 
the Spanish flag and by offering supplies. After visiting with these 
tribes, the party traveled to the Caddochoan village, having been 
. . d b . f h 'b 11 J01ne y representatives o t e tr1 es. 
The party was greeted at the Caddocho village by their chief, Tin-
hioven, an old friend of the European who had willingly utilized his 
good offices to arrange the meeting. De M~zi~res was informed that the 
convocation would be held the day after their arrival. Waiting at the 
village were the chiefs of several of the Wichitan tribes. He was dis-
appointed to learn that only part of the Wichita had arrived because 
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many had turned back during their journey to the village, fearing the 
meeting had been called as a trap. The chiefs. who had come noted that 
they too feared such a design, but they asserted that their valor had 
h . f 12 overcome t eir ears. 
At the established hour the chiefs of the offending Wichitan and 
Caddo tribes me.t with the Spaniards. De Mezi~res spoke for the Euro~· 
peans. He stated that the French had urged the natives· to injure the 
Spaniards previously, noting that these abuses were "worthy of eternal 
silence since with remembrance of it alone one,'s eyes were filled with 
tears •••• 1113 But those times had passed. France had left Louisiana, 
, \ 
and the Frenchmen, including De Mezieres, had become naturalized Span-
iards. He warned the Indians that the Spanish king was the mightiest 
monarch on earth, and that the natives were in danger of incurring his 
terrible wrath if they continued their warlike policy. However, the 
king was as magnanimous as he was powerful; if the natives would repent 
their sins~ the king would grant them peace and friendship. 
~ \ 
De Mezieres-
also noted that the Wichita were surrounded by possible enemies and 
urged them to consider their fate. Finally he reminded the natives that 
the French were gone forever and that their only hope was honest and 
forthright friendship with Spain. His benediction was to embrace each 
of the Spaniards present, demonstrating "the close and sacred pact which 
binds us •. 1114 
After De ~zi~res' speech, Tinhioven, the Caddocho chief, and 
Cocay, the chief of the Yatassi, another Caddoan tribe which had re-
mained friendly after the Spaniards had taken Louisiana, urged the 
_Wichita to accept Spaniards as friends. Then a spokesman for the Wich-
ita rose to speak. He stated that the trouble between the Wichita and 
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the Spaniards had resulted from the latter's aid to the Apache. Before 
this the Wichita· had refrained from injuring Spaniards. However, the 
spokesman asserted the hatred had died. The Wichita were ready for 
peace. Finally he noted that their coming to the meeting with the 
Spaniards had seriously irritated their old allies, the Comanche. The 
latter accordingly had begun hostilities on the Wichita, sorely press~ 
. h . . 15 ing t eir existence. 
After listening to the Wichita, De M~zi~res rose again. He ex-
pressed his pleasure at the statement of the natives, but demanded they 
travel to San Antonio, the site of many of their depredations, and seek 
peace with the commander there. The Wichita demurred at this demand, 
asserting that this would involve traveling through the country of the 
Apache, and that they had much work to accomplish before leaving on such 
a long journey. De M'zi~res replied that they at least should accompany 
him to Los Adaes where they could ask the Spanish commander for forgive-
ness and swear their allegiance to Spain. Again the Wichita refused. 
" ' To De Mezieres it became evident that the natives feared appearing at 
San Antonio or Los Adaes because of possible punishment. Finally, he 
decided to keep the gifts he had brought until the Wichita decided to 
comply with his demands. The Wichita promised to gather again in the 
spring to consider his offer; meanwhile they would remain peaceful and 
pursue the hunt. The meeting was then adjourned. 
16 
~ ' Athanse de Mezieres reported the events of this meeting to Governor 
Unzaga y Amezaga, emphasizing that he believed the natives sincere in 
their statements. I ·' As proof of their sincerity, De Mezieres noted that 
the Taovayan were willing 11 to return the two brass cannons which they 
17 
had taken from Parrilla in 1759. 11 
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Regardless of De M~zi~res' confidence in the natives, many Spanish 
officials remained skeptical, including those who had accompanied the 
Frenchman to the Caddocho village. The general attitude in Texas, and 
to a lesser extent in Louisiana, was that De M~zi~res had made promises 
which would not be kept and that the natives had misrepresented their 
intentions. 
I '\. 
Few officials believed De Mezieres I efforts would achieve 
a workable settlement. Nonetheless, the Frenchman maintained his opti-
18 
mism. 
A year after his first meeting with the Wichita, De Mtzi~res was 
rewarded for his work by the signing of a treaty of peace with the 
Wichita. Coming to a meeting at Natchitoches, the Wichita promised to 
refrain from further hostilities against. Spain, to notify the commander 
of San Antonio if they should approach that city, to punish criminals 
who broke the treaty, to return the cannon which had been taken from 
Parrilla, to return all Spanish captives, and to attempt to prevent fu-
ture hostilities by their allies, the Comanche. Peace at last had been 
established along the Red River. The Wichita fulfilled the promises of 
the treaty, except the provision which called for controlling the 
C h h . d h 1 h s . d 19 omanc e, w o remaine osti e to t e paniar s. 
,, '\ 
Athanse de Mezieres' task thus was far from complete. English en-
croachment into the Red River Valley to trade with the Wichita and con-. 
tinued obstinance by the Comanche required much ~dditional effort; how-
ever, he had accomplished the first phase of his plan to bring the 
natives of the Red River under the domination of Spain. To further his 
program, De M~zi~res' traveled to the headwaters of the Brazos and 
Trinity rivers in 1772, trying to persuade the natives there to accept 
Spanish rule peacably. During the expedition of 1772 De M~zi~res 
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learned that the Wichita on the Red River had been trading with English-
men from the Arkansas River region. As a result he attempted to con-
vince them to move southward, away from Englishmen. Although he was 
unsuccess.ful in that the Wichita continued to trade with the English, 
the commerce was infrequent and spa+s.e. Also, during this expedition 
De M~zi~res was able to settle some of the wandering tribes of Texas, 
such as, the Xaraname, who had left Mission Espfritu Santo de Z~iga, 
. h d 0 b 20 wit se entary tr1 es. 
" ·' Soon after returning from Texas, De Mez1eres was granted permis-
sion to visit Europe to settle several personal matters. During his 
visit he was promoted by the King of Spain to lieutenant colonel and 
made a knight of the Order of St. Louis in recognition of his accom-
plishments along the Red River. 21 
While De M'zi~res was in Europe, Indian problems erupted again in 
Texas. The Wichita along the Red River, principally the Taovaya, had 
maintained their trade in horses with the English, acting as middlemen 
for the Comanche. This tribe s.ecured hors.es by raising Sp1;1nish settle-
ments., repeating the events of years earlier. Also, the Osage who 
lived along the Arkansas River had begun to intrude along the Red River, 
agitating the natives and Europeans in the area. Possibly because De 
, ·' Mez1eres was not available, J. Gaignard was. appointed by Governor Unzaga 
y Amezaga to lead an expedition up the Red River to pacify the natives. 
Gaignard began his ascent of the Red River on October 1, 1773, at 
Natchitoches, accompanied by a small party of Spaniards and Frenchmen. 
The group moved up the Red River, passing through the lands of the 
Peticado to the Caddocho, where they stayed eighty-four days. 
Caddocho told Gaignard of silver mines. further up the river. 22 
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On January 16, 1774, Gaignard left the Caddocho village, traveling 
with several Wichita guides. Soon after leaving, the Wichita demanded 
that Gaignard give them booty. On February 5 the natives demanded 
blankets. Gaignard also had serious doubts about the intentions of his 
companion Manuel Sausier. Quickly these doubts were confirmed. On the 
tenth Gaignard was approached by the chief of the Wichita village at 
which he had camped; the chief informed him that. Sausier had ordered 
him'to seize half of the goods which the Spaniard had brought as gifts. 
The chief and his council refused to carry out this order and the con-
niving Sausier was dismissed. However, Gaignard soon afterward was at-
tacked by the Wichita and all of his goods were taken. Gaignard re-
ported, "They stole even my blanket; two· days afterward snow fell and I 
23 
nearly froze." 
Despite the loss of his goods, Gaignard pushed onward, arriving at 
a Wichita village one hundred leagues above the Caddo. Gaignard found 
the Wichita, whom he called the Panis, separated into four principal 
groups along the Red River. He listed them as the Taovaya, Wichita or 
Quatchita, Niscaniche, and Toyacane. At the time of his visit, Gaignard 
reported one thousand warriors. He asserted that the men did little 
but hunt and fight, while the women were engaged in agriculture. To his 
disgust he noted that "when they take a slave capable of returning, 
they boi 1 him and eat him, 11 and that "they are very cruel, and are 
liars and thieves, the women as well as the men, 1124 Also, he found two 
25 
cannon which had been taken from Colonel Parrilla. 
On the twenty-second of February a great assembly was held. A 
chief of the Wichita spoke, declaring that he would love the Spaniards 
as he had the French and that he desired peace, but that he desired 
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some small gift ~s a token of Spanish esteem. Gaignard complied with 
the native's request by giving him ei~ht pounds of powder, sixteen 
pounds of shot, twenty-four hunters' knives, and tobacco. He then pro-
ceeded to make a speech similar to that given by De M:zi~res in 1770, 
emphasizing that the French were gone forever and that the Spaniards 
were now allies. The Wichitas replied. that they were entirely recep-
tive to Spanish rule. 26 
Despite the Wichitas 1 protestations of loyalty to Spain, Gaignard 
learned two days after the meeting that the Indians were making plans 
for two groups to attack the Spaniards in Texas. Gaignard immediately 
demanded that the chief explain the reasons for the sudden change in 
attitude. He was told that many of the young men wished to make war 
I ' because De Mezieres' promises of gifts had not been fulfilled. Gaignard 
said he would rectify the situation and asked that the chief stop the 
proposed raids. Gaignard then sent a messenger to Natchitoches to re-
port what had happened. Despite this accomplishment, Gaignard's 
27 
troubles were only beginning. 
Gaignard 1 s mission was to treat with both the Wichita and the 
Comanche. Although he was able to notify the leaders of one branch of 
the latter tribe, the Naytana, of his wishes. to meet with them, subse-
quent events prevented this meeting. On March 4, 1774, one month after 
Gaignard notified the Comanche of his desired meeting, a band of the 
Naytane arrived at the Wichita village, returning from a battle with 
the Apache. They reported that Spaniards h.ad given firearms to the 
Pacloucah, another branch of the Comanche with whom the Naytane were at 
that time unfriendly. This news created a great stir among the Wichita, 
and they renewed their demand for gifts. Gaignard was understandably 
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discouraged by this turn of events. However, his hopes were revived a 
week later by the appearance of a chief of the Naytane who reported that 
the great chief of the Naytane was pleased with Gaignard 1 s presence, 
that the Naytane desired peace, and that the great chief desired a 
meeting. Gaignard was hopeful that his mission finally would prove 
28 
successful. 
Soon after the Naytane had left, a group of French traders ar-
rived at the village from the Arkansas River. The Wichita stated that 
they liked the French from the Arkansas better than those from Natchi-
toches because the former wanted horses, mules, and slaves, articles 
which were prohibited at Natchitoches. 29 
Gaignard remained at the Wichita village until October of 1774. 
Despite repeated requests by the Naytane for Gaignard to visit their 
camp, he was unable to comply because of protests made by the Wichita. 
This group continually refused to allow the Spaniard to leave their 
village. Finally he decided to return to Natchitoches, his mission un-
completed. The journey home was as unpleasant as had been his stay with 
the Wichita. Nonetheless, Gaignard finally reached Natchitoches on 
30 
November 24, 1774, a year after he had left. 
In his report Gaignard noted that further expeditions to the 
Wichita and Comanche were mandatory. He emphasized that the trade from 
Arkansas. should be stopped and that only the most persuasive agents 
should be sent to deal with the natives on the Red. The frontier still 
was restless--and in need of another expedition by Anthanse de 
, \. 31 
Mezieres. 
, " It was evident from Gaignard's report that De Mezieres again was 
needed along the Red River. However, the problems in Louisiana and 
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Texas were legion. Also, De M6zi~res was charged with fulfilling the 
responsibilities of his post at Natchitoches. Thus two years passed 
before the Frenchman again was ready to journey to the Red River. 
Meanwhile De M~zi~res made certain that:; the Wichita were given presents 
d "f d 32 an paci ie • 
By M~rch of 1778 De M~zi~res was ready to focus his attention on 
the problems of the Red River frontier. With the blessing of comman-
dant'"'general of the Interior Provinces Teodoro de Croix, another French-
man who had entered the service of Spain, De M~zi~res organized another 
expedition to visit the natives of the Red River. However, this mis-
sion was not to the Wichita, but rather to the natives who inhabited 
the headwaters of the Red River-'"'the Comanche. The Wichita had re-
frained from creating further disturbances in Texas. De M~zi~res' 
policy of liberal gift distribution seemingly had worked with that 
tribe. But the Comanche had remained a pro.blem, stealing and raiding 
along a network of Sp~nish settlements in northern Texas and New Mexico. 
It was clear that neither missionization, which had been attempted un-
til 1772, nor military conquest, which had been initiated after 1772, 
could end the problem with the Comanche. Therefore, Athanse de M~zi~res 




The expedition was organized at San Antonio de Bexar, present-day 
San Antonio, Texas. Accompanying De M~zi~res were a lieutenant and 
1 twenty-two soldiers from the garrison at Bexar, six militi<31Ilen whom he 
had brought from Natchitoches, and the Frenchmen's two sons. The party 
officially departed from San Antonio on March 18, 1778, following the 
, 
royal road to Presidio Santa Cruz at Arroyo del Cibolo. From that 
'6.8' 
place the group traveled northward, meeting the royal road at its ford 
on the Guadalupe River. After leaving the Guadalupe the group then 
cross.ed the Colorado and Brazos rivers before reaching Presidio Nuestra 
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Se~ora del Pilar de Bucareli near the Trinity. 
At Bucareli the party rested while De M~zi~res collected informa-. 
tion about the surrounding area for his report to the commandant-
general. On March 23, 1778, the expedition departed, having added 
thirteen militiamen, a captain, and the Reverend Francisco Jos: de la 
G . b 35 arza to its num er. 
From Bucareli De M:zi~res led his group to the headwaters of the 
Brazos where he met with the Tawakoni Indians, a Coahuiltecan tribe 
which traditionally had befriended Spaniards; he also spoke to a band 
of the Xarame tribe, which had settled near the Tawakoni. However, the 
Xarame were unwilling to negotiate with the Europeans, having deserted 
their missions in South Texas. The Tawakoni were happy to see Spaniards 
because the Comanche had continually raided their villages and carried 
away stock. They complained to De Mfzi~res and demanded that Spaniards 
stop the raids. After speaking with the Tawakoni, De M~zi~res led his 
party upriver to another settlement of the same tribe. The inhabitants 
of this place repeated the complaints of the first--the Comanche were 
warring along the northern frontier. At the second Tawakoni village a 
portion of the party, including Fray de la Garza, returned to San 
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Antonio because of poor health. 
From the villages of the Tawakoni the group moved northward, 
reaching the Wichita villages near the Red River early in the spring. 
, \ 
During the journey De Mezieres reported his first sighting of the Cross 
Timbers, which the natives called the '.'Grand Forest." He noted that 
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the long stretch of trees served as guide for the natives of the region 
and that at times the dense growth provided refuge from the elements or 
. 37 
enemies. 
On the Red River the Frenchman found the Wichita living in two 
villages, one on either side of the stream. He estimated that the total 
number of natives at the villages was more than eight hundred. He 
noted the advantages of the location: the river supplied potable water, 
buffalo were numerous, and the Cross Timbers provided firewood. De-
spite these obvious advantages, De M~zi~res commented that the Wichita 
suffered from their neighbors: the Apache to the south and the Osages 
to the north constantly warred on the Wichita, and, "the Comanche, who 
in the guise of friends, make them repeated visits, always with the 
purpose of stealing. 1138 He added that the Wichita pretended not to 
perceive the thefts of the Comanche "lest they should make other 
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enemies, when they already have too many~" 
While with the Wichita, De M~zi~res noted the advantages which the 
Red River offered to Spaniards. He wrote, "Since it joins the San 
Luis, or Micissipi [sic], sixty leagues above the city of New Orleans, 
and five hundred below its source, taking into consideration its sinuo-
sity, we owe to it easy access to and communication with the settlements 
40 
of Natchitoches and the neighboring Indian nations." He urged in his 
report to Croix that a settlement should be made among the Wichita on 
the Red, noting that this would aid in controlling the Comanche and that 
the location on the Red River would provide easy communication with the 
41 centers of government. 
The Wichita, who had treated Gaignard badly five years before, 
greeted De M~zi~res with joy. They asked that Spaniards be sent to 
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settle within their lands and noted that they had refused admittance to 
two English traders from the Arkansas River region. De M{zi~res was 
pleased with the attitude of the Wichita because it reflected the s.uc-
cess of his policies. Also, he received the two brass cannon which had 
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been taken from Parrilla nearly twenty years before. 
On April 8, 1778, De M~zi~res received a disturbing report. Most 
of the warriors from a nearby Comanche village had recently traveled 
southward to attack Spaniards, and had r~turned with many horses and 
the scalp of the lieutenant paymaster of the presidia of San Antonio, 
whom they had found traveling across the region. He also was informed 
that the Comanche had determined to cease their raids on San Antonio 
and the surrounding area because the risks were too great and because 
the region around Laredo provided· an easier target. On hearing this 
report De M~zi~res was greatly discouraged and considered abandoning his 
mission. He wrote to Croix, asking, "Why should I go? To offer my 
hand to hands that I might see stained in our blood? To be witness of 
the spoliation of my nation? To fondle and protect barbarians whose 
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crude understanding would ascribe our conduct to fear?" However, 
after counciling with the chiefs of the Wichita, De M'zi~res decided 
. 44 
to continue. 
He dispatched a Comanche warrior, whom he had found wandering in 
the region, with a message from the Comanche chiefs, notifying them of 
his presence and demanding that their recent actions be explained. 
Also, De Mezi~res included a warning that if the natives continued 
their warlike manners, Spaniards would be forced to inflict punishment 
on their people. The Frenchman then waited, his spirits downcast and 
his expectations for success destroyed, at the village of the Wichita. 
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Meµnwhile he wrote to Croix, suggesting that Spaniards urge the various 
nations along the river to make war on the Comanche should the latter 
f . 45 re use to negotiate. 
De M~zi~res waited at the village of the Wichita during April. He 
then transferred his force southward to Bucareli, having received no 
replies to his message to the Comanche. However, his mission was not a 
failure. The Tawakoni had been placated, at least for the moment, and 
the Wichita had demonstrated their friendship for Spaniards. Only the 
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Comanche remained unsettled--as they would for many years to come. 
On May 2, 1778, De M~zi~res informed Croix that his mission was 
completed, and that he would return to his post at Natchitoches• How-
ever, Croix and other officials in Mexico believed that De M~zi~res 
could better serve his country in Texas; late in 1778 the Frenchman was 
ordered to return to Texas where he would be promoted to Colonel and 
1 d h d . . h f . 47 ea anot er expe ition to t e rontier. 
The reasons for De M~zi~res third mission to the natives on the 
northern frontier varied; however, his principal objective was further 
pacification of the Comanche. Early in 1779 the aging Frenchman set 
out for Texas. He passed through East Texas to Bucareli, which recently 
had been abandoned, and from there went to the Brazos where he treated 
with the Tawakoni once more. After mee~ing with these natives, De 
M6zi~res journeyed to San Antonio, where, to his surpsied, he learned 
he had been appointed governor of Texas in recognition of his skills 
and past services. However, De M~zi~res never assumed his new po-
sition. He had returned from his last expedition in ill-health, suffer-
ing from the effects of a serious fall from his horse during the 
journey. On November 2, 1779, he died after serving Spain for twenty 
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years. Although he had not solved all the problems which the natives 
of the region had created, he at least had offered some succor to a 
dying empire--an empire that had replaced that of his own nation and an 
empire that would soon vanish in North America. The day after his 
death he was buried at San Antonio de Blxar in the cemetary of the 
parochial church. His burden was shouldered by others. 48 
Despite the continued efforts by commandant-general Croix and 
Domingo Cabello y Robles, who had been appointed governor of Texas af-
ter De M:zi~res' death, the Comanche remained a nuisance--and at times 
a major problem--for Spaniards in Texas and New Mexico. This tribe had 
been the great trouble in De Mlzi~res 1 life, and they continued to haunt 
other officials who tried to deal with them. However, their enemies, 
the Apache, proved to be a more pressing problem, and in 1780 Spaniards 
in Texas focused their attention on settling their long debt with the 
Lipan Apache. 
Commandant-general Croix determined that although the Comanche had 
repeatedly broken vows of friendship and continually raided Spanish 
settlements, they could be used to the benefit of the Europeans. A 
policy of extermination was initiated against the Apache. As a result 
of the Royal Regulation of 1772, which had been promulgated in an at-
tempt to solve the Indian problems in New Spain by creating the Interior· 
Provinces from Texas, New Mexico, California, Sonora, Sinaloa, Nuevo 
Leon, and Nuevo Santander, Spanish Indian policy was altered from mis-
misionization to military conquest. Whereas the Comanche had been 
originally the principal target, Croix decided that the war-like tribe 
should be urged to make constant war on its traditional enemy--the 
Apache. By the end of 1781 the Apache sued for peace. They were 
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settled on the Rio Grande as a buffer to future Comanche raids into 
M . 49 exico. 
Croix realized that the policy of making war on the Apache was 
merely a temporary solution to the Comanche problem. Therefore he 
moved in 1780 to achieve a permanent settlement. Another expedition 
would go to the Comanche and attempt to arrange some type of agreement 
that would end the raids. Unfortunately for the Spaniards, Athanse de 
Mfzi~res lay dead in San Antonio. He alone had seemed capable of ne-
gotiating a long-lasting peace with the Comanche. Nevertheless, 
Nicolas de la Matte, another alien in the service of Spain, was ap-
pointed to lead an expedition to the Red River. La Matte set out for 
the frontier in November of 1780, reaching the villages of the Wichita 
on the Red River three months later. He distributed gifts and ha-
rangued the natives to maintain peace. However, he apparently did not 
reach the villages of the Comanche, but rather notified them through 
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their nominal allies of the Spanish desire for peace. 
Despite the efforts of La Matte, the Comanche continued to sweep 
down from their villages on the Llano Estacada and the Red River and 
spread death, destruction, and bloodshed in their wake. In 1785 the 
citizens of Spanish Texas were relieved of the Comanche pressure by a 
treaty with the Kotsoteka and Penateka branches of that tribe which 
temporarily established friendly relations. The treaty was gained af-
ter Spanish officials in Texas overlooked repeated depredations by the 
natives, and by the liberal distribution of gifts among the tribe. In-
deed, the eighth article of the treaty promised that: " ••• each year 
presents would be distributed to the chiefs and principal tribal mem-
bers as a proof and manifestation of our [the Spaniards J good wi 11." 
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However, soon after the document was signed the natives began to raid 
into Texas, claiming that Spaniards had not fulfilled their portion of 
the agreement. Thus the treaty of 1785 was soon abrogated. From this 
time forward the Comanche continually raided Spanish settlements in 
Texas, striking seemingly at will from the Gulf of Mexico to the Rio 
Grande. Spanish officials in Texas and in Mexico, recognizing a fact 
known on the frontier for many years, finally abdicated authority on 
the frontier, trying only to pacify the natives with gifts and spor-
adically demanding that the small presidial guard in Texas punish the 
savages. The Comanche were a problem which another nation would have 
to settle--and only after great expenditures of money and men would a 
solution be achieved. 51 
Although Spaniards in Texas were unable to establish a permanent 
peace along their northern border, other problems pressed them for so-
lutions. Since the cession of Louisiana to Spain in 176'2, Louisiana 
had been ruled by governors appointed by the viceroy in Cuba, while 
Texas and New Mexico had been under the control of the viceroy of New 
Spain, based in Mexico City. Although officials in each province had 
attempted to cooperate with their counterparts in other provinces, com-
munication had been sporatic and difficult. By 1780 officials in New 
Mexico realized that the provinces were in dire need of connecting 
roads. These roads would serve several purposes, in addition to making 
connunication easier. They would allow supplies to be brought from 
Louisiana westward at far less expense than bringing them overland from 
Mexico, and the products of Santa Fe could more easily be brought from 
New Me~ico. Also, the roads would bind the provinces together, an im-
portant fact because the Spaniards feared encroachment from the newly 
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established United States of America. French traders for many years 
had been trading with the Wichita on the Red .River by crossing overland 
from the Arkansas. Spaniards thus hoped that roads connecting Santa Fe, 
San Antonio, Cilnd Natchitoches would discourage this trade, as well as· 
. . b Am . 52 intrusion y ericans. 
Regardless of the advantages which routes between Santa Fe, San 
Antonio, and Natchitoches would provide, Spaniards were faced with the 
problem of surveying such roads. Less than a dozen expeditions had 
been made into the areas between these cities, and many of the men who 
had led the expeditions, such as Athanse de M~zi~res, were dead. Also, 
the country was infested with natives who often were hostile to Span-
iards. The first problem was to find a man capable of blazing a trail 
between the cities, a man like Louis Jucehereau de St. Denis or Athanse 
de M:ziires. Such a man was found in Pedro (Pierre) Vial, another 
F hm h 1 . d . h f s . 53 renc an w o en iste in t e service o Pain. 
Pedro Vial, as he was known to the Spaniards of the Southwest, was 
born at Lyon, France, about the middle of the eighteenth century. Some-
time during the 1770s he came to the New World, trading along the Mis-
souri River during the American Revolution. Little is known of his 
background; however, he was in the Southwest in the 1780s, and evidently 
had acquired much of experience in the wilderness, judging from his 
subsequent activities. The Red River would play an important role in 
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the traveler of Pedro Vial. 
The first matter at hand was the opening of a road from Santa Fe 
to San Antonio de B~xar. Because of Indian hostilities and because of 
insufficient knowledge of the region, travel between the two cities was 
forced to follow a circuitous route: from Santa Fe southward to 
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Chihuahua via El Paso, then to Satillo, and from there to San Antonio--
more than fifteen hundred miles. Finding a shorter route was Vial's 
f . . 55 irst assignment. 
The origin of the order for a survey to be made from Bexar to 
Santa Fe is obscure. However, it probably came from Jacobo Ugarte y 
Loyola, cop:unandant-general of the Interid.r Provinces, who was in a po-
' 
sition to realize the importance of connnunication between the two 
cities. Regardless of the origin of the order, Governor Domingo Cabello 
of Texas was authorized to organize such an expedition. He also was · 
informed that Pedro Vial, who had lived among the Indians of Texas for 
som.e time, had offered his services to fulfill this order. Undoubtedly 
pleasing to the economy-minded Spaniards was Vial's offer to make the 
trip with only one companion; the fewer travelers, the less money ex-
56 
pended. 
Vial promised to blaze the most· direct path possible from BJxar to 
Santa Fe, stopping at Indian villages along the way. On October 4, 1786, 
I the intrepid explorer set out from San Antonio de Bexar; he was accom-
panied by Cristob~l de los Sant~s, his only; companion. Two days after 
their departure, the pair suffered a mishap in crossing the Guadalupe 
River. One of their pack horses was caught by the rising waters and 
drowned. Besides the loss of the horse, all the supplies which it car-
ried were lost. Nonetheless, Vial pushed northward. On October 8 the 
paid arrived at the Colorado, where Vial became ill. When he recovered 
somewhat, they then followed the Colorado to the northwest, using the 
river as a guide, a trait which Vial demonstrated throughout his ex-
plorations. They followed the Colorado until the fourteenth. During 
this portion of the journey, Vial's sickness became critical, and the 
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explorer fainted, falling from his horse, to lay unconscious for two 
hours. The severity of his illness was illustrated by his companion's 
request for a document from Vial exonerating him from any wrong-doing 
in Vial's death! However, Vial responded, 11 1 trusted in God that I 
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should not die ••• ," and the journey was continued. Leaving the 
Colorado, the two turned to the northeast, heading for the Brazos by a 
trail which Vial believed to be used by the Tawakoni, a branch of the 
Wichita, while stealing horses from San Antonio. Two weeks after leav-
ing Colorado, they reached the Brazos, where Vial searched upriver 
looking for the camps of the Wichita. He located the natives in their 
village called "El Quiscat" near the location of present-day Waco, 
Texas. The chief of the tribe, Quiscat, greeted Vial as a friend. 
From the end of October until the middle of December, Vial stayed with 
the Wichita, living in the chief's lodge and recuperating from his i 11-
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ness. 
On December 15, 1786, Vial and Sant6s set out once again on their 
journey, traveling along the Brazos--using the river as a guide. For 
several days they followed the river, reaching another Wichita village 
on December 28. This village was probably near the site of present-day 
Wichita Falls, Texas. Near this Wichita village, Vial met a Spaniard 
traveling with a Wichita. He was informed that the two had been steal-
ing horses, although they did not clarify from whom they had taken the 
stock. Also during the march he learned that a group of Wichita had 
gone south to steal horses from Spaniards. Therefore, when he reached 
the Wichita village, he inquired about the recent raids and demanded an 
explanation. He warned the natives that if they were "among those who 
send their people to make trouble at San Antonio, there will be no one 
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to save you from those who may harm you" --strong words for a man 
alone in the wilderness and surrounded by possibly hostile natives. 
However, the Wichita replied that Vial's statement was correct and asked 
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for forgiveness, promising to remain peaceful in the future. · 
Although the meeting with the Wichitas had begun badly, the natives 
soon warmed to the Spaniard. They told Vial that they were waiting for 
one of their chiefs to return from a visit to the Comanche, and they 
would then trade with that tribe. Vial decided to wait for the Chief 
to return in order to ascerta:l,n what the situation among the Comanche 
might be before venturing into their lands. 61 
The Wichita chief returned on J ~nuary 6, 178.7, accompanied by six 
Comanche braves. Vial then set out for the camps of the Comanche. He 
found them nearby and held a conference with their chiefs. During this 
meeting the Comanche told Vial that San Antonio was far away and that a 
Spanish settlement at the abandoned site of San Sab' would be welcomed. 
Also, Vial was approached by the great chief Guaquangas, or Goat of 
Mail, who told the explorer that he would like to go to San Antonio to 
speak with the governor and asked Vi~l to take him.there. However, 
Vial would not be deterred from his mission, and on January 18, he de-
parted in a westerly direction. Two days later the pair made winter 
camp in an arroyo near the present-day city of Burkburnett, Texas. They 
. . 62 remained at the camp until March 4, 1787. 
After the cold days of January and February passed, the party set 
out northward again, and on March 15 Vial reached the destination he 
apparently had been seeking since leaving San Antonio--the Red River. 
Evidently Vial had learned previously that the Red would guide him to 
Santa Fe; his route from San Antonio had been generally north. 
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Undoubtedly the explorer knew that Santa Fe lay to the northwest. Vial 
apparently had set out for the Red River, ignoring the fact that a 
shorter and more direct route was· possible, because he preferred the 
security of traveling along a. rive·:i:• During his journey from San An-
tonio to the Red he demonstrated, by following the Colorado and Brazos, 
h . . f ' . 1 f . . ' 63 is propensity or using streams as ·natura . means o navigation. 
Reaching the Red Riv-er, Vial turned westward, following the stream. 
I Sometime during this portion of the journey, Vial and Santos were 
joined by the Comanche chief Zoquine, who promised to guide them to 
Santa Fe. Despite the presence of the Comanche chief, the party was 
threatened by another group of Comanche who asserted that Vial had come 
to take the natives to Santa Fe where they would be murdered. Vial re-
sponded, with his usual confidence, that these men were liars and that 
the Spaniards were not black-hearted like the Comanche. Again his strong 
statement served him well, and natives allowed him to continue. 
The explorer followed the Red for most of April, leaving the 
stream as it entered the Llano Estacado. From the Red, Vial went to 
the South Canadian, which he followed into New Mexico. On May 26, 1787, 
he reported to Spanish officials at Santa Fe, having journeyed via 
North Texas from the city of Saint Anthony to the city of the Holy Faith 
for the first time. 
I 
He and Santos had traveled more than.one thousand 
miles, most of them alone, in less than one year. Moreover, they had 
passed through the lands of the most feared Indians in the Southwest. 
This was the first of Vial s remarkable accomplishments. 65 
Pedro Vial's journey from San Antonio to Santa Fe was a great feat 
of exploration and courage; however, he found Spanish officials in New 
Mexico unsatisfied. There must be another, more direct route between 
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the two cities. Vial's road was too circuitous, too time-consuming, 
and too dangerous. Therefore they determined to send another explorer 
to find a more direct connection. Juan Bautista de Anza, the governor 
, 
of New Mexico and himself an accomplished explorer, appointed Jose Mares 
to lead another expedition. Mares was ordered to travel from Santa Fe 
to San Antonio by the most direct route possible. On July 31, 1787, 
less than two months after Vial had· reached Santa Fe, Mares departed 
for San Antonio accompanied by Cristob'l de los.Santos, Pedro Vial's 
former companion, and Alejandro Martfn, an Indian interpreter who had 
worked previously for officials in New Mexico. 66 
San Antonio, more than five hundred miles to the east and south of 
Santa Fe, lay at a forty-five degree angle from the New Mexica~ city. 
Therefore Mares' direction should have been to the southeast to open 
the most direct route between the two outposts. He began his journey 
in this direction, traveling to the Pecos and then to the Gallianas; 
however, he then turned to the northeast, heading for the Red River. He 
ascended the Llano Estacado and reached the Tule River, a tributary of 
the Red. Leaving the Tule on the Llano, Mares marches to the Peace 
River, another tributary of the Red, followed the Peace for several 
days, a~d then marched to the Wichita River. He crossed that stream and 
continued to the Little Wichita, which he called the Rio de los Taguaya-
zes, or the River of the Taovayas (for the sub-tribe of the Wichita who 
lived near the mouth of the stream on the Red River). Throughout this 
portion of the journey, the Spaniard repeatedly met bands of Comanche 
who greeted him as a friend and traveled with him for varying spans of 
time. Many of the natives accompanied the Spaniard to the village of 
I 
the Wichita, to trade. On September 5, 1787, Mares reached the villages 
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on the Red, and his party was greeted as frie~ds by the natives. The 
Spaniards stayed four days on the Red River, leaving on September 9. 
From the Red, Mares led his expedition almost directly toward San An-
tonio, forming a rough right angle. Why had the Spaniard, having re-
ceived strict orders to find the most direct route, chosen to repeat 
Vial's visit to the Red? Mares' return journe~ to Santa Fe--after se-
vere chastisement by the governor of Texas for going via the Red--was 
one-third shorter than his march from Santa Fe to San Antonio, Un-
doubtedly Mares went to the Red River for two similar reasons: the 
Wichita villages on the river were a wel.1-known point of determination, 
for the travels of De M~zi~res and Vial had definately located the vil-
lages; and the river itself was a well-k~own point of demarcation. 
Probably going to the Red River, Mares had ~p lit his journey to San An-. 
tonio into two portions; only the first part involved blazing a new 
trail. His second reason was that because the Wichita villages were 
well known and a trading center for natives in the region, he believed 
that a route from Santa Fe to San Antonio should pass through this im-
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portant marketplace. 
I Jose Mares returned to Santa Fe in 1788, making the journey in four 
months. His return trip pleased Spanish officials in New Mexico be-
cause it demonstrated the possibility of direct traffic between the ma-
jor cities of New Mexico and Texas. However, the third city of the 
Spanish trinity in the Interior Provinces, Natchitoches, remained sepa-
rated from the others. It perhaps was the most important of the three 
because of its location on the Red River, which was navigable; this 
made it an important lini in any future trading system the Spaniards 
might devise. If Santa Fe and San Antonio were joined to Natchitoches 
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by good roads, then supplies could be brought to the post on the Red by 
water and thence transferred to the other posts via the roads. Con; 
versely, products from New Mexico and Texas could be brought out of the 
interior by the same route. Therefore the Spaniards next step was to 
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connect Natchitoches with its sister outposts. 
Before Jos' Mares left· San Antonio,. Pedro Vial had suggested to 
Governor Anza that an expedition should go from Santa Fe to Natchi~ 
toches. The governor had forwarded Vial's comments to Commandant-
general Jacobo Ugarte. Evidently Vial believed his work between San 
Antonio and Santa Fe was sufficient and did not wish to seek a more di-
rect route. Despite dissatisfaction with Vial's first expedition, 
Spanish officials were willing to utilize his experience and courage 
once again in order to open a road from Santa Fe to Natchitoches. Anza's 
replacement as governor of New Mexico, Fernando de la Concha, accepted 
Vial's offer to go to Louisiana, and on Jun~ 24, 1788, less than a 
month after Mares had returned from San Antonio, Pedro Vial set out 
once more into the wilderness. With Vial went four Spaniards, who 
would make the entire journey with him, as well as several individuals 
who would make only part of the trip; included was Santiago Fernandez, 
who would go only to the Wichita villages on the Red River and then re-
turn to Santa Fe to report the progress of the mission to the Spanish 
officials. The four who would accom?any Vial were Francisco Xavier 
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Fragoso, Jose Maria Romero~ Gregorio Leyva, and Juan Lucero. 
The expedition set out in the same direction which Jos~ Mares had 
taken a year before. crossing the Pecos and Gallinas rivers to the 
headwaters of the Red River, and passing the region near present-day 
Tucumcari, New Mexico. Near Palo Duro Canyon the party reached the 
83 
Prairie Dog Town Fork of the Red River, which it followed eastward. 
Following the river, which the Spaniards called the Rio Blanco, the 
party was met by a Comanche near the mouth of the Tule River. The na-
tive took the Spaniards to his camp where they were treated as guests 
and refreshed from their journey. After visiting with the Comanche, 
the group set out again to the east, following the river. About the 
middle of July the group descended from the Llano and continued along 
the stream, noting the entrance of the North Fork and the Pease rivers, 
which greatly enlarged the river's size. Near the mouths of these 
streams, several groups of Comanche were sighted. These natives, like 
the ones met earlier, were friendly to the Spaniards and volunteered to 
guide the party to the villages of the Wichita, an offer Vial accepted 
because among them were those who had led him to Santa Fe on his first 
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exploration. 
On July 20 Vial reached the mouths of the Wichita River and Cache 
Creek, which entered the Red from the south and north respectively. 
The next day the party found the camps of the Wichita which Vi~l had 
I 
visited a year and a half before and which Jose Mares had passed 
through earlier. These villages had changed little from the time when 
Athanse de Mezieres had visited them in 1778, although the population 
of both appeared to have decreased markedly. De M~zi~res reported the 
number of inhabitants as more than eight hundred, but Vial found each 
village consisting of only seventeen huts. However, Vial's chronicler, 
Fragoso, noted another village east of the two which had not been re-
ported earlier. Possibly the presence of this third village accounts 
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for the decrease in the population of the other two settlements. 
The Spaniards spent six days with the Wichita, allowing themselves 
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and their animals to recuperate for the last portion of their journey 
to Natchitoches. On May 26 th~y set out from the last Wichita village, 
leaving the Red River to travel overland. Evidently Vial knew that by 
cutting across present-day East Texas he could reach Natchitoches much 
quicke·r than by following the river along its grE~at bend. After leav-
ing the Red, the party marched almost directly to Natchitoches, cross.., 
ing the headwaters of the Trinity north of present-day Dallas. During 
this portion of the march, Fragoso was repeatedly impressed by the ter~ 
rain, noting the Cross Timbers and the divide between the watersheds. of 
the Red and Trinity rivers where two small stre~s rose, one flowing 
north, the other south. On August 14 they crossed the Sabine, reaching 
settled areas near the abandoned site of Los Adaes. Six days later the 
group entered Natchitoches, ending a journey of more than nine hundred 
miles. 72 
Pedro Vial stayed at Natchitoches for two weeks and then set out 
for San Antonio. He then traveled to Santa Fe, which he reached on 
August 20, 1789. In less than three years he had completed the original 
task which had been given him by officials of the Interior Provinces--
with a little help from Jos~ Mares. From October 4, 1786, to August 
20, 1789, he had crossed the entire breath of Texas once, joining Santa 
Fe, San Antonio, and Natchitoches. Throughout his travels the Red River 
had played a major role, guiding him from San Antonio to Santa Fe, as 
it did Jos~ Mares. Like an aquatic Polaris, the Red was a sign which 
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pointed the way for Pedro Vial. 
Despite the successes of Vial and Mares in connecting Santa Fe, 
San Antonio, and Natchitoches, these roads did not prevent the encroach.., 
ment of foreigners into Spanish territory. A decade after Vial's 
85 
journey from Santa Fe to Natchitoches, Louisiana's fate again was de-
cided by European diplomacy; by the Treaty of San Illedefonso the pro"" 
vince was retroceded to France by Spain. Napoleon had decided to re-
build the French empire in North America. 
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CHAPTER V 
SPAIN 1 S NEW FOE 
France had lost Louisiana in 1762 because of problems not con-
nected with the province. In 1803 the situation recurred. Because his 
armies could not quell the insurrection in Santo Domingo, because war 
was inminent in Europe, and because he did not want Louisiana to fall 
into the hands of the British, Napoleon, once he regained Louisiana, 
sold the province to the willing Americans for the bargain price of 
fifteen million dollars. Despite Thomas Jefferson's constitutional ob-
jections to the purchase, the United States quickly accepted the pro-
vince of Louisiana as its own. The only questions was what had the 
United States brought? The French refused to define what they had sold, 
answering American questions concerning the boundaries of Louisiana 
with suggestions that obscure borders provided a chance to steal some 
Spanish land! The Spaniards, who remained in physical control of the 
province until its transfer to the United States had an answer, but the 
United States was unwilling to accept their somewhat biased judgment. 
The only boundary which could be found for Louisiana with any certainty 
was the Mississippi. West of that great stream the continent remained 
virginal and unexplored except for the small areas of Spanish occupa-
tion in the Southwest. There were serious questions as to the validity 
of Spanish claims, especially along the Red River. 1 
President Thomas Jefferson for many years had been interested in 
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the exploration of the Trans-Mississippi West, suggesting various mis-
sions during the latter part of the eighteenth-century. As president 
his interest had not waned. He suggested the expedition of Meriweather 
Lewis and William Clark before the Louisiana Purchase was made and be-
came an American soil by an accident of European diplomacy. But Jeffer-
son 1 s interest was not limited to the Northwest; in 1803 the President 
wrote to three individuals, Daniel Clark, the American consul at New 
Orleans; William Dunbar, the foremost scientist of th,e Mississippi 
Valley; and William c. c. C lairborne, governor of the newly created 
Louisiana Territory, asking for information regarding the Red River. 
The responses to Jefferson's questions were vague, general, and brief, 
Therefore he determined that another expedition, s.imilar to that of 
Lewis and Clark, was in order. He then wrote William Dunbar requesting 
him to lead an expedition up the Red River to its source and then cross 
over to the Arkansas and descend that stream, noting that his plans 
were contingent on the appropriation of funds by Congress. Happily 
the legislative branch was cooperative, and three thousand dollars were 
set aside for the suggested purpose--exploration of the Red and Arkan-
sas. Jefferson thereupon wrote Dunbar again, asking him to make prepa-
rations for the journey. Also, he informed Dunbar that Dr. George 
Hunter, a chemist living in Philadelphia, would accompany the mission to 
make scientific observations. 2 
Preparing for his proposed journey up the Red, Dunbar wrote to 
Peter Walker, a trader who frequently ascended the river, to repeat the 
questions about the stream which Jefferson earlier had asked. However, 
he made few physical preparations, and when George Hunter, having de~ 
scended the Ohio and Mississippi rivers by flatboat, arrived at Dunbar's 
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plantation on the Mississippi he learned that boats and provisions for 
the journey had not been acquired. Lieutenant Colonel Constant Freeman, 
miiitary commander at New Orleans, had been ordered by Secretary of War 
Henry Dearborn to provide these articles, but he had decided to wait 
until Hunter's arrival to begin preparations. Thus the expedition im-
3 
mediately was behind schedule in setting out. , 
Hunter, having determined that he would have to make the neces-
sary preparations, went to New Orleans where he had the flatboat in 
which he had descended the Mississippi altered, and obtained the pro-
visions for the journey. After two months in New Orleans, Hunter re-
turned to Dunbar's plantation. When he arrived, he learned that the ex-
pedition again had been delayed. In July President Jefferson had been 
visited by a delegation of the Osage Nation. The Indians had informed 
him of the split in the nation which had resulted in the settlement of 
one band on the Verdigris River, a tributary of the Arkansas in present-
day Oklahoma, and another band on the Neosho, another tributary of the 
Arkansas located east of the Verdigris. They warned Jefferson that an 
American expedition on the Arkansas would be attacked by the band lo-
cated on the Verdigris. Therefore Jefferson had written Dunbar to sug-
gest that the proposed expedition to the Red and Arkansas be postponed. 
Instead Dunbar and Hunter were to ascend the Ouachita, a tributary of 
the Red which flowed from south~central Arkansas, entering the Red a 
few miles above its mouth, in order to utilize the men and supplies 
which had been collected. The President urged Dunbar to forward a re-
port of his actions in order that Congress could be apprised of the 
journey--and asked to appropriate additional funds. Finally, Jefferson 
noted that the delay was fortunate because it would allow Americans to 
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settle their difficulties with Spaniards, difficulties which had arisen 
over the Texas-Louisiana boundary. 4 
As noted, Spain and the United States had quarrelled because of 
the vagueness of the limits of Louisiana. France, the conduit through 
which Louisiana had passed to the United States, had claimed that the 
province included Texas, citing La Salle's settlement as proof of such 
a claim. The United States, seeing an opportunity make a good deal 
better, re-asserted the French claim to Texas for many years, was in no 
mood to allow the upstart Americans to take the province. Indeed, 
Spaniards proclaimed that the Arkansas was the southern boundary of 
Louisiana, asserting that the province of Texas had expanded during the 
years of Spanish domination in Louisiana (1762-1800). Therefore they 
were not willing to allow an American exploring party to ascend the Red 
River. Their attitude had been summarized in Commandant-General Nemesio 
Salcedo's proclamation in May of 1804 that all American attempts to 
enter Texas or to survey the boundaries of Louisiana would be stopped 
and the men arrested. Wisely, Dunbar and Hunter decided that the 
Ouachita would make an acceptable object of exploration--no Spaniards 
5 
were there. 
The expedition left the Mississippi on October 4, 1804, and re-
turned in February of 1805, having reached the head of navigation on 
the Ouachita near the mouth of the Fourche de Chalfat. Thus the first 
American expedition on the Red River proved abortive. But the mission 
was not entirely unsuccessful. The reports by Hunter and Dunbar con-
tained valuable advice to latter explorers in the area; special boats 
were needed, an authoritative officer was mandatory to control the en-
listed men, and sophisticated scientific equipment was necessary to 
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make workable observations. 
While Hunter and Dunbar had been waiting to ascend the Ouachita, 
President Jefferson was approached by a man with additional informa~ 
tion concerning the Red River. John C. Sibley, a native of Massachu-
setts, had settled at Natchitoches in 1802 and had involved himself in 
the affairs of the area. More important to Jefferson, Sibley had 
journeyed up the Red River in 1803, making copious notes and observa~ 
tions. In March of 1804 he wrote to Jefferson relating his geographic 
knowledg..e o.f. the region and of its natives. Although Sibley 1 s knowledge 
was limited to the lower reaches of the river below the great bend, his 
letters whetted Jefferson's appetite--and got Sibley an appointment as 
contract surgeon for the Natchitoches area. In 1805 Jefferson appointed 
Sibley to head the Natchitoches Indian Factory, which burdened him with 
the task of controlling the natives of the Louisiana-Texas frontier. 
He performed this task well, remaining a thorn in the side of Spaniards, 
as had St. Denis a hundred years before. 6 
Despite the failure of Hunter and Dunbar, Jefferson was intent on 
sending an expedition up the Red River. The President hoped that the 
boundaries of Louisiana could be defined quickly, but he was not willing 
to allow haste to cheat the United States of any part of its rightful 
property. The Spaniards were equally adamant in their determination 
that Texas should not be lost to Americans. Therefore, the exploration 
of the Red which Jefferson desired would have to be made into disputed 
territory--territory under the physical control of Spaniards. The 
President had two problems: he needed someone to lead the expedition, 
and he needed some method of obtaining Spanish cooperation, or, at 
7 
least, Spanish permission for the expedition. 
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On March 12, 1805, Jefferson wrote to Dunbar expressing his hopes 
for a second mission. Inasmuch as neither Dunbar nor Hunter was will-
ing to assume leadership of this mission, Jefferson included a list of 
the names of several men whom he believed capable of the task. Un-
fortunately, none of these men were willing to accept the position. 
Finally, Thomas Freeman was selected to lead the exploration. Jeffer-
son realized that Freeman, who was an experienced surveyor, could not 
perform the botanical observations which were necessary. Therefore Dr. 
Peter Custis was selected to accompany the party as the scientific 
specialist. Jefferson meanwhile had decided that the journey should be 
limited to the Red River, rather than ascending the Red and then march-
ing overland to the source of the Arkansas. By restricting the ex-
ploration to the Red, the problems of transporting the men and their 
supplies overland and the difficulties with the Osage on the Arkansas 
would be avoided. Jefferson thus had secured a leader for the mission. 
8 
His second problem--the Spaniards--proved more difficult. 
In the same letter to Dunbar which spoke of new goals for the ex-
pedition, Jefferson noted that Dunbar should write Governor Claiborne 
of Louisiana, asking him to approach the former governor of Spanish 
Louisiana, the Marquis de Casa Calvo, who had remained in New Orleans 
as a boundary commissioner, to ask for a passport for the expedition. 
Claiborne was dutifully informed, and in July of 1805 he asked Casa 
Calvo for the desired document. The American was careful to emphasize 
that the mission was solely for purposes of gathering scientific data 
and in no way was an encroachment on Spanish territory. Despite these 
promises, Caso Calvo was leery of the Americans. He was certain the 
mission was designed to collect military information about the region 
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and to agitate the local natives against Spaniards. The Marquis also 
was confident that the Americans were planning a military invasion of 
the region to secure their claims. However, Clairborne 1 s request was 
difficult to refuse. In addition to the vows of good faith, the Ameri-
cans offered to allow Spaniards to accompany the mission, and the re-
quest was endorsed by the secretary of the Spanish boundary commission, 
I Andres Lopez Armesto. Casa Calvo decided to grant his permission; how-
ever, he simultaneously informed Spanish officials in Texas of the 
planned mission. Finally, he noted that he could not interfere w'ith 
any decisions made in Texas concerning the expedition. This effectively 
negated the power of the passport given to Claiborne. What worth is a 
passport which carries no authority? Casa Calvo had determined to re-
main friendly to the Americans, while assuring that the Spanish of-
ficials in Texas would act against the proposed mission. Thus he 
"d d k' d . . 9 avoi e ma ing a ec1s1on. 
Casa Calvo's actions set both Americans and Spaniards to working. 
Commandant-General Salcedo, who earlier had issued an order banning all 
Americans from Texas, moved to preclude any advancement into Spanish 
territory by ordering troops to be garrisoned at Bayou Pierre (near the 
site of the ancient post of Los Adaes). This would block the path of 
the proposed expedition. However, in February of 1806 the commander of 
the American detachment at Natchitoches sent a force of sixty men to 
compell the Spaniards to withdraw. This force, under the command of 
Captain Edward Turner, found the Spanish force, consisting of twenty men, 
near Los Adaes. 
I I 
The Spaniards, under the command of Ensign Jose Maria 
Gonzales, protested, but they agreed to withdraw, a wise decision con-
sidering the inequity of opposing forces. Although this action cleared 
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the path for the expedition, it also strengthened the Spanish distrust 
of Americans. 
( 
In addition, the Marquis de Casa Calvo was asked to re-
move himself from the soil of the United States on February 12, 1806. 10 
This action increased the susupicions of Spaniards toward the Americans, 
and it decreased the value of the passport which Casa Calvo had given 
to Claiborne. 11 
Despite all these problems, the expedition departed in April of 
1806, almost a year after Jefferson had suggested the mission. The 
leaders of the party were Freeman and Custis; Lieutenant Enoch Humphrey 
was assistant to Dr. Custis in making botanical observations; and Cap-
tain Richard Sparks was the military commander of the group. In ad-
dition, there were two non-commissioned officers, seventeen privates, 
and one black servant. Two flatboats and a smaller pirouge were utili-
zed to carry the group upriver. At Natchitoches thirteen more privates 
were added to the company, increasing the number in the expedition to 
h . 12 t irty-seven. 
Late in May the party left Natchitoches. Above that village the 
river became increasingly difficult to navigate because of driftwood and 
mud which clogged the channel. This was the lower reaches of the 
"Great Raft" which lay further north. The jams were called rafts be-
cause they bore a resemblance to rafts which had been formed by stick-
ing logs and brush together with mud. The rafts made travel tortuous 
and slow. Boats had to be lifted over shallows which had been created 
by collections of wood and mud, and a serpentine course was followed 
because the rafts had filled the main bed of the river, leaving the 
waters to flow through myriad miniature channels. Much time was wasted 
searching for open paths through the woody barrier because channels 
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were continually changing--opening and closing. A course which was open 
one day might be closed the next by the whims of water and wood. 
On June 8 the party's problems increased. A runner from John 
Sibley at Natchitoches notified Freeman that a Spanish force of con-
siderable magnitude had left Nacrag,doches, the center of Spanish athority 
in East Texas, with orders to stop the Americans. That afternoon Sibley 
reached the party with the same warning. Although Freeman had no wish 
to fight with a larger Spanish force, he and his fellow explorers de-
cided to push onward, hoping to evade the Spaniards. 
On J.une 11 the party reached the ''Great Raft," ·an almost solid mass 
of wood, brush, and mud which had jammed together by the wind and water 
to clog the river's channel for more than fifty miles. Attempting to 
pass through the Great Raft was useless. .Therefore the party, led by 
French guides, followed a circuitous path around the raft which con-
sumed more than one hundred miles. Finally, two hundred miles above 
Natchitoches, and just below the Great Bend of the Red, the group re~ 
entered the unclogged channel of the river. Two days after they emerged 
from the raft the explorers reached the village of the Alabama-Coashutta 
Indians: this tribe had moved into the region from the east during the 
latter part of the eighteenth century, fleeing from the pressures of 
white men. However, the natives received the explorers well. At the 
village Freeman received news that a Spanish force of approximately 
three hundred recently had visited the nearby Caddo village, searching 
for the Americans. 
In keeping with the American policy of courting the friendship of 
natives in that area, Freeman gave the chief presents, including an 
American flag. On July 1 chiefs from the neighboring Caddo villages 
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arrived, and Freeman again distributed gifts. Also he made speeches de-
claring that Americans were friends of the natives and praising the 
chiefs for their bravery and abilities. The Indians replied by lauding 
the Americans, promising never to make war on whites, and inviting them 
to visit their villages often. Thus the Americans followed the French 
policy of endearing themselves to the natives of the region. Two days 
after their arrival, the Caddo departed, promising to warn the Americans 
of movements by the Spaniards. 
On July 11 the party left the Alabama-Coashutta village, having 
won the friendship of the natives, and continued upriver, entering its 
Great Bend. Two weeks after leaving the village, the explorers 
emerged from the bend, reaching the former location of the Nassonite 
village where Benard de La Harpe had erected his trading post eighty-
seven years before. A few rotting posts were the only remains of the 
old French fort. The day after the explorers arrived at the abandoned 
fort, they were met by three Caddo Indians who warned that the Spaniards 
recently had visited their villages. The Spanish commander, whose force 
numbered one thousand, had berated the chiefs for accepting the Ameri-
cans, pulled down the flag which Freeman had left, and swore to kill the 
American explorers if they attempted to continue their journey. The 
natives, evidently impressed by this Spanish show of strength, urged 
the Americans to retreat and avoid contact with the terrible Spaniards. 
However, Thomas Freeman refused their admonitions and commanded his 
force to push onward. 
Despite his determination to continue, Freeman realized that the 
Spanish force represented a serious threat to his party and his mission. 
Therefore he ordered his men to bury part of their equipment, including 
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their instruments and notes. Also, he urged them tQ' remain alert. The 
group then advanced cautiously, expecting to meet Spaniards at each 
turn of the river. 
While the American force had been visiting with the natives and 
pushing upriver, the Spaniards in Texas had been busy. After the Span-
ish force had been ejected from the area around Bayou Pierre by the 
American force under Turner, Spanish officials in Texas had believed 
that armed conflict was imminent along the Texas-Louisiana border. The 
commander of the forces at Nacogdoches, Captain Sebastian Rodriguez, had 
asked that his garrison be increased, and that he be replaced by a more 
experienced officer. Governor Antonio Cordero y Bustamante evidently 
had agreed with Rodriguez because Captain Francisco Viana had been 
placed in command at Nacogdoches in June. Viana had wasted little time 
in preparing for the expected American assault, bolstering garrisons in 
East Texas and deciding to repulse the American expedition up the Red 
River. On July 12 he left Nacogdoches, heading for the Red River. Mov-
ing quickly and forcefully, the Spaniard reached the villages of the 
Caddo where he learned of the recent visit by Americans. Realizing that 
Americans would follow the circuitous route of the river, Viana then 
marched overland, arriving at the river ahead of the Americans. On the 
river he arranged his force and readied them for battle, expecting armed 
fl . . h h h. Am . 13 con ict wit t e approac ing ericans. 
On July 28 the Americans reached the waiting Spaniards. However, 
the expected battle did not occur. Rather the American and Spanish of-. 
ficers met to find a peaceful solution to the impasse. Viana demanded 
that the Americans withdraw, promising to enforce his demand with arms 
if necessary. Freeman had little choice. Either he could retreat or his 
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party would surely perish. However, the American demanded that Viana 
put in writing his reasons for turning back the expedition, evidently 
wishing to have some document to give President Jefferson when he re-
turned without completing his mission. Stubbo:i:nedly Viana refused, 
stating only that he was acting in accord with the wishes of officials 
in Mexico. The Spaniard, confident in his numerical superiority, ended 
the meeting by asking when the Americans planned to depart. The next 
day the Americans withdrew, leaving the Spaniards victorious, although 
14 
many of Freeman's party favored battle. 
In August Freeman's party returned to Natchitoches, having over-
come the elements and the river but not the Spaniards. Again President 
Jefferson's hopes of exploring the Red River had been dashed by the 
fortunes of international diplomacy and Spanish arms. However, the re~ 
sults of Freeman's mission were not entirely negative. The Americans 
had succeeded in winning the friendship of the Alabama-Coashutta and 
the Caddo. And Viana 1 s unseemly behavior at the village of the Caddo 
had demonstrated to the natives the differences in attitude of Spaniard 
and American. Thus, while Viana had won an immediate victory for his 
nation, he had laid the foundation for permanent American control of 
the region along the Red. 
Repulsing the American exploring party was seen by Spanish offi-
cials in Texas as a prelude to full scale conflict along the border. 
The Spaniards believed that the expedition had been arranged to collect 
military information and to win the aid of the natives of Northeastern 
Texas. Therefore they believed that Americans, thwarted in their ex-
ploring, would soon return in force to seize the region west of the 
Red River. Preparations to fight such an invasion already had begun 
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before Freeman had been turned back. Viana's appointment had been part 
of the strengthening of the defenses of East Texas, as had been the 
transferring of troops from Mexico to Texas. Furthermore, Lieutenant 
I 
Colonel Simon de Herrera, the government of Nueva Santander, had been 
ordered by Commandant-General Salcedo to take military control of East 
Texas. By the time Viana was ushering Thomas Freeman doW'n the Red 
River, there were more than thirteen hundred Spanish troops in Texas. 
Of these more than eight hundred were garrisoned at Nacogdoches. Span-
ish troops also were stationed east of the Sabine River near the loca-
tion of Los Adaes. About four hundred men of the garrison at Nacog-
doches were sent to Bayou Pierre under the command of Colonel Herrera. 
The Spaniards were determined to defend their territory east of the Sa-
15 
bine along the Red River. 
In Louisiana the Americans were equally determined to drive the 
Spaniards west of the Sabine. The Spaniards were seen as counter-
revolutionaries who were the enemies of the republicanism of the United 
States. Also, many Americans coveted the rich lands which lay between 
the Red and Sabine rivers. Feelings ran high in Louisiana for war; 
orators called for militiamen to rally together to aid the Army in 
driving the Spanish invaders back. Newspapers proclaimed that the Amer-
ican Revolution should be spread to the people of Texas. Finally, 
General James Wilkinson, the military commander of Louisiana, moved 
toward the Texas-Louisiana border accompanied by reinforcements for the 
. N h" h 16 garrison at ate itoc es. 
On reaching Natchitoches, Wilkinson notified Governor Cordero y 
Bustamante that the Spanish force at Bayou Pierre had to be removed or 
conflict would result. Cordero replied that his authority did not 
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include yielding Spanish territory to foreign armies. It was September, 
17 
and war seemed inevitable. 
James Wilkinson did not want war. His fuzzy, double-dealing asso-
ciation with Aaron Burr was reaching a watershed, and the general did 
not want a conflict with the Spaniards to draw attention to his dis-
trict. However, his orders were explicit: the Spanish force east of 
the Sabine had to be ejected. Wilkinson had little choice but to 
18 
initiate hostilities if the Spaniards did not retreat. 
Suddenly, almost as if by design, Herrera moved west of the Sa-
bine! Inexplicably the Spaniard ordered his force away from Bayou 
Pierre. Possibly Herrera had decided that his position was untenable; 
possibly he had decided that the starvation and illness plaguing his 
troops had to be eased. Whatever his motive, Herrera's move ended the 
crisis. His only comment to his superiors was that he was preserving 
the territory of his nation. Possibly he believed that by avoiding a 
military defeat Spain might regain the area by diplomacy. 19 
Wilkinson, about to betray Aaron Burr instead of his country, was 
astounded by Herrera's move. However, he was not stumped for a course 
of action. Four weeks after the Spaniard withdrew, Wilkinson moved to 
the Sabine. There he issued a proposal to the Spanish officials: if 
Spaniards would remain west of the Sabine, Americans would remain east 
of the Arroyo Hondo; the area in between would become a neutral ground, 
separating the two nations. On November 4, 1806, Herrera agreed--with-
out consulting his superiors. Despite Herrera's oversight, officials 
in Mexico City ~ubsequently gave their consent to the agreement, reali-
zing that this pragmatic solution was better than a military defeat. 
The permanent settlement to the dispute border between Louisiana and 
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Texas would be left to diplomats in Washington and Madrid. Once more 
the Red River was the boundary between Texas and Louisiana. 20 
While these pawns were jousting along the frontier, diplomats were 
making little progress in Europe. Although a connnission had been es-
tablished after the Louisiana Purchase to define the borders of Louisi-
ana and Texas, and although James Monroe and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney 
had been sent to Spain, a settlement had not been reached. The inter-
national impasse was similar to the one that Wilkinson and herrera had 
solved. Carlos IV, the King of Spain, and his prime minister, Manuel de 
Godoy, the self-styled Prince of Peace, were determined to hold Florida 
and Texas. The Americans were hopeful of grabbing at least part of 
these provinces. Along the border between Texas and Louisiana, Ameri-
cans were willing to compromise: the Colorado River instead of the Rio 
Grande was an acceptable boundary for Texas. This solution would have 
split the province of Texas in half, giving the Americans the rich and 
fertile portion and leaving the Spaniards the barren and wild area. 
But Spain remained adamant--and its position was supported by Napoleon 
and the armies of France. Therefore war was not a solution which the 
United States considered, at least after Napoleon's intentions were 
made clear to the American minister in France, General John Armstrong. 
Unfortunately for the diplomats they could not arrange a temporary 
settlement as had the soldiers on the frontier. 21 
Defining the Louisiana Purchase was an unenviable task, and the 
problems multiplied soon after the sale was made. Napoleon sold Louisi-
ana because his American dreams had been shattered, but his aspirations 
in Europe remained strong. Soon after the sale he threw Europe into 
war, continuing the conflict that had begun during the French Revolution. 
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The Americans were attempting to walk a tightrope between the navies of 
Britain and the armies of France. By 1808 Spain was torn by civil war 
because of Napoleon's attempt to place his brother Joseph on that na-
tion 1 s throne. The question of Louisiana and Texas was cast into ob-
scurity by the larger problems of national survival. Until 1815 the 
United States was struggling t.o maintain its sovereignty against Great 
Britain. Texas had to wait. 22 
The world war that Napoleon created--and almost won--ended in 
1815. Nothing was the same again after the great dictator retired into 
exile. Spain had lost--or was losing--much of its empire in America, 
and the new king, Ferdinand VII, was ill-prepared to guide his nation 
back to sup:remacy. The United States emerged from the war scarred and 
in debt; however, Americans reacted boldly and adventurously. The 
young nation, on the verge of defeat in 1814, convinced itself in 1815 
that Andrew Jackson's victory at New Orleans had recouped all previous 
losses, and that the United States was entering a golden era of re-
publicanism while Europe was sinking into a leaden period of deca-
23 
dence. 
In Europe the leaders seemed bent on fulfilling the American 
prophecies. In Vienna, Austria, France, and Prussia, the leaders 
worked to reap the spoils of war rather than render the world from the 
shambles that Napoleon had made. Spain ineptly demanded that the Con-
gress of Vienna return Louisiana, or at least give it the fifteen 
million dollars which France had received for the province. The others 
refused, knowing that Spain would have to accept the decisions they 
made. England, growing more and more isolated from its European 
neighbors, watched uneasily. 24 
107 
Spain's problems were legion. Revolutions had swept its American 
colonies; Mexico, long a money-making province, was in the midst of re-
volt, and colonies throughout South America were burning with rebellion. 
Hard-pressed in Europe, as well as in America, Spanish officials had to 
settle the problem of the boundaries of the Louisiana Purchase--and 
. h d h d h . . . 25 time a not strengt ene t eir position. 
The task of negotiating a settlement fell to the Spanish minister 
to the United States, Lu(s de On{s y Gonzales, a career diplomat whose 
uncle had been the Spanish ambassador to Saxony and Russia. Onis had 
been the minister to Saxony, and had been. in charge of relations with 
. 26 
France before his appointment to Washington· in October of 1809 •. 
on{s• arrival in the United States· had not been greeted with en-
thusiasm. Indeed, President James Madison had refused to recognize the 
Spaniard's appointment because of the civil war in Spain. ~ Onis had 
chafed under his non-recognition and had made his feeling evident to 
all concerned. By 1814 onfs was extremely unpopular with American of-
ficials, including, Secretary of State James Monroe. Monroe wrote the 
I American minister in Madrid, George Erving, that Onis was unwelcome in 
Washington and that the administration would favor his replacement. 
However, Monroe added, should the Spanish government sincerely wish 
Onfs to remain, a request from the king would suffice to reinstate Onis 
into good standing. Although the Spanish government balked at lowering 
itself to asking a favor of the Americans, the request was forwarded, 
and On{s remained, in America. And in 1816 the Spaniard was granted full 
powers to treat with the Americans concerning the question of the 
b d . f L . . 27 oun aries o ouisiana. 
Meanwhile, the Americans had been attempting to settle the 
108 
problem by diplomacy in Madrid. In 1815 George Erving had been sent to 
Madrid to consul with the Spanish Secretary of State for foreign af-
fairs, Pedro Cevallos. The Spaniards had not been willing to discuss 
the matter, much to Secretary Monroe's disgust. In August of 1816 
Cevallos refused to speak with Erving, asserting that all papers con-
cerning the problem had been sent to On{s. Thus negotiations were 
transferred to Washington at the insistence of the Spanish government. 
Indeed, Spaniards had transferred the talks without consulting the 
Am . . f . h 28 er1cans or even not1 y1ng t em. 
With the removal of the talks to Washington, the situation sur-
rounding the problems of defining the Louisiana Purchase began to im-
prove. Pedro Cevallos, who repeatedly had demonstrated his inadequacy 
as a diplomat, was replaced by Josi Garcia de Le~n y Pizarro, a talented 
and perceptive diplomat who possessed both the ability and the tempera-
ment to aid in the solution of the problem. Pizarro was in his forty-
sixth year when he was appointed secretary of state for foreign af-
fairs. He had spent more than twenty-five of his years as a diplomat, 
serving a Spanish minister to Prussia before his appointment to an ad-
ministrative position. Under his leadership and guidance, Luis Onis 
was able to negotiate freely and seriously. The tightly reined ad-
29 
ministration of Cevallos had prevented such movements. 
The appointment of John Quincy Adams as Secretary of State in 
Monroe's administration aided greatly in creating circumstances favor-
able to a settlement of the dispute between Spain and the United States. 
Adams had spent most of his life in the diplomatic service. As a teen-
ager in 1781 he had gone with Charles Francis Dana to the Russian court 
as secretary to the American minister. Later he had served as 
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American council to Prussia and Russia, and he had been an important 
member of the American committee negotiating at Ghent during the talks 
which ended the War of 1812. By 1817 he long had deserted the Federal-
ism of his father in favor of Jefferson's republicanism. Therefore, in 
light of his diplomatic experience and his political inclination, he 
was a natural choice to head the Department of State. 30 
Perhaps the most important attribute that Adams carried to the De-
partment of State was his scope and depth of knowledge. Having visited 
many of the nations of Europe and having studied the nature of many of 
the people of the world, Adams was uniquely qualified to treat with the 
Spanish minister on any problem, including the settlement of the bound-
ary between the United States and the Spanish colonies in the New 
World. 31 
Until 1817 efforts to settle this dispute had been limited to pro-
posals and counter-proposals; each side was unwilling to compromise, 
maintaining that its claims were just and honest. The differences were 
many, but the major problem was settlement of the southern and western 
boundary of the Louisiana Purchase and ownership of Florida. In the 
Southwest, Spaniards claimed that the Arkansas River was the limit of 
Louisiana, while Americans claimed that all of Texas had been included 
in the purchase and that Louisiana extended to the Pacific Ocean. The 
United States also claimed that Louisiana included part of West Florida 
and that this area had been bought from France. Spain replied that 
Florida had never been part of the French domain and could not have been 
included in the Louisiana Purchase. 32 
Although On!s in 1816 was given full power to settle the problem, 
several factors delayed initiating negotiations. The administration of 
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Pizarro in Spain needed time to develop its policies, and the formation 
of Monroe's administration after the election of 1816 delayed matters 
until the spring .. of 1817. However, when Onfs received his instructions 
from the home office in 1817, and when John Quincy Adams took possession 
of the Department of State, negotiations could begin, at least that 
early sparring which invariably occurred before major negotiations were 
begun. By the end of the summer of 1817 On{s was provided with a full 
set of instructions. However, the proposals of the Spanish government 
were similar to those already presented: the province of Louisiana had 
limited and well defined borders which did not include Texas or West 
Florida, Also, the Spaniards suggested that the Floridas might be sold 
to Great Britain. 33 
Lufs On!s had little confidence in the instructions which his 
government had forwarded. The United States was in no mood to forsake 
its claims, and there was a movement afoot in Congress, led by a young 
Westerner named Henry Clay, to recognize the independence of Spain's 
rebellious colonies in South America. With apprehension on!s arranged 
a meeting with Secretary Adams on December 1, 1817, to announce his na-
tion's proposals. As expected, On!s• demands were rejected immediately 
by Adams, Then the two diplomats began detailed talks, discussing the 
respective needs of their nations. These talks would last many days and 
search into many subjects before a final agreement was reached. 34 
Despite Adams' rejection of his offers, Onfs evidently believed 
that he and the New Englander could hammer out an agreement. However, 
on the same day that he met with Adams he received a notice from Pizarro 
announcing that the British had offered their good offices to mediate 
the dispute. This added another dimension to the negotiations--for the 
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British were not offering their aid from altruism, and England's offer 
had come as a result of Spain's plea to its European friends for aid. 
However, the offer was contingent on requests from both Spain and the 
United States to Britain for mediation. On!s 1 reply to this news was 
vague. He asked his superiors to return the talks to Madrid, and he 
warned them of the dangers of delaying a settlement of the affair. 
Americans, he asserted, might sei.ze Spanish territory by force if an 
agreement was not made quickly, and Spanish defenses in both Texas and 
Florida were appallingly poor. No mention of the English offer was 
35 
made, and the matter was dropped. 
In January of 1818 Adams and On!s again met to discuss their dif-
ferences. Adams expressed his distress that the Spaniards had wasted 
time in reaching a settlement, noting that a treaty could be made in a 
matter of days if Spaniards would negotiate in good faith. The problem, 
Adams asserted, was not insurmountable. Nonetheless, onfs countered 
Adams's statement by stating that any treaty made quickly would have to 
be based on uti possidetis as of 1809; each nation would receive the 
territory it had possessed that year. This arrangement was clearly un-
acceptable to the United States because it would deprive it of Texas 
and most of Florida. Thus negotiations continued. 36 
While these talks were proceeding, Adams warned his Spanish counter-
part that problems along the frontier might necessitate American inter-
vention into Spanish territory. In Florida the Seminole Indians had 
continually raided across the international boundary into American ter-
ritory. Also, pirates based on the coast of Texas were creating a 
hazard to American shipping. In the Treaty of San Lorenzo of 1795, 
Spai.n had promised to control the natives of its territories and to 
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prevent their injuring the citizens of the United States. Adams warned 
that Spain was not fulfilling this agreement. Already General Andrew 
Jackson, military connnander of the southern area of the United States, 
37 
had been given broad powers to punish the offending Seminoles. · 
on(s was not impressed by Adams' arguments. On January 16 Adams 
and On{s again met to discuss the affair. The American raised the 
thought of using the Colorado River as a boundary for Louisiana and the 
cession of all territory east of the Mississippi by Spain to the United 
States in return for the Americans giving up a claim to Texas! Onfs 1 
reply was to ask if Adams was referring to the Colorado of Natchitoches. 
This was one of the Spanish names for the Red River; surely, Onis 
queried, Adams could not be speaking of the Colorado River which:flowed 
through the middle of the Spanish province. Whether the Spaniard was 
attempting to cloud the issue or to chide Adams for his boldness in de-
manding Spanish territory is unclear. However, in his reports to Spain, 
onfs seemed certain which river the American meant. Nonetheless, Onis 
used this play on names to stall the issue for several weeks, and he 
displayed great surprise when Adams explained the situation to him in 
detail. onfs 1 shock--real or feigned--delayed the negotiations further, 
and the futile bantering between the two men continued. 38 
Although the Spaniard seemed to be purposefully delaying the talks, 
he was waiting for a more favorable time to settle the affair. However, 
he realized that too much waiting could result in military action on 
the frontier. Finally, in April, onfs was ordered to offer the Ameri-
cans a compromise: Spain would cede the Floridas to the United States, 
settling the eastern boundary dispute, and a line would be drawn be-
tween Natchitoches and Los Adaes straight north to the Missouri River, 
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then follow that stream to its source, thence straight north again, 
ending the western boundary dispute. on!s had been given instructions 
that would at least allow the beginning of give-and-take negotiations. 
This was the moment for which John Quincy Adams had been waiting. How-
ever, before On{s forwarded these proposals to Adams, the diplomats were 
shocked by news from the frontier--Andrew Jackson had invaded Florida! 39 
Luis On!s was looking to the end of the cold and wet winter when 
the news of Jackson's invasion reached him, spoiling his good spirits. 
He innnediately issued protests to the American government. However, 
despite the uproar which Jackson's bold action created, the action pro-
vided the incentive that the diplomats needed to spur them to serious 
negotiating. After the frontier clash, both Onfs and Adams realized 
that a settlement to the affair was needed quickly to avoid further in-
cident--and possibly war--between the United States and Spain. Neither 
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Adams nor Onis wanted war. 
In October, after the furor over Jackson's invasion had abated 
slightly, the Spaniard made new proposals. Florida would be ceded to 
the United States, as had been proposed previously. However, in the 
west the Spaniards were willing to compromise further. A line would be 
drawn following the Arroyo Hondo as before, but it would then follow 
the course of the Red River to 32° north latitude, then run north to 
the Missouri, and then west along that stream's course. It was a small 
concession, but it was something. Finally, fifteen years after the 
Louisiana Purchase had been made, negotiations to settle the disputed 
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boundary began in earnest. 
Adams rejected the Spanish offer, but countered with his own pro-
posal. The cession of Florida had become assured except for the fate 
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of Spanish land grants that had been made in that region. Thus the 
problem was negotiating the western boundary. Adams proposed that a 
line be drawn running up the Sabine River from its mouth to the 32nd 
parallel, thence north to the Red, up that stream to its source, then 
north to the 42nd parallel, and then west along that degree to the 
Pacific Ocean. This proposal, Adams told On{s, was the final American 
offer. Spain either could accept these terms or negotiations would 
42 
end. 
Nonetheless, the Spaniard demurred. In mid-November, On{s an-
nounced new Spanish terms: the line would begin at the Sabine, but 
would then go straight north to the Missouri and thence along that 
river to its source. In the period before Adams' offer and On!s 1 re-
ply, the Spaniard received permission from his government to withdraw 
Spanish claims to the Colorado River. However, On!s evidently believed 
that he could make an agreement without yielding part of Texas and con-
cealed this news from Adams. 43 
At this time the negotiations were delayed by outside events. The 
matter of Jackson's invasion had to be settled and a new administra-
tion assumed control in Spain. Following the invasion of Florida, 
Spaniards demanded that preparations be made for the damages done by 
the American troops and that General Jackson be reprimanded publically. 
Most American officials, including President Monroe, believed that 
Jackson had made a serious error in judgment and that the United States 
had been put in an awkward position by his actions. However, John 
Quincy Adams saw the matter differently. He asserted that Jackson had 
been merely aiding the Spaniards with their Indian problem; rather than 
a reprimand, he said, Jackson should be th.anked for his actions. Thus 
ll5 
the Spaniards, who believed the affair had given them the upper hand in 
the negotiations, were presented with a surprising situation. Adams 
had turned an embarrassing incident into an American advantage by noting 
that the Spaniards had not performed their promise to control the na-
44 
tives in Florida. 
In Spain financial troubles and court intrigues caused the fall of 
Pizarro's ministry. He was replaced by the administration of the Mar-
qu!s de Casa Irujo, who had been the Spanish minister to the United 
States during Jefferson's presidency. Fortunately for the diplomats, 
this new government continued Pizarro's approach to negotiating. Thus 
when On!s was notified of the change in government late in November, 
his instructions were similar to those issued previously by Pizarro. 
Therefore negotiations continued, altered only slightly by Adams' of-
fensive use of the affair in Florida. 45 
After Onfs received his new instructions from Irujo, and after 
Adams laid the dispute over Jackson's invasion to rest, the two men were 
near a settlement. On February 1, 1819, the Spaniard issued a revised 
offer to Adams, embodying new and liberal compromise terms. A line 
would be drawn up the Sabine to its source, then run north to the Red 
River; it would then follow that stream to the 95th meridian, thence 
straight north to the Arkansas and along that stream to its source, 
then run due west to the Williamette and follow that river to the 
Pacific. Of course, the Willamette, a tributary of the Columbia, did 
not flow into the Pacific, but neither Adams nor onfs was armed with 
specific information concerning the geography of the West. The agree-
ment worked on paper, and for their purposes proved satisfactory. 46 
The Americans rejected On!s• proposal, however, and issued a 
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counter-proposal. Adams suggested that a line be placed either on the 
lOlst or 102nd meridian, run to the 4lst parallel, and then move along 
that line to the Pacific. On!s responded by offering to fix the bound-
ary at the Sabine north to the 32nd parallel, thence north to the Red, 
follow that stream to the lOOth meridian, run north to the Arkansas, 
and go up that stream to the 42nd paralle, go west to the Williamette, 
follow that river to the 43rd parallel, and then go west to the Pacific. 
Again inaccurate geographical information prevented the diplomats from 
noting that the Arkansas did not touch the 42nd parallel. 47 
The Spanish proposal was well received by the Americans. Presi-
dent Monroe expressed his pleasure at the terms, noting that a settle-
ment seemed near. However, John Quincy Adams was dissatisfied because 
the agreement did not include the cession of Texas to the United 
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States. Yet Monroe was adamant that the dispute be settled. 
With minor changes the treaty was signed on February 22, 1819. 
Florida was ceded to the United States in return for that nation's as-
sumption of debts owed by Spain to American citizens. And the Louisiana 
boundary was similar to that proposed by Onfs: it began at the mouth 
of the Sabine River, it then followed the west or south bank of the Sa-
bine to the 32nd parallel, then ran due north to the Red River, followed 
that stream along its south or west bank to the lOOth meridian, then 
west straight north to its source, then went due north to the 42nd 
parallel, and followed that due west to the Pacific Ocean. The boundary 
was placed on the southern or western banks of the streams mentioned at 
Adams' demand. He had been forced to give up his claim to Texas; 
therefore he demanded that Spain in return grant sole ownership of the 
rivers to the United States. This appeared to be a small matter, for 
117 
Spaniards retained the right to navigate the streams; however, Adams' 
insistence on the south or west bank would later create many problems 
for the State of Texas in disputes over mineral rights in the beds of 
the Sabine and Red rivers. Also included in the treaty were minor 
settlements of claims and damage suits and protection of the rights of 
Spanish citizens living in the ceded territories. 49 
The Adams-On{s Treaty, as it became known, was greeted with loud 
protests because it did not secure Texas for the United States. Some 
officials, led by Henry Clay, wanted to reject the treaty because Adams 
had forsaken all American claim to Texas. However, there was little 
hope of success for the treaty's opponents. Adams had negotiated the 
first agreement which extended American ownership of the Pacific. Also 
the agreement defined the southern and western boundaries of the Louisi-
ana Purchase. The vagueness of Louisiana had become a festering sore 
by 1819. Settlers wishing to move into the area along the Red River 
could not be certain whether they were on American or Spanish soil un-
til this boundary was drawn. Therefore, whatever the drawbacks of the 
treaty, its ratification was inevitable. Although disputes over the 
fate of Spanish land grants in Florida delayed the exchange of ratif ica-
tions until 1821, the agreement withstood criticism. The United States 
once more had definite borders in the Southwest, and once more the Red 
River had an important role. rhe Red had separated Spanish and French 
possessions in the New World for more than half a century; in 1819 it 
marked the division of Spanish Texas and the United States. With this 
agreement, the area along the Red River was open for willing settlers 
h . h "ld so to carve omes int e wi erness. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE GREAT RAFT 
By 1819, when the Adams-Onfs Treaty was signed, the lower valley 
of the Red River, that part below the Great Raft, was in the process of 
rapid settlement by Americans. Alexandria, near the mouth of the 
river, and Natchitoches, the old French trading post, had become cen-
ters of trade and marketing. Rapides Parish, where Alexandria was lo-
cated, had 6,065 citizens in the census of 1820, while Natchitoches 
County that year had 7,486 inhabitants. Between these two towns were 
farmers, cutting timber and selling it to lumbermen, grubbing out 
stumps, and planting their fields with cotton. Traders still wandered 
the region, selling goods at isolated farmhouses and bartering for furs 
with the few Indians still living there. Louisiana was booming, thanks 
in part to statehood which had come in 1812, and the northern portion 
was gaining population rapidly. 1 
Upriver from the Great Raft, however, the valley of the Red River 
in 1819 was still largely the domain of Indians, as it had been for un-
countable centuries. Prior to that time, few Americans had ventured 
into the area because national ownership of the region was uncertain. 
Then, when the Adams-Onfs Treaty removed that problem, three barriers to 
settlement remained~ the land to the south of the Red was controlled 
by Spaniards to 1821 and then by Mexicans, and their policies toward 
American settlers fluctuated rapidly; the land to the north of the Red 
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was forbidden to white settlers, for it had been set aside by the 
government of the United States as a permanent home for Indians, many 
of them refugees from the East; and, third, the Great Raft was blocking 
navigation of the river and flooding the surrounding countryside with 
backwater. Before the upper portion of the Red could be settled per-
manently, each of these barriers would have to be modified or changed 
drastically. 2 
As early as 1763, when Spain received,Louisiana from France, 
Spaniards realized that the vast, sprawling province should be popu-
lated. But how to populate the area was a difficult problem. Despite 
repeated attempts by the Spanish government to encourage its citizens 
to colonize Louisiana, few Spaniards were willing to forsake civiliza-
tion for the wilderness. However, after the American Revolution, some 
citizens of that republic were lured across the Mississippi by a Spanish 
promise of free or inexpensive land. At first Spanish officials were 
favorable to the colonization of Louisiana by Americans. However, 
these officials gradually grew fearful that Americans were plotting to 
wrest the province from Spanish control. This fear was heightened by 
the French Revolution, which caused the death of many aristocrats in 
Europe and which found many supporters in the United States. Spanish 
officials, most of them noblemen, were uninspired by the free-thinking 
republicanism espoused by revolutionaries. Indeed, many Spaniards, 
fingering their ruffled collars, saw American colonists as potential 
revolutionaries. In 1795 all foreigners were banned from the Spanish 
colonies--and all Frenchmen were ordered arrested! 3 
After the Louisiana Purchase, Spanish officials in Texas became 
increasingly suspicious of the intentions of Americans who wished to 
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enter the province. They believed that the grasping attitude of the 
Americans concerning the boundaries of Louiaiana indicated rampant im-
pe-rialism toward Spanish colonies. Thus Texas was closed to Americans 
in 1804 by order of Cormnandant-General Nemesis Salcedo. 4 
The passage of time gradually relieved these fears of American 
aggression, although several filibusters into Texas during the second 
decade of the nineteenth century had originated in the United States. 
By 1820 Spanish officials were again concerned by the scant population 
in Texas. Their fears were overcome by their desires to populate the 
province. Thus, they were receptive to the plan of Moses Austin in 
late 1820 to bring American settlers into Texas. However, they were 
careful to assure the loyalty of such Americans by demanding an oath of 
allegiance from the settlers. 5 
More directly, the creation of the Indian Territory, accompanied 
by a prohibition of white settlement of the area, prevented the popula-
tion of the Red River valley in the present-day state of Oklahoma. How-
ever, the Indian policy of the United States led to the construction of 
the first military post on the Red River above Natchitoches. Hoping 
to prevent conflicts among the Indians, the United States Army es-
tablished Cantonment Towson near the confluence of the Red and Kiamichi 
rivers in May of 1824. A small garrison was stationed at the post to 
keep the peace. However, the need for the troops elsewhere and the 
difficulties of supplying the post caused by the raft on the Red River 
forced the cantonment to be abandoned in 1829. 6 
After Cantonment Towson was abandoned, Indian troubles increased. 
A year after the troops left the post on the Red, they returned to es-
tablish Camp Phoenix. The post was, opened in November of 1830; in 1831 
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it was renamed Cantonment Towson, using the name given to the original 
post at the site. Also in 1831 the army established another post on the 
Red. Farther upriver, near the mouth of the Washita, Cantonment Leaven-
worth was erected for reasons similar to those which had caused the 
building of Cantonment Towson. 7 
The establishment of the two military posts accentuated the need 
for the removal of the raft from the Red River. Boats carrying supplies 
to these posts were forced to circumnavigate the raft by entering the 
bayous and cut-offs along the course of the river, extending the time 
needed to make the voyage and endangering the vessels and their cargos. 
The time had come for the government to begin the long-awaited effort 
to remove the obstruction from the river. 8 
Many people had urged the government to remove the raft because 
the advantages were obvious. Of course, the primary gain would be 
easier navigation of the Red River. Cleared of this obstruction, the 
river would become a highway of connnerce and settlement into the in-
terior of the continent. This alone was justification for the necessary 
appropriations to remove the raft. However, other advantages were 
probable. The raft clogged the river to the intent that water which 
ordinarily would have flowed harmlessly downstream was backed up, 
flooding the low-lands which surrounded the river. Thus large areas of 
present-day northeast Texas, northwest Louisiana, southwest Arkansas, 
and southeastern Oklahoma were inundated annually. These lands were 
rich and fertile, ideal for farming, but could not be settled because 
of the high waters created by the raft. 9 
Removal of the raft could come only after Congressional action. 
Andrew H •. Sevier, a leader of the Arkansas delegation, presented several 
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documents to Congress containing information about the raft. These 
were the first detailed reports which Congress received concerning the 
problem. One of the reports was especially informative because it came 
from Dr. Joseph Paxton of Mount Prairie, Arkansas, in the southwestern 
part of that territory. Paxton, a long-time resident of the region and 
a trained scientist, detailed the problems which the raft had created, 
10 
and suggested methods for its removal. . To Sevier he wrote: 
Opening the raft, then, would reclaim at least three-
fourths of the land at present occupied, and rendered en-
tirely useless by it [the water], and thus would place at 
the innnediat.e disposal of the United States, property in 
its present situation of no value, but which would then be 
worth the enormous sum of seven hundred thousand dollars.11 
Realizing that Congressmen might be skeptical of such a large figure, 
Paxton explained his calculations: 
The· raft is eighty miles long, and will average twenty 
in width. This section ••• would be more completely re-
claimed, and when reclaimed, would be better, inasmuch as 
it would be more free from inundation, than the bottoms 
of this river generally; and the numerous lakes in this 
valley that formed by the river so frequently cutting 
across the necks of its bends, are filled up.--These 
circumstances, together with its advantageous situation 
in other respects, would render it equal, if not su-
perior, in intrinsic ·value, to any section of its size 
whatever.12 
Paxton tried to convince the national legislators that removal- of 
the raft was in the national interest: "Opening the raft would prevent 
an immense destruction of United States' property. It must not be for-
gotten that the raft is not standing still, but is gradually progressing 
upwards, like a destroying angel, spreading desolation over a most 
13 lovely country." This growth of the raft was costing "the appalling 
14 
rate of near one hundred thousand dollars in each ten years •11 More-
over, wrote the doctor, the raft was impeding the settlement of the 
area behind it, leaving tens of thousands of beautiful and fertile 
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acres desolate with so few people that they hardly constitute "three 
respectable counties." Next in his argument he appealed to American 
patriotism, asserting that if the raft was not removed the region up-
. ld . d h . f 1 f S . d d I d · l S river wou remain un er t e in uence o paniar s an n ians. 
Fearing that his audience of Congressmen might not fully under-
stand the advantages of appropriating funds for the removal of the 
raft, he summarized the benefits that would follow. Among these were 
easier transport for supplies bound for Cantonment Towson and greater 
control over the Indians living along the upper Red River. These two 
elements were directly linked together, for at the time he was writing, 
Paxton knew that Army officials were considering the removal of the 
soldiers from Cantonment Towson because ot' the difficulties of supply-
ing them. Such a removal, he declared, would be a grave mistake; what 
was needed was more troops, not fewer. Angrily he wrote that the 
government "as well might send a bear in pursuit of an antelope, as 
16 
troops after the Osages•" 
Finally Paxton asserted that the lumber along the Red River that 
would be available once the raft was removed was worth the expenditure. 
He wrote: 
About forty miles above the head of the raft it [the 
forest] commences growing, and seems to take place and grow 
in the same kinds of soil that the cypress does below. It 
would be difficult for a person acquainted only with up-
land cedars, to form a correct idea of the beauty, size, 
and synunetry of those that grow in the bottoms of Red 
river. I have seen, with wonder and never-ceasing as-
tonishment, those vast, lofty cedar groves, in many places 
for three hundred miles above the settlement. They had 
frequently been described to me, but I had formed no 
ade·quate idea of them; nor do I believe it is in the 
power of language to give a representation of their im-
posing grandeur, that would not fall far short of reality 
on seeing them. They would doubtless be a valuable ac-
quisition, particularly to the Navy, and to the city and 
neighborhood of New-Orleans; nor can I believe that the 
time is far hence, when the cedars of Red river will be-
come as celebrated in these United States, as those of 
Lebanon were once in Palestine.17 
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After praising the virtues of opening the Red River, Paxton turned 
to the matter of performing the task. Although he begged Congressmen 
to realize that he was not an expert concerning cost analysis, he as-
serted, "Opening the raft, however, would doubtless far more than re-
munerate government for any money that, with proper management, would 
18 be necessarily expended." He suggested several ways of removing the 
raft, such as cutting canals to divert the waters of the Red into old 
channels of the river that had been forsaken by the whims of the river. 
By diverting the water the river bed could then be cleared of the raft. 
Also he suggested that the bayous and swamps along the river should be 
dammed to prevent the gathering of another raft because much of the 
driftwood which had formed the original raft had come into the stream 
from these sources. Finally, low banks that were apt to be washed away 
by high waters should be built up to prevent such an occurrence. Paxton 
concluded that the raft should be removed as soon as possible for the 
sake of the nation and the area along the river. 19 
The first Congressional appropriation for the removal of the raft, 
made on May 23, 1828, was twenty-five thousand dollars, a miniscule sum 
considering the magnitude of the task at hand. However, for four years 
little was done except plan. In 1832 Captain Henry Miller Shreve of the 
Army Corps of Engineerings, the first captain to take a steamboat above 
the rapids on the river at Alexandria, ascending the Red in the Enter-
prise in 1815, was appointed to direct the· removal of the obstruction. 
At the time of his appointment, Shreve was Superintendent of the Carp's 
Western Waters Department. Originally, the Corps had planned to 
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circumvent the raft by digging canals and deepening bayous rather than 
by clearing the main channel. However, by 1832 the Chief Engineer of 
the Army, Brigadeer General Charles Gratiot, had determined that the 
plan"··· of opening short canals and deepening bayous with a view to 
effect a passage around the raft, is not such as to ensure permanent 
b f . 1120 ene 1t •••• Gratiot therefore wrote to Shreve, asking him to re ... 
i h . . 21 appra se t e s1tuat1on. 
On September 29, 1832, Captain Shreve replied to Gratiot that "by 
the application of the proper means to accomplish such an object ••• the 
raft may be removed at much less expense than canals can be ex-
cavated ••• and better navigation would of course be obtained •••• 1122 
Shreve suggested that the raft could be removed easily if all obstruc-
tions below it were cleared; then the timbers of the raft could be 
loosened and allowed to float downstream. This not only would facili-
tate the removal of the raft, but also would improve the navigability 
of the lower section of the stream. Finally, Shreve suggested that the 
task could be performed by the snag-boat Archimedes, which he had de-
signed and which at that time was working on the Ohio River. 23 
Evidently impressed by Shreve's ideas, General Gratiot on February 
8, 1833, ordered the captain to proceed with all available machinery to 
the Red River and to connnence operations to remove the raft. After a 
short delay, created by his absence from the Corps' western headquarters 
in Louisville, Kentucky, Shreve departed for the Red River, arriving at 
the Great Raft on April 11, 1833. 24 
The day after his arrival Shreve reported to Gratiot, relating his 
first impression of the raft. He wrote that he had traveled five miles 
into the raft and had found it surprisingly easy to remove. However, 
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he noted that the serious problem would be disposing of the timber after 
it had been removed from the raft. He wrote, "it is impracticable to 
clear the banks of the timber and willows that grow to low water mark" 
because of the level of the water in the river. Hopefully he added 
that if this problem was solved the raft could be cleared away in two 
25 
months. 
A month after his first report to Gratiot, Shreve wrote t;hat some 
forty miles of the raft had been cleared. Thirty-one sections of the 
raft had been removed "by drawing them out, log by log, and separating 
them in such manner as to pass them down the bayous •••• 11 He continued 
that the bayous were filled with timber, and then the lumber was packed 
solid by ramming a snag boat against the logs. Thus two problems were 
solved. The unwanted timbers were disposed of and the bayous were 
filled, preventing the run-off of water from the main channe1. 26 
On June 23, 1833, progress ceased because of low water. During 
the three months of work four snag boats, the Archimedes, the Souvenir, 
the Java, and the Pearl, had removed more than seventy miles of the 
raft. Shreve happily reported that the main channel was deepening be-
cause of the increased current created by the removal of the raft and 
the closing of the bayous. Shreve, evidently secure in his methods, 
ended his report by declaring that he was " ••• prepared to state to the 
department, in positive terms, that the whole of the great raft can be 
removed in such a manner as to be as permanent and safe a steamboat 
navigation as any part of the river, from the raft to the Mississip~ 
pi.1127 All that was needed was congressional funds. 
In his report to the Chief Engineer, detailing all the work done 
during the fiscal year 1833, Shreve noted that "the expense of removing 
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the raft ••• will be repaid at least threefold by the lands that must 
evidently be redeemed in the immediate line of the raft.1128 He then 
asked that Congress appropriate one hundred thousand dollars to complete 
29 
the task. 
The national legislators responded to Shreve's request by allotting 
fifty thousand dollars for the project and work continued the next sea-
son. However, to the dismay of Shreve and his superiors, the raft had 
replenished itself during the off season. While the engineers had been 
prevented from working, the low waters had continued to deposit drift-
wood in the main channel. In addition, several of the dams that had 
been placed in the bayous had rotted and broken, allowing timbers to re-
turn to the raft and allowing water to drain from the main channel. 
The problems of removing the raft were greater than Shreve originally 
30 had supposed. 
Although Shreve had estimated that the raft could be removed for 
one hundred thousand dollars·, costs continued to mount. In 1835 Con-
gress again allotted fifty thousand dollars, bringing the total appropri-
ation to Shreve's figure of one hundred thousand. However, work was not 
completed on the raft. Indeed, additional appropriations of forty 
thousand dollars in 1836, sixty-five thousand in 1837, and seventy 
thousand in 1838 were necessary to continue the task. 31 
Despite these large outlays of funds, the raft remained. Shreve 
had believed that the raft could be removed in a matter of months, but 
in December of 1839 Captain Abram Tyson, in command of the snagboat 
Eradicator, accompanied by a keel boat and a large group of men, reached 
the raft to begin operations. Work continued on the removal until 
April 15 when "an unusual high freshet in the river brought down a 
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heavy run of timber, and formed a new raft of 2,150 yards in the same 
place from which the raft had been removed •••• 1132 This new raft blocked 
the channel entirely, trapping two steamboats on the upper section of 
the stream. Also, in June of 1839 all appropriated funds had been ex~ 
pended; almost a quarter of a million dollars had been spent--and the 
river was still blocked by the contrary raft. Shreve, still in charge 
of the operation, estimated that another eighty-five thousand dollars 
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was needed to complete the task. 
Henry Shreve evidently realized that Congressmen were growing un-
happy with the continued expense involved in removing the raft. There-
fore in his report for the fiscal year 1839 he added another list of 
advantages which would be obtained by removing the raft. However, Con-
gressmen were unimpressed and no funds were appropriated in 1839 or 
1840. Meanwhile, work on the raft stopped--and the obstruction grew. 
In December of 1839, Quartermaster General Thomas Jessup informed Secre-
tary of War Joel Poinsett that supplies for Fort Towson would have to be 
transported overland because the raft made navigation of the Red River 
impossible. By the end of 1839 the raft had grown a mile in length. 
More than two hundred thousand dollars and five years of work would be 
34 
negated by the whims of the river unless action was taken. 
Everyone realized that work had to be resumed to remove the raft. 
Finally in September of 1841 Congress appropriated seventy-five thousand 
dollars for the project. Meanwhile, the burden of directing the re-
moval of the raft had passed from Henry Shreve to Colonial Stephen Har-
riman Long, an experienced engineer and scientist who had led an ex-
pedition into the Trans-Mississippi West twenty years before his ap-




On reaching the Red, Long found the difficulties that Shreve had 
faced. These included constant additions to the raft made by each rise 
of the water, and the disposal of the timber which had been extracted 
from the raft. Work on the raft was limited to a few months each year, 
January to June, because of a marked decrease in the depth of the water 
during the summer and fall. During periods of low water, the river was 
flooded by sporatic rains on its upper watershed. These dramatic rises 
and falls of the water left large deposits of driftwood, enlarging the 
raft. Also, the timber which had been placed in bayous rotted and es-
capped, re-entering the raft. These problems had been compounded by 
repeated delays in progress to repair aging machinery. Long reported 
that on arriving at the raft he had found the snag boat Eradicator 
"lying at the shore of the river out of repair, and unfit for ser-. 
vice.1136 The failure of Congress to appropriate funds for the project 
had prevented proper maintenance. 
By Long's estimation seventy-five thousand dollars were needed for 
the removal of the raft. However, his report contained no promises of 
early completion and immediate benefits as had Shreve 1 s. The Red River 
raft had become a complex and challenging problem, one not to be taken 
lightly. Long realized that many more dollars and man-hours would be 
needed to open the Red River. 37 
Although the Congress answered Long's request by appropriating 
seventy-five thousand dollars in 1841, little progress was made. Prob-
lems with the raft continued to negate the efforts of the engineers. 
Hoping to facilitate the task, Long turned to private contractors. In 
1841 Thomas T. Williamson was contracted to remove three miles of the 
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raft for fifteen thousand dollars. Additional funds were provided for 
38 
keeping the river open for four years. 
Williamson's contract granted him the right to dig artificial 
channels across bends of the river. Thus the river would be straightened 
and the loops of the bends could be used to store unwanted timber from 
the raft. However, residents of the river below the raft complained 
that the cut-offs would increase both the volume and speed of the 
river's current, flooding their lands and ruining their crops. There-
fore Williamson was not allowed to create artificial channels. This 
increased expenses and slowed progress. Although the work was completed 
during the spring of 1842, the cost of removing three miles of raft was 
considerably more than fifteen thousand dollars. And a large freshet of 
water late in the spring brought large quantities of driftwood down-
river after the work was completed, erecting a raft larger than the one 
that had been removed! The work had to be done again. 39 
Williamson continued to labor on the raft until 1845. That year 
the superintendent of the project, Captain Charles Linnard, wrote: 
Work of this kind cannot be done by contract. He who 
has sufficient means will not hazard them in so precarious 
and costly an undertaking and he who has not is, of course, 
unable to accomplish anything. Such work can be done only 
by the Government, with its own means, and under well-
selected superintendents. It is not merely necessary that 40 
the materials of which they are composed be ••• destroyed •••• 
Thus the experiment in using private contractors to remove the Red River 
raft ended in failure. Most of the funds that had been appropriated in 
1841 had been expended by 1845; and Congress was unwilling to make ad-
ditional allotments. Work on the raft slowed to a standstill. Work was 
resumed briefly in 1852. Reacting to public demand, the Congress ap-
propriated one hundred thousand dollars for the project and Colonel 
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Joseph E. Johnston was appointed to• connnand the effort. The thrust of 
the work was consumed by the construction of canals around the raft. 
However, continued failures to develop a permanent solution caused work 
to cease again in 1856. 41 
Work resumed under the direction of Charles A. Fuller, a civilian 
agent of the Army Corps of Topographical Engineers. By 1855 only six 
thousand dollars of the appropriation had been spent. Fuller's report 
for 1855 gave little hope for a permanent solution to the problem of 
the raft. His suggestions were limited to annual expenditures for the 
removal of each new raft which formed with the rising water. Thus the 
project had deteriorated from permanently improving the Red River for 
navigation to merely repeating the task of. removing the obstructions 
each year. This meant that the river would be open for navigation only 
a few months each year, and that an annual appropriation would be neces-
sary. Congress, unwilling to see huge amounts of government funds float 
down the Red River each year, refused further appropriations after 1852. 
The nation was descending into the greatest crisis of its history, and 
national legislators were too busy with debates over slavery and 
trans-continental railroad routes to be concerned with inland waterways, 
especially one that had proven so expensive and uncooperative as the Red 
River. Congress would not appropriate additional funds for the removal 
of the raft until 1872, long after the problems of the 1850s had been 
. 42 
solved by war and replaced by other questions. 
Although the first effort to remove the raft had failed, much of 
the upper Red River valley had been settled by 1855. A revolution in 
1836 had ended the problem of Mexican ownership of Texas, and that 
state's subsequent annexation by the United States had led to the 
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migration of many Americans to the area along the southern bank of the 
Red. The north bank of the river had been populated by members of the 
Choctaw and Chicksaw nations; the populations of both Louisiana and 
Arkansas had increased measurably reaching more than 30,000 and 20,000 
respectively in 1850. In the 1830s Shreveport, Louisiana, had grown on 
the west bank of the Red about one hundred miles north of Natchitoches. 
Jefferson, Texas, founded in the 1830s on Big Cypruss Creek fifty miles 
from the Red River, had become one of the leading towns in Texas with a 
population of more than five thousand by 1850. Also, by 1850 Jefferson 
was a leading waterport--because of the raft. With the raft clogging 
the main channel and backing up the waters of the stream, the water 
level was raised sufficiently to allow steamboats to reach Jefferson. 
Because of this Jefferson was the trading center of Northeast Texas. 
However, the prosperity which Jefferson enjoyed was tied to its con-
nection with the Red. The removal of the raft would stop the shipment 
of goods and end the years of plenty. 
Despite this growth of the population of the Red River valley, by 
1850 the section west of the ninety-seventh meridian remained desolate, 
the home of the unchallenged masters of the southern plains, the Coman-
che. Since 1800 land west of the 97th meridian had remained unchanged. 
The buffalo still roamed the land feeding the natives, and the Comanche 
still swept down from their homes along the Red River to spread de-
struction across Texas. Thomas Jefferson's dream of an American expedi-
tion to the source of the Red River remained unfulfilled. In 1852 
Randolph B. Marcy set out on one of the last great explorations of the 
American West to discover the headwaters of the Red River--and to still 
Jefferson's ghost. 
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CHAPTER VII 
RANDOLPH MARCY AND THE TERRA INCOGNITA 
By mid-nineteenth century, the United States had expanded across 
North America, reaching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from Canada 
to Mexico. From New York to California, Americans could call the land 
theirs. The United States was coming of age, but despite the refine-
ment of Boston and the bustling of San Francisco, much of the region 
stretching from the Mississippi to the Rockies and from Texas to the 
Dakota country lay unknown and unsettled, guarding its secrets from 
white men. Intripid explorers such as Zebulon Pike and John C. Fremont 
had wandered the American West, but much of the fact of what Jefferson 
had bought in 1803 remained veiled except to the eyes of wandering 
tribes of aborigines. 
Thomas Jefferson had organized two expeditions to ascent the Red 
River to its source. Both had failed. Zebulon Pike had set out across 
the West in 1805 to discover the sources of the Arkansas and Red 
rivers. He had failed, mainly due to problems of his own making. In 
1820 Stephen Harriman Long, a dour and scholarly explorer, had failed 
to reach the Red River because he mistook the Canadian for his goal. 
Thus the upper reaches of the Red River remained the domain of the Red-
man. This situation could not be allowed to continue. The Red River, 
an important international boundary for many years, and, in 1850, the 
northern border of Texas, could not remain unknown to its owners. The 
task fell to Captain Randolph Barnes Marcy of the Fifth Infantry, an 
infantryman who possessed unique and outstanding abilities. 1 
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Randolph Marcy was born in Greenwich, Massachusetts, in 1812, and 
graduated from the United States Military Academy twenty years later. 
Until 1849 his career had been undistinguished. That year he guided a 
group of two thousand westering settlers from Fort Smith, Arkansas, to 
Santa Fe, New Mexico, blazing a trail along the southern bank of the 
Canadian as he went. This endeavor had won Marcy acclaim for his tal-
ents, along with further assignments as an explorer. From 1849 until 
1852, Marcy explored the region surrounding the headwaters of the 
Trinity, Brazos, and Colorado rivers of Texas. During this period he 
noticed "the remarkable fact that a portion of one of the largest and 
most important rivers in the United States ••• remained up to that late 
period wholly unexplored and unknown, no white man having ever ascended 
the stream [the Red River] to its sources •••• In a word, the country em-
braced within the basin of Upper Red river had always been to us a 
2 
1 terra incognita. 111 On March 5, 1852, Randolph Marcy was instructed 
d h . . . 3 to reme y t is situation. 
Marcy was ordered to make his exploration without unnecessary de-
lay. Therefore he proceeded to the Red River, arriving near the mouth 
of the Little Wichita River in May of 1852. His second-in-command was 
Brevet Captain George B. McClellan, a close friend and his future son-
in-law. Arrangements were made for supplies to be shipped overland by 
wagons from Fort Smith, Arkansas, to the mouth of Cache Creek, the of-
ficial starting point of the expedition. Therefore, Marcy, McClellan, 
and a small contigent of soldiers followed the Red from the mouth of 
the Little Wichita to Cache Creek, arriving there on May 13. Finding 
that the supply train had not yet arrived because of heavy rains, Marcy 
explored the surrounding area. The explorer was impressed by the plant 
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life of the area, noting the size and quantity of trees. The next day 
the baggage train arrived, and the expedition began in earnest. 4 
Staying along the river, the party moved westward. On the seven-
teenth buffalo tracks were found, exciting the explorers. Marcy re-
marked, "We are anxiously awaiting the time when we shall see the 
5 
animals themselves, and anticipate much sport." However, the Indians 
who had been hired as guides informed the party that the tracks were 
five days old, and that the buffalo were far away. The sport would 
have to wait. However, that evening the explorers got an unexpected 
and dubious surprise. One of the guides informed them that a cougar 
had crossed the river nearby and was heading toward their camp. Im-
mediately the soldiers were armed and set their hunting dogs loose. 
The dogs, elated t-o be free from their shackles, sprinted into the 
darkness. However, Marcy noted that "the zeal which they manifested 
in starting out from camp, suddenly abated as soon as their olfactories 
came in contact with the track •••• " Nonetheless, the soldiers con-
vinced the rightfully cautious canines to continue, and the cougar was 
soon treed. Marcy arrived at the scene first and "fired several shots, 
which took effect and soon placed him 'hors du combat. 1116 Marcy's 
first big game trophy of the journey measured eight and a half feet from 
'l 7 nose to ta1 • 
The next day the party was forced to leave the Red River because 
the rugged terrain prevented the wagons from transversing the banks. 
In the afternoon the party was astonished by a freshet in the waters of 
a small stream on which they had camped. An hour after they had found 
the stream empty except for occasional holes of water, it was filled 
with a "perfect torrent." Marcy was amazed because the skies had been 
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clear for several days; his Indian guides informed him that it was a 
'f f h G S . . B gi t rom t e reat pirit. 
The next day the rains that had swollen the creek reached the 
party, drenching the men and making progress impossible for two days. 
On the twenty-second the group continued, having sighted the Wichita 
Mountains. That afternoon they reached a small tributary of the Red 
which they named Otter Creek in honor of the abundant inhabitants of 
the stream. A short excursion up this stream to its exit from the 
Wichitas revealed deposits of quartz which contained small flakes of 
gold. These same formations would lure latter-day prospectors to the 
region to search vainly for a mother lode. 9 
The rains which had slowed progress continued, leading Marcy to 
conclude that, because the region was usually dry, the effects of the 
Wichita Mountains protruding into the atmosphere had created the heavy 
downpours. On May 26 they sighted their first buffalo, and one was 
killed by an Indian guide. Marcy noted that the country changed near 
the mountains. Also, the river was different there. Whereas it pre-
viously had been wide and slow moving, it now was a narrow, rushing tor-
10 
rent. 
On the twenty-seventh the explorers met a party of Wichita Indians 
who had been hunting buffalo. The natives had many horses loaded with 
meat and were bound for their villages. The chief told Marcy that he 
had been searching for the white men for several days, having heard of 
their presence and wanting to know what their business was in his land. 
Marcy replied that he was going to the headwaters of the Red River, and 
assured the chief of the peaceful intent of his mission. Also, gifts 
were distributed among the natives. Marcy then warned the chief that 
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the Republic of Texas had become part of the United States, and that 
depredations into Texas would result in severe punishment for the of-
fending Indians. 11 
After these preliminaries were concluded, Marcy asked the chief 
for information about the country upriver. The reply was disheartening. 
Marcy recorded the chief's assertion that 
••• we would find one more stream of good water about two 
days' travel ••• that we should then leave the mountains, 
and after that find no more fresh water to the sources 
of the river. The chief represented the river from where 
it leaves the mountains as flowing over an elevated flat 
prairie country, totally destitute of water, wood, or grass, 
and the only substitute for fuel that could be had was the 
buffalo 'chips.112 
Marcy then asked if holes of fresh water could be found. The chief re-
plied that all water was soaked into the porous earth as soon as it 
13 
fell from the sky. 
The natives soon left the party, but their information stayed. 
The explorer wrote that "it would seem that we have anything but an 
14 
agreeable prospect before us." But he would not forsake his mission: 
"As soon ••• as the creek will admit of fording, I shall, without subject-
ing the command to too great privations, push forward as far as possible 
15 
into this most inhospitable and dreaded salt desert." Randolph Marcy 
h d . d d f h d. . f h" . "d. 16 a not receive comman o t e expe ition or is timi ity. 
The next day the explorers discovered by lunar observations that 
their camp was near the point "where the line dividing the Choctaw 
territory from the State of Texas crosses the Red River.1117 Accordingly 
the exact spot was marked by carving the longitude (100° 0' 4511 ) and 
latitude (34° 34 1 611 ) on a convenient tree. Also the next day, May 29, 
McClellan located and marked the point where the lOOth meridian crossed 
the Red River. 18 
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On May 30 the party marched to the confluence of the Red and its 
North Fork. Here the stream was six hundred and fifty yards wide. 
After passing the confluence of the streams, the explorers progressed 
up the North Fork without hardship for two days, arriving at the mouth 
of the Salt Fork. The contents of this stream were brackish and salty, 
polluting the contents of the main channel. Also, the waters in the 
main stream were found to contain minerals and salts which made it un-
palatable. However, fresh-water springs were located which provided 
sufficient quantities of drinking water. Near the mouth of the Salt 
Fork the party found a large mountain which they named Mount Webster in 
honor of Daniel Webster, the Secretary of State. 19 
Ascending the North Fork, the party found signs of a hunting party 
of Comanche Indians; however, no natives were sighted. Marcy noted 
that his guides, who were Delaware and Shawnee, were enemies of the 
Comanche, but that they scouted far away from the main column each day 
without fear; he remarked that they were ready to fight any plains 
. 20 
Indians if the odds were not greater than six to one. 
On June 7 Marcy and two of the Indian guides set out to explore 
the surrounding area. After traveling about three miles, the trio 
found fresh buffalo tracks. Marcy, still anxious to make his first 
kill, decided to follow the tracks, hoping to overtake the animals. On 
reaching a rise in the countryside, he sent one of his guides to its 
sunnnit to survey the area for animals. The guide, John Bull, rode to 
the appointed spot, and then began a series of gyrations which ended by 
his leaving at a full gallop toward the horizon. Marcy and his com-
panion followed to the top of the rise, arriving in time to sight Bull 
in hot pursuit of a fleeing buffalo. Marcy wrote that the native was 
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"mounted upon one of our most fractious and spirited horses, that had 
never been a buffalo before, and coming near the animal he seemed per-
fectly frantic with fear, making several desperate surges to the right 
and left, any one of which must have inevitably unseted his rider had 
he not been a most expert and skillful horseman.1121 Bull, on drawing 
near the beast, emptied his rifle in its direction; however, the great 
animal continued his fast pace. Reloading as he rode, the native 
pulled closer and "placed another ball directly back of the shoulder; 
but so tenacious of his life is this animal, that it was until the 
other Delaware and myself arrived and gave him four additional shots, 
22 
that we brought him to the ground." The three then took the best 
parts of the carcass and located a spring which Marcy determined would 
be the site of the next camp. 23 
The same day of the buffalo hunt Marcy dispatched McClellan with 
an interpreter to follow Comanche tracks found along the path. However, 
24 
the party returned to report that the natives had departed southward. 
The party then proceeded up the North Fork signing the Llano 
Estacado on June 12, 1852. That same day the explorers camped near the 
remains of hunting lodges of a band of Kiowa Indians. The native 
guides told the white men that the camp had been Kiowa rather than 
Comanche because the former dug "holes for their fires about two feet 
in diameter, while the latter only make them about fifteen inches.1125 
Leaving this site, the party pushed farther up the stream, reaching 
its headwaters on June 16. There a bottle was buried to coIIUnemorate 
the occasion. A note placed in the bottle read in part: 
On the 16th of June, 1852, an exploring expedition, 
composed of Captain R. B. Marcy, Captain G. B. McClellan, 
Lieutenant J. Updegraff, and Doctor G.C. Shumard, with 
fifty-five men of company D fifth infantry, encamped here, 
having ~5aced the north branch of Red river to its 
source. 
Also, a nearby tree was emblazoned with the message: "Exploring Ex-
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pedition, June 16, 1852. 11 The first leg of the journey had been com-
pleted. 
The day after he found the source of the North Fork, Marcy and 
eleven of his companions set out northward to find the Canadian River. 
Marching about twenty-five miles, the group arrived at the Canadian and 
soon located a point on the stream which Marcy recognized from his ex-
ploration in 1849. Having completed this mission, the party returned 
to the main camp. The next day, June 20, Marcy directed his men south-
28 
ward toward the main fork of the Red River--and its source. 
For six days the explorers traveled southward, sighting a party of 
Kiowa on the twenty-second, but avoided contact. On June 26 they 
reached a massive prairie dog town which moved Marcy to remark on the 
characteristics of the burrowing rodent. He asserted that one town 
would cover 896,000 square acres, for he estimated "the holes to be at 
the usual distances of about twenty yards apart, and each burrow oc-
cupied by a family of four or five dogs, I fancy that the aggregate 
1 ld b h h . h . 1129 popu ation wou e greater t an any ot er city in t e universe. 
Furthermore, noting that some had asserted that the rattlesnake and the 
prairie dog lived in harmony in the same holes, he remarked that 11 ••• we 
have satisfied ourselves that this is a domestic arrangement entirely 
at the variance with the wishes of the dogs, as the snakes prey upon 
. 30 
them, and must be considered as intruders •11 In support of this con-
clusion Marcy wrote that a rattlesnake that had been killed by the 
31 
explorers was found to have swallowed a full-grown prairie dog. 
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Pulling himself away from his evident fascination with the prairie 
dogs, Marcy pushed southward, skirting the edge of the Llano Estacado. 
The party, on June 27, reached the main channel of the Red near its 
exit from the Staked Plains. They found the river nine hundred yards 
wide and flowing over a sandy bed. The next day they reached the Llano, 
rising eight hundred feet above the prairies. Marcy and McClellan set 
out to discover a route onto _the escarpment which would allow passage 
for the wagons; however, this proved to be a futile task. Nonetheless, 
the excursion provided the explorers with excitement. 32 
During the brief survey of the area, the two explorers sighted a 
herd of antelope grazing quietly among a stand of mesquite. Marcy, 
ever a hunter, was determined to call one of the beasts within range of 
his rifle. Therefore he began a series of bleats with his call, which 
had been brought for such an occasion. Accordingly, one of the horned 
beasts approached. Marcy readied his weapon and was about to fire when 
his attention was captured by 11 ••• a rustling which I heard in the grass 
to my left. Casing my eyes in that direction, to my no small astonish-
ment I saw a tremendous panther bounding at full speed directly towards 
33 
me, and within the short distance of twenty steps." His role now 
changed from the hunter to the hunted, Marcy continued: 
As may be imagined, I immediately abandoned the ante-
lope, and directing my rifle at the panther, sent a ball 
through his chest, which stretched him out upon the grass 
about ten yards from where I had taken my position. Im-
pressed with the belief that I had accomplished a feat of 
rather more than ordinary importance in the sporting line, 
I placed my hand to my mouth, ('a la savage,') and gave 
several as loud shouts of exultation as my weak lungs 
would admit, partly for the purpose of giving vent to my 
feelings of triumph, and also to call the Captain. 
[McClellan]. 34 
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However, Marcy 1 s experience was not over. When McC le.l lan approached 
and the two men returned to the spot of Marcy's feat, they found the 
prey 11 ••• upon his feet, making off. 1135 Acting quickly, McClellan dis-
charged his rifle into the beast and administered a clubbing with its 
k II • h" h" . ,,36 stoc to give im is quietus. The adventure was over. 
Marcy, to his credit, noted that: "It occurred to me afterwards 
that it would not always be consistent with one's safety to use the 
deer-bleat ••• unless we were perfectly certain we should have out wits 
about us in the event of a panther or large bear (which is of ten the 
case) taking it into his head to give credence to the counterfeit.1137 
Laconically, the explorer sUIIlllled up the incident by writing, "The pan-
ther had probably heard the bleat, and was coming towards it with the 
pleasant anticipation of making his breakfast from a tender fawn; but, 
fortunately for me, I disappointed him. 1138 
Undeterred, Marcy set out exploring the next day. Because the ter-
rain was too rugged to support the wagons, the main party was left be-
hind while Marcy, McClellan, and ten men pushed onto the Llany Esta-
cado. Following the course of the river onto the Llano, the men were 
awed by the grandeur of the terrain. The great height of the escarp-
ments encased the river bed gave the explorers the feeling of walking 
into a massive tunnel. The walls of valley "were worn away, by the 
lapse of time and the action of the water, and the weather, into the 
most fantastic forms, that required but little effort of the imagination 
to convert into works of art, and all united in forming one of the 
grandest and most picturesque scenes that can be imagined •1139 Marcy, 
as always ready to invoke his powers of description, wrote: 
We all, with one accord, stopped and gazed with wonder 
and admiration upon a panorama which was not for the first 
time exhibited to the eyes of civilized man. Occasionally 
might be seen a good representation of the toweringwalls 
of a castle of the feudal ages, with its giddy battlements 
pierced with loopholes, and its projecting watch-towers 
standing out in bold relief upon the azure ground of pure 
and transparent sky above. In other places our fancy 
would metamorphose the escarpments into a bastion front, 
as perfectly modeled and constructed as if it had been a 
production of the genius of Vauban, with redoubts and 
salient angles all arranged in due order. Then, again, 
we would see a colossal specimen of sculpture representing 
the human figure, with all the features of the fact, 
which, standing upon its lofty pedestal, overlooks the 
valley, and seems to have been designed and executed by 
the Almighty artist as the presiding genius of these 
dismal solitudes.40 
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But Marcy was aware of the power--and possible danger--of nature.: He 
saw hidden within the grandeur and beauty of nature 11 ••• its unreclaimed 
sublimity and wildness ••• ," the power and scope of the scene inspired 
him 11 ••• with that veneration which is justly due to the high antiquity 
of nature's handiworks, and which seems to increase as we consider the 
solemn and important lesson that is taught us in reflecting upon their 
continued permanence when contrasted·with our own fleeting and momentary 
. ,41 existence •1 
Despite their wonderment at the beauty of the area, the explorers 
suffered. On the Llano fresh water was scarce, if not nonexistent. 
Several soldiers attempted to drank the brackish, mineral-laden waters 
of the river, but were rewarded by severe stomach cramps and vomiting. 
Nonetheless, the men retained their cheerfulness, discussing 11 ••• the 
relative merits of different kinds of fancy iced drinks would could be 
procured in the cities, and the prices that could be obtained for some 
42 
of them if they were within reach of our party." Even at might the 
group suffered. Sleep was an elusive goal despite the hardships of the 
day. Marcy noted that his ''slumbers were continually disturbed by 
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dreams, in which I fancied myself swallowing huge draughts of ice-
43 
water." One of the group offered 'two thousand dollars for one bucket 
of cold, clear water. However, Marcy sadly replied that "• •• this was 
one of those few instances in which money was not sufficiently potent 
to attain the object desired.1144 
On July 1, the determination of the explorers was rewarded by the 
discovery of a fresh water spring--and the source of the Red River. Af-
ter refreshing themselves at the spring, the party proceeded to a place 
where the valley closed, uniting the walls of the escarpment. Here a 
spring burst "out from its cavernous reservoir, and, leaping down over 
the huge masses of rock below, here connnences its long journey to unite 
with other tributaries in making the Mississippi the noblest river in 
the universe.1145 A nearby tree was blazed with the date. Marcy had 
seen the headwaters of the Red River. More important to him and his 
men at the moment was the fresh, sweet water which trickled from the 
d h . h . h' 46 groun , quenc ing t eir t irst. 
Two days after finding the source of the river, the party reached 
the main camp. On July 4, 1852, the explorers "turned our faced to-
d h ,47 war ome •••• ' Captain McClellan, riding ahead of the main party, 
found a large cougar. Either through luck or skill he killed the cat 
with one shot, bringing the group's total feline trophies to three. 
The rest of the journey proved uneventful, and on July 28. the explorers 
. 48 
marched into the confines of Fort Arbuckle, Indian Territory. 
Marcy had completed his task. He had found the sources of the 
main and north forks of the Red River. Moreover, he had fulfilled his 
task without loss of life, and, as he noted, the animals which were 
taken were returned "in fine condition, and are now much better capable 
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of performing service than when they came into our hands. 1149 
The mission had been performed in the peace and serenity of nature; 
but the country to which the explorers returned was boiling with hatred 
and fear. While one of Jefferson's dreams was becoming reality, the 
nation that he had helped create was bursting at its seams--rent as-
under by its sections. 
FOOTNOTES 
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HIGHWAY OF WAR 
In April of 1861 civil war burst upon the United States. The na-
tion seemed suddenly to have gone mad, allowing itself to be destroyed 
by Southern "fire-eaters" and Northern abolitionists. However, the con-
flict was long in brewing. Slavery had troubled the nation since 
Washington's administration, and the struggle between the sections had 
grown steadily worse. The dispute over Missouri's entrance into the 
Union was, as John Quincy Adams wrote, "the first page of a tragic 
drama," and the Compromise of 1820 was a stop-gap measure rather than a 
solution to the problem of the extension of slavery into Western ter-
ritories. The debate about the tariff in the early 1830s had led the 
nation to the brink of war, while the Compromise of 1850 had prevented 
war while making no one happy. In 1854 the Kansas-Nebraska Act, es-
tablishing popular sovereignty in the Western territories, had brought 
bloodshed to Kansas, and the Supreme Court's refusal of Dred Scott's 
plea for freedom had made compromise an evil word. 
After 1820 the Southern states had grown increasingly fearful of 
Federal infringement of their rights, and by 1850 South Carolina was 
proclaiming to the world that it had not lost its sovereignty by join-
ing the Union. Should the nation follow a course detrimental to South 
Carolina's welfare, leaders in that state felt they were within their 
rights by seceding. South Carolina had joined the Union by choice; it 
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could leave by the same manner. The North denied this assertion, re-
plying that the Union was inviolate. When Abraham Lincoln, a Republican 
who had made known his views on slavery, and whom the South deemed un-
acceptable, was elected to the presidency in 1860, South Carolina 
exercised its right to secede and demanded that all Federal possessions 
in the state be turned over to its officials. Lincoln refused, and on 
April 19, 1861, the "More Perfect Union" fragmented into war, torn by 
hatreds as old as the nation. 
Both Rebel and Yankee believed the war would be brief. But Bull 
Run was followed by Shiloh, and mothers and wives wept because of deaths 
at strange-sounding places like Cold Harbor and Island No. 10. The na-
tion soon learned the true meaning of civil war. 
By the end of 1863, the Deep South was starving, strangled by the 
Federal "Anaconda." Lincoln had blocaded the coast of the South during 
the first year of the war, and the fall of Vicksburg late in the spring 
of 1863 had given the North control of the Mississippi, cutting off 
supplies from the West. It seemed only a matter of time until the 
South would be forced to capitulate. But how long? And how many more 
men would die? 
After the fall of Vicksburg, General Ulysses S. Grant, connnander 
of Federal forces in the Trans-Mississippi West, and General Nathaniel 
Prentiss Banks, connnander of the Department of the Gulf, believed that 
Mobile, Alabama, should be the next target for a concerted Union as-
sault. However, President Lincoln and Connnanding General of the Army 
Henry W. "Old Brains" Halleck did not agree. The South was surrounded, 
and Federal armies were slicing into the heartland of the Confederacy. 
However, one state in the Confederacy stood scarred but unconquered--
• 
Texas. Lincoln and Halleck, under the urgings of exiled Unionists 
from Texas, such as Andrew Jackson Hamilton, believed that the es-
158 
tablishment of Federal supremacy in Texas was an urgent need to assure 
a quick end to the war. The psychological benefits from a successful 
invasion would be many, while an end to the trade between Texas and 
Mexico would deny rebels in the West a major source of supplies. Also, 
the disturbing news of the arrival of French troops in Mexico in June 
of 1863 created fears of an arrangement between France and Texas--
possibly the annexation of the state to France. Federal conquest of 
the state would preclude any such agreement, and it would strengthen 
the American position with regard to France's violation of the Monroe 
Doctrine in Mexico. Additionally, huge quantities of cotton--more than 
enough to ease the shortages in the textile mills of the North--were 
stored in Texas. 
With these goals in mind, Lincoln and his military chief urged 
Banks, who had more than thirty thousand men under his connnand, to plan 
and execute an invasion of Texas. Halleck advised Banks that the in-
vasion would "be best and most safely effected by a combined military 
and naval movement up Red River to Alexandria, Natchitoches, or Shreve-
port, and the military occupation of Northern Texas •11 
However, Banks had his own ideas of how Texas should be assaulted. 
To him the long, lightly defended coast of Texas was an ideal target 
for any proposed invasion. The possibility of a concerted attack on 
the Texas coast had been explored in the latter part of 1862 when a 
large Federal force had easily captured the port city of Galveston. 
Although Union troops had been quickly forced out of the city by a well-
conceived and executed Confederate assault, led by "Prince John" 
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Magruder, the success of the original attack had shown that the forces 
in Texas could not defend the entire strength of the state's coast-line. 
Banks believed that a well-armed attack could knife into the state and 
allow him to establish a Federal stronghold. 1 
Therefore in September of 1863 a large Federal flotilla, including 
four gunboats and twenty-two troop carriers, steamed up the Sabine River 
to attack the Confederates at Ft. Griffin. The rebel position was an 
earthwork fort defended by forty-seven men under the command of Lieu-
tenant Richard W. Dowling. Amazingly, the Federal force was thrown 
back by the defenders, who maintained a withering fire of one shell 
every two minutes. Meanwhile, missiles from the cannon aboard the 
Federal ships bounced harmlessly off the earthen walls. The Union force 
was forced to retreat, leaving two gunboats disabled, and three hundred 
and fifty men in the hands of the rebels. Texas remained Confederate. 2 
After his plan to invade at Sabine Pass failed, Banks remained op-
posed to a suggested invasion via the Red River. Instead he decided 
that another strike along the coast would better serve his country. Ac-
cordingly, troops were landed at the mouth of the Rio Grande, and the 
defenders were routed. A Federal beachhead had been established in 
Texas, but it consisted of only one town. Lincoln was unimpressed. 3 
While Banks was attempting to invade Texas along the coast, the 
President and his close advisers had grown more adamant in their sug-
gestions to the commander. To Banks, Halleck wrote on January 4, 1864, 
that Major General William T. Sherman agreed "that the Red River is the 
shortest and best line of defense for Louisiana and Arkansas and as a 
4 
base of operations against Texas." Banks chaffed under this pressure, 
asserting that the Red River was a dangerous and difficult route for 
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invasion, but Halleck persisted. Finally in late January, Banks ceased 
his protests, writing to Halleck his agreement that the Red was the 
shortest and best line on assault. The reasons for his sudden change 
in attitude were simple. Sherman had offered to loan part of his force 
in Mississippi to the effort, Halleck seemed determined, and Lincoln 
had a propensity for removing conunanders who were overly quarrelsome. 
Indeed, Banks had received his position in Louisiana because the former 
conunander, Banjamin F. Butler, had lost the President's favor. Also 
rumors persisted that huge stores of cotton were located along the Red 
5 
River, enough to make a money-wise general wealthy. 
Once Banks was convinced, his only problem was carrying out the in-
vasion. To coordinate the effort, Banks on January 25 wrote to Brigadier-
General Frederick Steele, connnander of the Department of Arkansas, asking 
for aid. The same day he wrote Sherman, asking what assistance he could 
provide. Also, he asked Halleck for specific instructions. Halleck, 
characteristically replied that he had no intention of designing a cam-
paign for Banks, adding that he was pleased to see that the validity of 
his suggestions for an invasion up the Red River finally had been recog-
nized. Also, the general-in-chief refused to appoint an overall com-
d f h d . . 6 man er or t e expe 1t1on. 
Sherman responded to Banks missive by coming to New Orleans in 
March. He was fresh from a slashing excursion across Mississippi, and he 
wanted to connnand the invasion up the Red. However, he found Banks pre-
pared for the invasion and ready to lead the expedition personally. In-
asmuch as the latter outranked him, Sherman promised to send as many men 
as possible to Banks and left, grumbling that Banks was delaying the 
invasion to attend the inauguration of the new Union governor of 
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Louisiana, Michael Hahn. 7 
General Steele's reply to Banks was as elusive as that from Hal-
leck. He complained that elections were soon to be held in Arkansas, 
and that his troops would be needed to oversee the balloting. In Mis-
sissippi, Sherman noted, "If we have to modify military plans for civil 
elections, we had better go home. 11 Nonetheless, Steele wondered if a 
mere feint by his forces toward Shreveport, the primary target of the 
invasion, would suffice. He was tired, under-manned, and over-worked. 8 
Except for Sherman, Banks' colleagues seemed little concerned with 
his plight, or with the success of the mission. However, Grant, who 
had opposed the project since its inception, believed that all avail-
able Federal forces should be utilized east of the Mississippi, but 
wanted to aid Banks if possible. Early in March he was appointed 
General-in-Chief of the Army, replacing Halleck, and on March 15 he 
wired Steele, "Move your force in full cooperation with General N. P. 
Banks'. A mere demonstration will not be sufficient.119 Grant's repu-
tation for brevity and straight-forwardness was well deserved. 
The last cog in the machinery for an invasion was completed when 
Admiral David Porter promised his cooperation, declaring that he would 
ascend the Red River with "every ironclad vessel in the fleet." Banks 
was ready--at least materially--for the invasion of Texas. The Red 
River Campaign was about to begin. Almost fifty thousand men would be 
sent against Confederate def enders in northwestern Louisiana and East 
10 
Texas. 
The massive Federal land force would be under the commander of 
Major General Banks. Yet Halleck's refusal to appoint an overall com-
mander, a decision that would plague the expedition, created a vacuum 
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of authority, leaving the design and execution of the campaign to the 
connnander of the Department of the Gulf. Although Banks could have 
chosen another man to lead the force in the field, the glories of a 
successful invasion of Texas--which he believed assured--lured him from 
the refinements and delights of the Crescent City; Nathaniel Banks was 
a man who believed himself destined for greater things--even the 
. 11 
presidency. 
Nathaniel Prentiss Banks had been born in Waltham, Massachusetts, 
in 1816. His formal education had been cut short by his family's 
economic situation. Finding employment at the textile mill where his 
father worked as a superintendent, he had received the nickname, "Bobbin 
Boy of Massachusetts," which clung to him in later life. Despite this 
humble beginning, Banks was determined and ambitious, teaching himself 
Latin and Spanish as well as oratory and acting. However, he had 
turned to law, passing his bar exams in 1839. He had decided to make 
politics his future. As a Democrat he had been elected to the Massachu-
setts lower house in 1849 and to the national Congress in 1852. He had 
been reelected to Congress in 1854 as a member of the Know Nothing Par-
ty, beginning his conversion to Republicanism. In 1958 he had been 
elected governor of his home state and retained that position until 
1860 when he became president of the Illinois Central Railroad, sue-
ceeding George B. McClellan. 
At the beginning of the Civil War, Banks had been connnissioned a 
major general of volunteers. His first service had been in the Depart-
ment of Annapolis, but he had been transferred to the Department of the 
Shanandoah, where he had received the dubious honor of facing Thomas 
"Stonewall" Jackson. Despite Jackson 1 s successes, Banks had fought 
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well. Afterwards he had been in charge of the defenses of Washington 
until his appointment as connnander of the Department of the Gulf, 
where he had taken part in the siege of Vicksburg. 12 
As a soldier Banks was more determined and confident than tal-
ented. At Vicksburg he had ordered direct assaults which had resulted 
in heavy losses. However, his determination had aided in the success 
of the siege. Banks was one of the many political generals of the 
Civil War, appointed for his attitudes and inclinations rather than for 
any military prowess. Ambitious to a fault, he eyed the presidential 
election of 1864 with relish, believing that his past services combined 
with a successful invasion of Texas would sweep him into the highest 
office in the land. Therefore he enthusiastically assumed command of 
the Red River Campaign. Throughout his life, determination and hard 
work had sufficed, overcoming his deficiencies. As the invasion of Texas 
began, he had little doubt that the same formula would succeed--and the 
"Bobbin Boy" would bask in the appreciation of his nation. 13 
Banks' colleagues did not share his optimism. Sherman believed 
him incompetent to connnand a large-scale operation, noting that he was 
better at gala affairs or in political debates than at killing people. 
However, Sherman had little patience with citizen soldiers--especially 
those who commanded operations he desired to lead. Steele, who would 
show his disrespect for Banks during the campaign, though him excitable 
and unorganized. Only Grant had confidence in Banks because of his de-
termination at Vicksburg; determination was an attribute that Grant ad-
. d 14 mire • 
Unfortunately for Nathaniel Banks, numerous Confederates, whose de-
termination had been grizzled and hardened by years of adversity, were 
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waiting for his invasion on the Red River. These were the men who would 
h B k h "b h ·1· 15 teac an s anot er attri ute-- umi ity. 
Since the failure of the Federal flotilla at Sabine Pass, Con-
federate authorities in the Trans-Mississippi West had waited for an-
other assault on Texas. This was the direct concern of three men: 
Lieutenant General Edmund Kirby-Smith, commander of the Department of 
the Trans-Mississippi headquartered at Shreveport; Major General 
Richard Taylor, commander of the District of Western Louisiana, also 
centered at Shreveport, and Major General John Bankhead Magruder, com-
mander of the District of Texas, whose headquarters wandered around the 
state with the commander. Kirby-Smith and Taylor were convinced that 
the Federal invasion would come via the Red River; Magruder kept busy--
and agitated--by the landing which Banks had ordered at the mouth of 
the Rio Grande, believing that the main Federal column would strike 
16 
there. 
Through the winter of 1863-1864, Kirby-Smith and Taylor worried 
over the prospects of a Federal invasion, believing that the assault 
would come when the water level of the river rose to allow passage of 
gunboats and troop transports. Then news of Sherman's thrust into Mis-
sissippi arrived. The meaning of this appeared clear: the next major 
Federal operation would be east of the Mississippi. Officials in Mobile 
braced for an onslaught, and Kirby-Smith and Taylor relaxed--but only 
slightly. For his part, Magruder continued to eye the Federal troops 
17 
at Brownsville. 
Despite the appearance of Federal intentions, the reality of Banks' 
presence in Louisiana bothered Taylor. Could Banks attack Texas without 
support from Sherman? he asked Kirby-Smith. The reply was equally 
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baffling; Kirby-Smith wrote, 11 1 still think that the enemy cannot be so 
infatuated as to occupy a large force in this department when every man 
should be employed east of the river, where the result of the campaign 
this summer must be decisive of our future •••• 1118 Evidently Kirby-
Smith agreed with Grant; Mobile seemed the logical target. However, 
Banks was not in Louisiana for nothing. Preparations had to be made for 
a Federal invasion. Taylor was ordered to gather his forces, and Ma-
gruder was asked to move his troops from Texas to the Red. The first 
order was executed; Taylor martialed his forces on the Red. However, 
Magruder was unable to comply with the command. Public officials in 
Texas considered "Prince John" an autocrat, and they opposed stripping 
Texas of its defenders. When Magruder attempted to march his force from 
Texas across the Sabine, a public outcry arose. Magruder was forced to 
remain in Texas with many of his troops. However, the aid Taylor re-
. d f T ld d · · 19 ceive rom exas wou prove ec1s1ve. 
To defend the Red River, Richard Taylor had less than fifteen 
thousand men. Banks had more than twenty-five thousand. The situation 
looked grim for the Confederates. However, the rebels held one ad-
vantage; they were commanded by an experienced and talented warrior--
20 
Richard Taylor, the son of former President Zachary Taylor. 
Richard Taylor had been born near Louisville, Kentucky, on his 
family's estate, "Springfields. 11 His education had ranged from private 
tutoring to studying at Edinburgh, Harvard, and Yale. In 1845 he had 
graduated from Yale, and in 1848 he had established his own estate, 
"Fashion," in Saint Charles Parish, Louisiana. Because of the influence 
of his father, Taylor originally had been a Whit, but his political in-
clination had changed toward the Democratic party during the 1850s--
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although he had opposed secession. In 1861 Taylor was elected a dele-
gate to the secession convention, where he had been swayed by the 
emotions of the times and voted for secession. Appointed chairman for 
military and naval affairs at the convention, Taylor had argued that 
the South should prepare itself for war--which he believed was inevit-
able. In July of 1861 he had been appointed a colonel of the 9th 
Louisiana Infantry, and in October he had been made a brigadier-general. 
Serving under Stonewall Jackson, Taylor had seen duty in the Shenandoah 
Valley and in the Seven Days' battles, demonstrating his courage and 
skill. In July of 1862 he had been sent to his home state as commander 
of the District of Western Louisiana. There he enjoyed his command by 
constantly harrassing the Federals in New Orleans with raids on their 
outposts and by seizing gunboats that ventured too far upriver~ Per-
sonally, "Dick" Taylor was easy to respect and hard to like. He was 
stubborn, quick-tempered, and quixotic, characteristics which, combined 
with boldness and skill, made him a valued commander; however, these 
same characteristics often earned him the spite and contempt of his 
fellow officers. Kirby-Smith, his immediate superior, found him diffi-
cult, argumentative, and, at times, antagonistic. For his part Taylor 
thought the commander of the Trans-Mississippi West was self-centered 
and bureaucratic, noting that "Hydrocephalus at Shreveport [Kirby-
Smith 1 s headquarters] produced atrophy elsewhere. 21 Despite these per-
sonal differences between the two men, Taylor's ability to fight was be-
yond question. 
The invasion began on March 12 and it was a muddled affair from the 
start. Sherman had sent ten thousand troops from Mississippi by trans-
ports under command of Brigadier General Andrew J. Smith, and Admiral 
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Porter's flotilla entered the Red River carrying these men. Two di-
visions under Smith's command were landed at Simsport, a few miles up 
the Atchafalaya River. From Simsport, Smith marched his men to the 
northeast toward Fort De Russy, the first Confederate fortification on 
the Red. Meanwhile, Porter pushed his fleet upriver, coordinating his 
attack with Smith so that rebel positions could be assaulted from land 
and water. Porter's fleet numbered fifteen ironclads and four tinclads 
as well as several troop carriers. However, Banks and the bulk of the 
Union force remained in New Orleans, waiting for the inauguration of 
Governor Hahn. 
Commanding the Confederates in the area between Simsport and Fort 
De Russy, Major John G. Walker received the distressing news that a 
massive Federal column had been embarked at Simsport, more than fifteen 
thousand Yankees said the reports. Walker, with less than four thou-
sand effective soldiers, determined that the two-pronged Federal attack 
had made his position untenable. He must retreat. Although his esti-
mate of the Federal force at Simsport was grossly inflated, Walker's 
position indeed was insecure. Smith's two divisions numbered almost 
ten thousand, more than twice as large as Walker's force. Also, to re-
main between De Russy and Simsport courted engulfment of the Confeder-
ate force. Should the Federal gunboats pound the fort into submission, 
Walker's line of retreat would be endangered, perhaps lost. Thus 
Walker retreated 
Russy and out of 
to Bayou Du Lac, twenty miles to the west of Fort De 
22 
harm's way for the moment. 
Walker's retreat cleared the path to the back door of Fort De 
Russy for Smith's divisions. On March 13, scouts reported the retreat 
of the rebels to Smith, and the commander ordered his forces toward 
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Marksville, a small town five miles on the main road southwest of Fort 
De Russy. On the fifteenth these troops reached the Confederate po-
. . d b . f . 23 sition an egan preparations or a siege. 
While Smith's soldiers had been enjoying a walk across the Louisi-
ana countryside, Admiral Porter's naval expedition had been busy. To 
deter the Yankees, the Confederates had placed several barricades in 
the Red. Almost two days were spent in breaching these obstacles; how-
ever, on the fifteenth the ironclads Eastport and Neosho broke through 
the barriers and proceeded to the Confederate fort, arriving the same 
time as Smith's column. 24 
The battle was joined almost iIIDnediately. Smith's troops sur~ 
rounded the fort, and Porter's gunboats shelled the rebels. Inside the 
fort three hundred Confederates waited for the inevitable. About six 
o'clock, two hours after the battle began, Brigadier-General Joseph 
Mower personally led the Third Division into the fort. The defenders, 
out-manned and shellshocked, surrendered. Union losses were thirty-
eight dead and wounded. 25 
Hoping to catch the rebels at Alexandria, Porter sent his fastest 
gunboats ahead. However, they arrived in time to see the last Con-
federate steamer pass beyond the horizon. General Taylor had opposed 
Kirby-Smith's suggestion to construct Fort De Russy, and he had little 
faith that it would effectively block a Federal invasion. Realizing 
that an engagement with the invaders at Alexandria would amost surely 
end in defeat, Taylor had his munitions and material loaded on steamers 
and moved upriver to Natchitoches. The quickness of the invasion caught 
the Confederates before they had massed. Taylor's only choice was to 
26 
retreat until he could unity his coIIDnand and ready a concerted defense. 
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To achieve this goal, Taylor moved to Bayou Bouef, twenty miles to 
the southwest of Alexandria. There he joined the commands of Camille 
Armand Jules Marie, Prince de Polignac, and Brigadier-General Alfred 
Mouton. Having collected almost seven thousand men, Taylor began his 
retreat toward Natchitoches, watching the Federals and waiting for the 
. 27 
right moment and place to make his stand. 
While Taylor was making his orderly retreat, Porter moved part of 
his force from Fort De Russy to Alexandria to assume control of the 
abandoned town, seizing three cannon which the Confederates had inad-
vertently left behind. On March 20, Banks arrived. With him were the 
forward elements of his fifteen thousand troops. The remainder of his 
men was strung along the roads between New Orleans and Alexandria. The 
Confederate position appeared to be worsening. A.concerted effort up-
river by Banks' troops and Porter's gunboat would surely carry any 
Confederate defenders. However, several problems loomed in the back-
ground. General Grant, who had become commanding general of the army, 
was determined that the troops which Sherm~n had loaned to Banks should 
be returned as soon as possible. On March 26 he wrote to Banks that 
should it appear by mid-April that Shreveport could not be taken by the 
end of that month, Smith's two divisions should be returned by Sherman 
immediately. Grant still believed the war would be won in the East. In 
addition to Grant's deadline, Banks was troubled by incomplete knowledge 
of the area. Was there a road along the Red which would allow his 
troops to remain near Porter's fleet? What was the best line of advance? 
Banks, still confident of victory, pondered these problems at Alexan-
d . 28 ria. 
While Banks mulled over his problems on the river, Taylor was 
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finding his own situation unpleasant. One of his primary problems was 
the insufficient number of cavalry in his command. His only cavalry was 
that of Colonel William G. Vincent, numbering only two hundred and fifty 
men. On March 19, Taylor, attempting to obtain information concerning 
the movements of the Federals, sent Vincent's force toward Bayou 
Rapides, between Boeuf and Alexandria. After jousting with the forward 
portion of the Union force, Vincent on the twenty-first settled his men 
near a place called Henderson's Hill. Here the sleeping Confederates 
were surrounded and captured by a large force of Federals under the 
command of General Mower. Taylor suddenly had lost what little cavalry 
he had. He could only wait for more horsemen to arrive from Texas, if 
29 
indeed any were coming. 
The matter of reinforcements from Texas was another problem that 
bothered Taylor. Brigadier-General Tom Green's force of Texans was 
supposed to be headed for Louisiana, but they had not arrived. Taylor 
badly needed them. If Banks decided to push up the river before these 
reinforcements arrived, Taylor might be forced to retreat into East 
Texas--or worse, be forced to fight the larger Union force without re-
. f 30 in orcements. 
By March 25, the last portion of Banks' force slogged into Alex-
andria. Heavy rains and muddy roads had slowed the column and delayed 
its arrival. But finally the entire invasion force was ready for ac-
tion. It was an impressive--almost overwhelming--collection of men and 
equipment. Banks had more than thirty thousand men, and Porter had 
twenty-one gunboats and more than forty troop transports. The combined 
number of cannon was three hundred: two hundred and ten were mounted 
on the boats, and ninety were the infantry. Little wonder that Banks 
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was confident. 31 
Banks at this point did not believe that Taylor would fight, as-
serting that the Confederates would retreat to Shreveport. Thus his 
decision as to which road his infantry and cavalry would take seemed 
insignificant. They were just going to walk and ride to Natchitoches 
and then to Shreveport. However, the matter of getting Porter's fleet 
32 past the rapids in the Red was another matter. 
Annually the Red rose in December or January, swollen by winter 
rains. However, in 1864 the rise was late, beginning in February, and 
it was small. Doubtless this was the result of insufficient rainfall 
on the upper watershed of the river; however, to the Union navy it must 
have seemed sheer orneriness. Since the gunboats had entered the mouth 
of the Red, snags, sand bars, and floating rafts of timber had hampered 
d h . f d . 33 progress, an now t e river re use to rise. 
Whether this condition was caused by atmospheric conditions or 
water demons, low water made the rapids a formidable barrier to Porter's 
ironclads. The admiral advised Banks that the big boats would have to 
be left behind at Alexandria; however, the lighter tinclad boats could 
navigate the rapids without difficulty. Banks replied that he needed 
all of Porter's fleet to insure the success of the mission, and would 
the admiral please get his boats upriver. 34 
Porter agreed, but remained uncertain of the advisability of taking 
his force above the rapids, wondering how he would get them down again 
if the water level did not rise. This question he later would have to 
answer in order to save his fleet. Nonetheless, Porter readied his 
boats for the dash over the rapids. However, he decided to send his 
largest and deepest boat, the Eastport, over the shallows first. 
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Evidently, Porter had decided that if the Eastport could navigate the 
rapids all of his fleet could do likewise, and if the boat ran aground 
the river would be blocked, preventing the passage of the rest of the 
fleet. Either way Porter would be satisfied. 35 
As expected the Eastport jammed in the rapids; however, the river 
finally rose enough for the great engine of war to pass. Porter then 
sent twelve more of his craft over the rapids. By April 3, the East-
port, Chillicothe, Carondelet, Louisville, Mound City, Pittsburg, Osage, 
~' Neosho, Fort Hindman, Cricket, Juliet, and Lexington were above 
the falls. 
Meanwhile, Banks' land force had departed for Natchitoches under 
the command of Major General William B. Franklin. Andrew J. Smith's 
36 men were transported upstream by boat. 
By April 3 all parties had reached Natchitoches, but the rebels 
again had retreated before the Union forces could make contact. While 
Porter's sailors seized tons of cotton as prizes of war, Banks sailed 
up the Red to Gran Ecore, four miles above Natchitoches. The time had 
come for him to decide which road his troops would take. There was a 
road which followed the west bank of the Red, but Banks evidently did 
not know of its existence. Apparently he believed his choice was be-
tween the road which led to Minden, a village some twenty-five miles 
east of Shreveport, or the road which formed a rough semi-circle between 
Gran Ecore and Shreveport, passing through Pleasant Hill and Mansfield. 
Banks, thinking that the route did not matter, chose the latter. 37 
His decision made, Banks returned to Natchitoches to review his 
troops. Surely a man such as Nathaniel Banks must have gloried in the 
knowledge that ancient heroes such as Louis Juchereau de St. Denis and 
173 
Athanase de Mezieres had been the masters of the town he now possessed. 
On April 6 his troops began to depart from Gran Ecore, heading 
toward Pleasant Hill and their rendezvous with the enemy. Unknown to 
the troops or to Banks, the Confederates had arranged a welcome while 
the Federals were parading in Natchitoches. Taylor, fretting over the 
delay of aid from Texas, had retreated to Mansfield. There on April 5 
he was gratified by the arrival of five thousand cavalrymen from Texas 
under the connnand of Fighting Tom Green, who recently had been recom-
mended for promotion to major general. The arrival of Green, a veteran 
of the Texas Revolution and the Mexican War and a fearless and respected 
connnander, eased Taylor's worries a little. Also, General Kirby-Smith 
ordered detachments from Major General Sterling Price's connnand in Ar-
kansas to move south to aid in the conflict. With the addition of these 
men, Taylor had almost fifteen thousand troops. 38 
Although he was still outnumbered almost two to one, Taylor 
realized that the odds were not going to improve. Also, during the 
time he had spent with Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley, 
Taylor had learned the advantages of speed from the master of alacrity. 
Despite Kirby-Smith's vaccillation between the fight in Louisiana and a 
retreat into East Texas, Taylor decided to deploy his forces. Unless 
his connnanding general ordered him out of Louisiana, he was through re-
treating. He had chafted during the early retreat before Banks' in-
vading army, for he thought little of Yankees in general, and even less 
of Major General Nathaniel Banks. 39 
Luckily for the South, Kirby-Smith continued to be uncertain as to 
the correct course he should follow, and allowed Taylor to remain in 
Louisiana. Taylor would fight before the enemy reached Mansfield. He 
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knew that his force was outnumbered. Accordingly he knew that he had 
to select a location for battle that would allow him to concentrate his 
forces. The area between Pleasant Hill and Mansfield was excellent be-
cause the Federals would be confined to one road. Past Mansfield, 
three roads led to Shreveport, and Taylor could not concentrate his. 
forces on all three. Thus he applied simple logic which Banks apparent-
ly missed. Taylor set about teaching the ''Bobbin Bot' a lesson in 
·1· 40 mi itary strategy. 
On April 8, Taylor began his preparations to defend Mansfield, or-
dering the infantry under Price from its camp at Keatchie to Mansfield. 
Also, the conunands of Generals Mouton and Walker were ordered to po-
sition themselves south of the town. By the ninth Taylor had almost 
nine thousand men on the road leading to Mansfield. Banks, who ex-
pressed his worry that the enemy would never stop and fight, would have 
41 
his battle. 
The forward elements of the Federal column reached Pleasant Hill 
on April 7, and that afternoon the mounted infantry of Brigadier General 
Albert Lee clashed with a detachment of Green's Texas, getting their 
first taste of combat--a decidedly unpleasant taste. Green's men, un-
like the Confederates whom the Northern had met before during the cam-
paign, did not fall back. Instead, the Texans performed their com-
mander's favorite maneuver--a charge. Although the Texans were beaten 
back with the aid of reserves, the skirmish was a demonstration of what 
42 
would follow. 
The next morning Lee's column pushed ahead, meeting resistance, but 
progressing. About noon the column reached a large clearing, extending 
almost a thousand yards before the advancing soldiers. In the midst of 
175 
the space was an abrupt rise. Atop it the Federals saw a line of Con-
federates. Although their position appeared strong, the rebels were 
. 43 
driven back, the last retreat Southerners made during the campaign. 
After securing the rise, Lee sent skirmishes ahead. These found 
the bulk of the Confederate force--Walker's Division--ready for battle. 
Lee had seen enough; he had no desire to lead his men into a hornet's 
nest. After convincing Banks that he would be unwise to effect a 
charge into the bristling Confederate position, Lee stationed his men 
before the enemy and waited. It was four o'clock and the air was heavy 
with tension, excitement, and fear. The two armies waited, one sick of 
retreats and running, the other wondering what had happened to Banks' 
boast that he would be in Shreveport by April lo. 44 
Banks wanted to bring up more infantry. Evidently he realized that 
he had unwittingly allowed Taylor to concentrate his forces in front of 
the long stretch of Union soldiers. But there was little he could do. 
Behind Lee's mounted cavalry was the baggage train, consisting of bun-
dreds of wagons and stretching for miles. Behind these wagons was 
Franklin's infantry. Banks had the superior force in the area, but he 
could not bring the full extent of his power into action. Wagons 
blocked the road, and it would take time to bring Franklin's infantry 
forward. Banks' only hope was that Taylor:would not assume the of-
45 
fensive. 
Dick Taylor either realized Banks' predicament or else he simply 
ran out of patience and ordered General Mouton to attack. Obligingly, 
46 
the Louisianan swept down on the right flank of the enemy. For the 
North Brigadier General T. E. G. Ransom's flank repulsed the first 
charge, but the fighting continued. After Mouton's forces had engaged 
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the enemy, Walker's eager Texans were unleashed on the left flank of 
the Northerners. Like their fathers who fought at San Jacinto and in 
Mexico City, the Texans charged, screaming their demonic exhortations, 
spurring their compatriots to higher accomplishments and tingling the 
spines of many untested Yankees. Soon the left flank of the defenders 
collapsed. Whole regiments were annihilated or captured. General Ran-
som quickly ordered a retreat. 47 
Falling back, the Federals found some small amount of succor from 
a line of reinforcements that General Franklin hurriedly had formed 
near the edge of the clearing. Realizing the danger, Franklin had led 
a division of his infantry to the front, and for a time the line held. 
But the rebels kept coming, charging and shouting, shooting and stab-
bing. Minie balls sang their siren-song of death, luring some men to 
destruction and pushing others to cowardice. Friends and brothers were 
suddenly only cold and leaden memories lying on the ground--and still 
the wild men came. Suddenly, as if some long-angered god had passed 
among the men, whispering the prophecy of impending doom, panic quaked 
through the Union ranks. Men threw down their weapons and fled, burn-
ing with fear and hearing only the din of their own minds. No longer 
48 
was there a battle, merely a rout, a debacle, a tragedy. 
Fortunately, Franklin not only brought reinforcements, he also saw 
that his position would not stand. Therefore he ordered Brigadier 
General William H. Emory to advance with a division of the Nineteenth 
Corps to a favorable location in the rear and form another line. Emory 
located his men near Pleasant Grove in a small stream bed and waited. 
The men of his division soon were greeted by the fleeing soldiers who 
warned that demons and devils were following. The Confederates soon 
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appeared. Unfettered emotions seemed to be contagious. The fear that 
had broken and scattered Banks' army spread to Taylor's and was trans-
lated into elation. When the Federals had fled, the Confederates pur-
suited into disorganized bunches. Arriving at Emory's position, they 
attacked piecemeal, and were repulsed. Finally the defenders were 
driven from the stream, but the rebels could not break the resistance. 
Soon darkness ended the madness for a time. The sounds of the living 
then were replaced by the wails of men preparing to die. It had been 
a day that many men would remember with pride, while others would feel 
only shame, but it was a night that men on both sides would spend a 
l 'f . . f 50 1 etime trying to orget. 
More than two thousand Union soldiers were either dead, wounded, 
or missing. Thousands of small arms, eighteen cannon, and more than 
one hundred and fifty wagons and their teams had been lost to the re-
bels. Taylor had extracted a heavy fee from Banks for a lesson in 
logic. Less than one thousand Confederates were dead or wounded. Con-
sidering that Banks had deployed more than 12,000 men in the battle, 
whereas Taylor had possessed only 8,800 troops, the results were re-
51 
markable. 
Regardless of this one battle, Banks still was confident. Emory's 
line had held, and Banks was still going to Shreveport. For a time he 
considered bringing Smith's Sixteenth Corps to the line Emory had es-
tablished; however, his subordinates convinced him the move would be 
unwise. The Thirteenth Corps, which had taken the brunt of the attack, 
was a shambles. No force on earth would convince the men who had fled 
in panic to stand and fight at Pleasant Grove. Finally, Banks decided 
to regroup his forces at Pleasant Hill, fifteen miles to the southeast 
of Mansfield. There Smith's troops were deployed on the rise which 
52 
gave the place its name. It was Taylor's move. 
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Seeing that Banks had retreated to Pleasant Hill, Taylor led his 
force forward on the ninth. He had been joined by the forces sent from 
Price under command of Brigadier General Thomas J. Churchill. Survey-
ing the situation, he devised his battle plan, a masterful but complex 
scheme. Churchill's force was to march to the road leading from the 
Sabine River toward Pleasant Hill, approaching the Federals from south-
east. Hopefully, this force would crush the enemy's left flank. Mean-
while, Walker was to lead his Texans down the road from Mansfield, 
attacking the middle of the Federal position. When these forces had 
disorganized the defenders, Brigadier General Hamilton P. Bee would de-
scend from Walker's left with his mounted Texans. Polignac, in command 
of the slain Mouton's division, was held in reserve on the road to 
53 
Mansfield. 
At five o'clock the battle began. Churchill swept in from the de-
fenders' left, and Walker pushed forward after hearing the sounds of 
battle. The fight went as planned. However, Tom Green, thinking that 
the Federals had been put to flight, ordered Bee to commence his as.-
sault. The Texans rode into a wicked cross-fire which repulsed their 
attack and caused them to take heavy losses. Meanwhile, Walker had re-
ceived a similar greeting. However, Churchill's force was making head-
way, rolling up the left flank. Taylor, seeing that Bee and Walker had 
been stymied, ordered Polignac into the fray. The center of the Union 
line was carried, and the Confederates threatened to surround the right 
flank of the enemy commanded by Brigadier General William Dwight. The 
Union forces appeared in danger of suffering their second overwhelming 
54 
defeat in as many days. 
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Just as the situation seemed hopeless, the Fifty-eighth Illinois, 
which had been held in reserve, attacked Churchill, stopping his pro-
gress. Andrew Smith, commanding on the left flank, ordered his troops 
to charge. The right flank of the Confederates was crushed. The at-
tack had been repulsed. Taylor's only choice was to retreat. As the 
Confederates fell back, it was their turn to feel panic, and the battle 
55 
ended. 
Banks thus had won a victory--and he still was determined to press 
his invasion to Shreveport. But his commanders knew better. The Union 
forces had been lucky not to have been overwhelmed. The men were tired 
and discouraged, and they had lost faith in Banks. Finally, the comman-
der was convinced to withdraw and break off the invasion. Banks or-
dered his force to retreat to Gran Ecore where Porter's boats would 
h d . 56 transport t em ownriver. 
While Taylor's force was pushing the Federals back from Mansfield, 
Admiral Porter had steamed part of his force up the Red, reaching 
Springfield Landing, thirty miles from Shreveport. Banks had promised 
to meet him there to reunite the land and naval arms of the expedition 
for the final assault on Shreveport. Leaving Gran Ecore, Porter had 
been unable to take his entire fleet upriver. The Red had still not 
freshened, and the water level remained too low for some of his craft. 
Only six of the gunboats, the Cricket, the admiral's flag ship Osage, 
Neosho, Fort Hindman, Lexington and Chillicothe, were able to navigate 
the shallow waters above Gran Ecore. These were accompanied by twenty 
troop carriers. To protect the boats, part of the Sixteenth Corps 




The voyage upriver had been unevently except for frequent stops to 
free boats that had run aground. Reaching Springfield Landing on April 
10, Porter found the channel blocked by the wreckage of the New Falls 
City, a larger steamer that the Confederates had scuttled to slow the 
Union fleet. Waiting at the rendezvous point, Porter was informed of 
the happening at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill, and of the decision to re-
58 
treat. 
Porter was in a dangerous position. The confidence of the in-
vaders had led them to plunge headlong into the heart of enemy country. 
Porter like Banks, was brash and confident in the abilities of his 
fleet. Given to bold statements, he once had boas·ted that his boats 
59 
could go anywhere "the sand was damp." Such boldness and confidence 
had brought him to Springfield Landing. 60 
While Banks' troops had been near, available to help defend the 
fleet, there was little danger to the boats. The Confederate naval 
forces on the Red were nil, and with the infantry, cavalry, and artil-
lery of Banks' force at hand the armada was truly invincible. However, 
Banks' decision to send his troops on the inland route through Mansfield 
had changed the situation drastically; and the defeat of the Federals 
and the subsequent withdrawal to Gran Ecore left Porter's fleet open to 
assault from land. If the Confederates made a concerted attack on the 
fleet, the results probably would be unfavorable for the Union. Indeed, 
the addition of several gunboats to the Confederate navy would change 
Union fortunes in the Mississippi and Gulf region. Therefore Porter 
ordered a hasty retreat downriver, having been advised that Banks would 
meet him at Gran Ecore. 61 
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Regardless of Admiral Porter's wishes, the flotilla's speed was 
limited by shallow water. Boats continually ran aground, and the of-
ficers knew that a boat stuck on the mud too long was courting attack 
by Confederates. Captain Thomas Selfri.d.ge, commanding the Osage, found 
his craft unmanageable. Finally, on April 12 the transport Black~ 
was lashed to the starboard of the Osage to aid in navigation, but about 
two o'clock in the afternoon it ran hard aground near Blair's Landing, 
forty-five river miles above Gran Ecore. 62 
Meanwhile, many of Taylor's men had been recalled from the area to 
aid in repulsing a Union column approaching Shreveport from Arkansas 
under the command of General Steele. Tom Green's cavalry was left to 
63 
watch the retreat of the Federals. 
On the day the Osage ran aground at Blair's Landing, Green was 
notified of the event, and immediately he led his men to the scene. 
Arriving to find the Osage had freed itself and had been joined by the 
gunboat Lexington, Green stationed his artillery near the banks of the 
river and prepared to attack. However, Captain Selfridge was informed 
if the presence of rebels and ordered the Lexington to open dire. 
Green's Texans replied with their muskets, leading Selfridge to note 
later that "Everything that was made of wood on the Osage and Black Hawk 
was pierced with bullets.1164 Green, relying on his standard tactic, or-
dered his forces to charge. The assault was repulsed by fire from the 
gunboats; Green, as usual in the midst of action, was struck in the 
forehead by a cannon shell from the Osage, dying instantly. Their com-
mander dead and prospects of success few, the Confederates withdrew. 
Porter's fleet continued downriver to Gran Ecore, bouncing and scraping 
all the way. The arrival of the boats greatly relieved Banks and his 
• 
182 
soldiers. Some had speculated that when the boats appeared they would 
be flying the Stars and Bars of the Confederacy. However, the joining 
of forces did not end the problems which faced Banks and Porter. 66 
At Gran Ecore, Banks received orders from Sherman, demanding the 
return of Smith's corps. This would, in Banks' estimation, leave the 
Union forces grossly undermanned; he believed that Taylor had at least 
twenty-five thousand troops. Thus Banks replied to Sherman that he 
could not comply. Smith's forces were needed on the Red. However, 
Banks realized that Sherman would ask again, probably with Grant 1 s sup-
port. His time was running out, and Porter's difficulties with the 
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river were creating dangerous delays. 
The Red was still playing havoc with the admiral's fleet. The 
chute at Gran Ecore effectively blocked the passage of several of the 
larger boats, and on April 14, the Eastport, having safely navigated the 
shallows, stuck a torpedo, sinking to the muddy bottom. The admiral 
needed time to get his fleet downriver; but time was a connnodity that 
68 
was dear to Banks. 
Not only was Sherman asking for his troops, but he felt Taylor 
doubtless was nearby arranging something unfriendly. Banks wanted to 
return to Alexandria as soon as possible. Porter feared that the army 
would depart, leaving his stranded boats at the mercy of the rebels. 




Evidently Banks had learned from the lesson Taylor had taught him 
at Mansfield. Realizing that his foe probably would attempt to block 
his retreat, Banks on April 19 dispatched General Smith downriver to 
prevent such an occurrence. Smith departed on April 21, the same day 
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that Porter's boats were taken over the chute and the Eastport was 
raised from the bottom. The retreat from Gran Ecore began. 
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By the morning of the twenty-third, the fleet and the army had 
evacuated Gran Ecore, leaving the town in flames. Moving to Natchi-
toches, the army then followed the course of the Cane River, an ancient 
bed of the Red that had long been forsaken by the waters of the river. 
Thirty miles downstream the Cane rejoined the Red, forming a great island 
in the area between the two rivers. However, Banks learned that Taylor's 
forces were headed for Monett 1 s Ferry, the main crossing on the Cane 
which the Union army had to utilize. Attempting to avoid the trap, 
71 
Banks pushed his army relentlessly. 
For his part Taylor was aching from the destruction which the 
Union army had brought to his state. Everywhere houses and barns had 
been burned, livestock killed and fields flattened. Taylor wanted re-
venge. Thus with only five thousand men he attempted to surround Banks' 
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force of twenty thousand. 
Arriving at Monett 1 s Ferry first, the Confederates deployed. Their 
plan was simple. Major General John A. Wharton, who recently had ar-
rived from Texas with a small brigade of cavalry, was to harass the 
Federal column from the rear. Polignac's division was stationed near 
Cloutierville, a small town to the northwest of Monett's Ferry, and 
Hamilton Bee's force was placed at the crossing. He was ordered to hold 
his position at all costs because it was crucial in preventing the 
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Federals from escaping. 
The plan was good, but after the Federal assault began on the 
twenty-third, Bee mistakenly thought the center of the Confederate po-
sitiop had been overwhelmed. In reality the Federal charge had been 
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repulsed, but Bee, assuming the battle was lost, withdrew, opening the 
road to Alexandria. Taylor was livid, removing Bee from his command. 
Nonetheless, the damage had been done. Banks was free to enter Alex-
. 74 andria. 
Admiral Porter was not fairing· as well as Banks. On April 26 the 
Eastport ran hard aground near the small town of Montgomery. All ef-
forts to free the craft failed, and Porter reluctantly ordered the boat 
destroyed. The descent then continued. Five miles above the mouth of 
the Cane, the fleet came under heavy fire from the Confederate artil-
lery. Two transports, the Champion No. 1 and the Champion No. 1, were 
lost. Tragically, the farmer's boiler was struck by a shell and ex-
ploded, killing more than one hundred and fifty blacks who had been 
picked up by the Federals. Additionally, the ironclads Cricket, Juliet, 
and ~Hindman were severely damaged, taking heavy losses among their 
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crews. 
On April 28 all boats had been run past the Confederate gunners 
and were collected at Alexandria. However, matters were little better 
there. Commanding General Grant was making growling noises in Banks' 
direction about the prompt return of Sherman's troops. Grant wanted 
Smith's corps east of the Mississippi. Banks wanted to comply, but 
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Porter's boats were in trouble again--serious trouble. 
The rapids at Alexandria, the same ones that had worried Porter a 
month before, had the fleet trapped. The Red still had· not risen, and 
twelve gunboats were above the rapids. If Banks took his army down-
river before the boats were rescued, the backbone of the fleet would be 
lost. The crafts would have to be scuttled to prevent their capture by 
Confederates. Porter's career was on the verge of ruin. Admirals, no 
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matter what their past accomplishments, did not lose twelve gunboats 
and retain Lincoln's favor. Porter, for once at a loss for an answer, 
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or even a boast, asked for suggestions. 
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Bailey, the chief engineer for the Nine-
teenth Corps, approached Porter, proposing a dam across the river below 
the rapids. This would raise the water level on the rapids and allow 
the boats to cross. Once the boats were over the rapids the dam could 
be removed and the fleet could continue. It was a good plan. The only 
question was the building of the dam. Below the rapids the river was 
almost three hundred feet wide, and the current was near ten miles an 
hour. 
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Although Porter was unconvinced, the project was approved. 
The soldiers worked feverishly. Houses were demolished and their 
timbers used in the dam. Great trees were felled, and added to the pro-
ject. Finally, only a twenty foot space separated the two wings of the 
dam. Two barges filled this hold. On May 8 the Neosho, Port Hindman, 
and Osage cross.ed the rapids; however, for reasons unknown, the rest of 
the fleet remained. The soldiers, who had constructed the dam while the 
navy watched, suggested that the pilots of the boats had gone to sleep. 
P h h . h 79 er aps t ey were rig t. 
Whatever the reasons, the boats remained above the rapids that day, 
and the on the morning the ninth they again were trapped. The pressure 
of the water on the barges in the middle of the dam carried them away 
during the ·night. Only the Lexington, which Porter ordered to shoot the 
rapids as the dams disintegrated, was rescued. Bouncing on the bottom 
the Lexington pushed over the rapids and through the hole in the dam be-
fore the water disappeared. Eight boats remained above the rapids. 80 
Banks, who had watched the fleet's activity with interest, growled 
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that he needed to get his army downriver. Grant was growing more ada-
mant in his demands for the troops to be returned to Sherman, and the 
Confederates were still lurking in the woods. Bailey went back to work, 
building wing dams at the head of the rapids to concentrate the flow of 
the water. By the tenth the wing dams were completed, but the water 
was still too shallow. Another army engineer, Lieutenant Colonel U. B. 
Pearsall, suggested that a "bracket dam" would slow the current and 
back water sufficiently to allow the boats to pass. To Porter's relief 
this plan worked, and the boats were saved. The final obstacle over-
come, Porter led his fleet to the Mississippi, and Banks followed suit. 
By May 15 the Federals had retreated below the Atchafalya. The Red 
River Campaign was over. 
Banks and Porter had accomplished their retreat none too soon. 
Steele's invasion from Arkansas had been repulsed by the end of April, 
and during the first week in May Churchill's and Walker's forces were 
returned to Taylor. Fortunately for the Federals, just as Taylor re-
united his forces and readied an assault, the invaders floated and 
marched down the Red. 81 
Several factors had combined to cause a failure of the Union in-
vasion of Northwest Louisiana and East Texas. Taylor's talents and his 
troops' dedication had helped, as had the Red River's refusal to rise. 
However, Banks' own mistakes were at the base of the failure. Had he 
not sent his troops on the inland road to Mansfield, Taylor's talents 
would have been unexercised, or at least used to defend the streets of 
Shreveport. 
Despite the low water, Porter's flotilla eventually reached Spring-
field Landing. Had Banks marched his force along the river near the 
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fleet, a combined water-and-land assault could have been launched, 
severely testing the defenders. Also, had the invaders approached 
Shreveport from Springfield Landing en masse, the Confederates would 
have been unable to mount a concerted defense against Steele's invasion 
from Arkansas. The problems were not the plan proposed by Halleck to 
ascend the Red to Shreveport, but rather the execution of the plan by 
Nathaniel Banks. 
At New Orleans, Banks received his reward for the campaign. There 
he was informed on May 7 that Major General Edward R. S. Canby had been 
named commander of the Military District of West Mississippi. Canby was 
given control of all military operations in the Departments of the Gulf 
and Mississippi. Banks' political connections had prevented his com-
plete removal from authority, for he remained at New Orleans. In name 
he still was commander of the Department of the Gulf; in reality he was 
only a figurehead. His military career was over, and his presidential 
aspirations were dead. He had found precious little glory on the Red 
R. 82 i.ver. 
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CHAPTER IX 
PEACE AND PROSPERITY 
A year after Nathaniel Banks returned to New Orleans, the end came 
for the Confederate States of America. Gallant warriors such as 
Robert E. Lee, Joseph Eggleston Johnston, Nathan Bedfort Forrest, and 
Richard Taylor laid their burdens down, recognizing the inevitable. 
Their great cause was lost. In the Trans-Mississippi West Kirby-Smith 
and Magruder spoke empty phrases for a time of continuing the war, and 
then they slipped away to Mexico. Some, like Jo Shelby and his mag-
nificent cavalrymen, mounted their horses and rode away, never ac-
knowledging in defeat the mastery of those whom they had bested in war. 
S_oon Lincoln joined the hosts who had died during the tragedy, 
and something called "Radical Reconstruction" began. Slowly--sadly--
the nation bound its wounds. As they had after the American Revolution, 
leaders, some good, some evil, set about forming a nation from the 
shambles. Rising phoenix-like from its own ashes, a new United States 
emerged. The nation was different, altered forever by the spasms of 
civil war. Some men hated it, others gloried in it, but most simply 
worked. The union had survived. 
After the war ended, the country along the Red River was in ruins. 
Plantations and farms were gone, slaves were free, owners were dead. 
Cotton gins were charred flames, and steamboats were gutted hulls. But 
the people went to work, building and planting, mending and making. By 
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1870 the country was becoming productive again~ Steamboats such as the 
Arrow Line, Belle Ida No. l' Big Horn, ~Era, Henry M. Shreve, 
~· !• Curtis, and Anne Everson were ascending the river to Shreveport 
and Jefferson to take on cotton. The cargo then was carried to New 
Orleans for sale. However, one problem remained: the raft. 
1 
Work on the raft had ceased in the late 1850s because Congress re-
fused to keep appropriating funds for what seemed a never-ending task. 
After the war ended, the issue was revived. In the winter of 1872, 
Lieutenant E. A. Woodruff of the Army Corps of Engineers was dispatched 
to Louisiana to survey the raft and estimate the cost of its removal. 
While in Louisiana, Woodruff received a letter from C. M. Hervey, a 
planter who owned a large tract of land on the Red near Washington, 
Arkansas. Hervey urged that work innnediately be connnenced to remove 
the raft, asserting that more than 200,000 acres of fertile bottom land 
thereby could be reclaimed and that $150,000 could be saved each year 
in shipping fees, cotton prices, and insurance rates. In 1870, he 
wrote, high water and growth of the raft had caused more than $400,000 
to be wasted in routing shipments around the route. Finally, Hervey 
noted that merely removing the raft would not suffice, but that pro~ 
visions h d b d f h b 
. 2 
a to e ma e to prevent a reoccurrence o t e arr1er. 
In his report Woodruff wrote, "That the removal of the raft and the 
prevention of its re-formation is desirable, hardly admits of discus-
sion. The need of a cheap mode of transportation of the products of the 
upper river, the relief of valuable plantations made worthless by over-
flow, and the prevention of the ruin of more valuable plantations 
above, are sufficient reasons to warrant extensive appropriations for 
h d 113 t ese ens •••• He estimated the total cost of removing the raft in 
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in one year to be $116,000, with an additional cost of $98,000 to ac-
quire the needed equipment. He suggested that annual appropriations 
ranging from ten to twenty-five thousand dollars would be needed to 
4 
prevent a reforming of the raft. 
Congress was in a mood to comply, for the nation demanded raw 
products to feed the industrial centers of the North. On June 10, 
1872, it appropriate.d $150,000 to remove the raft. Little work was 
done in 1872. However, considerable progress was made in 1873. In 
addition to using snag boats and whences to pull sections, of the raft 
asunder, a new tool was utilized: nitroglycerine. The explosive was 
. 
used to break'up large sections of timbers that had become tightly 
packed. Such s.ections, called rafts by the workmen, had posed serious 
problems during previous attempts to free the Red because equipment was 
frequen'tly damaged while attempting to pry the logs apart. Also the 
"nitro" was useful in breaking large timbers into small pieces which 
would float downriver. Wrjting in 1874, Captain c. W. Howell, the 
engineer in charge of the project, noted: 
In breaking the jams and cutting off snags, nitro-
glycerine had been found indispensible, from 60 to 75 
pounds being used in a day, generally in from 2 to 5 
pound charges,. For instance, the 31st [of October] was 
almost entirely spent in an unsuccessful attempt to re-
move a snag under water, which stopped all drift pulled 
[from floating downstream]; the last attempt for the 
day was made with a 7~-inch premium line led to the 
large steam-capstan of the Aid [one of the snag boats]. 
The capstan was 'stalled.' The next morning a 5-pound 
charge of nitro-glycerine removed the obstruction.5 
In his report Howell also described the first application of the ex-
plosive in removing the raft: 
Cans, containing from 10 to 20 pounds of nitro-
glycerine, were sunk as near the bottom of the river as 
possible and exploded, with the effect of breaking the 
long logs and a general loosening of the mass in the 
innnediate proximity. Small charges were also used in 
cutting long logs and stumps too far beneath the sur-
face of the water to be operated on by other means.6 
Although the work of removing the raft was slowed by low water, 
progress was made. Saw boats designed, as the name implied, to cut 
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timbers and brush, worked constantly, removing obstacles above the sur-
face, and snag boats opened a channel through the raft, pulling stumps 
and timbers. In November of 1873, the channel finally was clear. 
Howell wrote: 
Operations ••• were continued until the evening of the 
26th. The river at that time was rising rapidly, and at 
daylight on the 27th the remaining portion of the raft 
obstructing the channel went out, and Red River was re-
lieved of a serious obstruction to its navigation. The 
most important of the work having been accomplished, 
preparation was at once made to return to the foot of 
the raft and improve the channel existing through the 
raft.7 
The Red River raft had finally been conquered, but the job was not 
finished. The raft had to be prevented from reforming. Dams had to be 
built across bayous to prevent run off from the main channel, and small 
rafts had to be removed. In 1875 the rapids at Alexandria were deepened, 
removing another serious obstacle to navigation. The next year the 
mouth of the river was deepened and widened. Work on the Red River by 
the Corps of Engineers continued until 1900, with improvements in the 
river made yearly. The channel was straightened at several bends of the 
river, and numerous "chutes," or shallows, were removed. In all, con-
gressional appropriations for the improvement of the Red River, includ-
ing the removal of the raft, from 1872 to 1900 amounted to $1,397,000. 
Total appropriations for improving the river, including surveys, were 
$2,403,377.50. Additionally, Congress appropriated $45,000 during the 
8 
period from 1886 to 1896 to improve Cypress Bayou. 
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The effects of the raft's removal were as expected. Large amounts 
of land were reclaimed after the water drained downriver, costs of ship-
ping products from the upper Red River valley were vastly reduced, and 
Shreveport became a busy port •. Steamboats began ascending the river to 
Fulton, Arkansas, and then beyond the great,bend. One negative result 
of the raft's removal, however, was the demise of Jefferson, Texas, as 
a river port. Steamboats had been able to ascend Cypress Bayou from the 
Red to Jefferson prior to the removal of the raft because the backwater 
had raised the water level of the bayou and of Caddo Lake. When the 
raft was removed the water level dropped, leaving Jefferson beyond the 
"· reach of steamers. Although work on Cypress Bayou by the Corps of 
Engineers between 1886 and 1896 revived the trade between Jefferson and 
the Red River, the town never attained its previous status as the second 
largest port in Texas. Instead, Jefferson, which also was bypassed by 
the railroads, became a small country town. Only the great ante-bellum 
plantation homes remained to remind Jefferson of its past glories. 9 
Despite Jefferson's plight, other ports on the Red River were aided 
inuneasurably by the removal of the raft. Despite competition from rail-
roads, which entered the area along the Red River during the 1870s, 
traffic on the river increased. In 1875 there were fourteen steamers 
plying its course, making regular runs upriver. By 1881 there were 
twenty steamers running regularly between Shreveport,.the principal port 
on the Red, and New Orleans. The total carrying capacity of these boats 
was 64,630 tons. During the period from September 1, 1880, to May 31, 
1881, these boats carried such varied items downriver to New Orleans as 
beeswax, tallow, cotton, cotton seed, cotton oil, grain, hay, wool, and 
hides. 
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During this period 86,646 bales of cotton were carried to New 
Orleans from ports on the Red River. Because steamboat operators 
charged lower rates, the cargoes on boats out of Shreveport were in-
creasing while the railroads' tonnage was decreasing. For the period 
mentioned, 21,193 bales of cotton were shipped by rail from Shreveport, 
whereas the previous year 58,243 bales had been shipped. Also, during 
the same period 37,474 bales of cotton were shipped from Shreveport by 
boat, whereas the previous year only 14, 181 bales had been carried 
d . 10 ownriver. 
During the next fiscal year, ending in June of 1882, almost 90,000 
bales of cotton were delivered at New Orleans from ports on the Red, of 
which 55,000 bales were shipped from Shreveport. Also, 45,000 sacks of 
11 
cottonseed were shipped to New Orleans. 
While Shreveport was the center for trade on the Red, steamers 
were pushing farther upriver, reaching Fulton, Arkansas, and the mouth 
of Kiamichi River. During the years 1880-1881, more than 14,000 bales 
12 
of cotton were shipped to New Orleans from points above Shreveport. 
The following year traffic on the Red peaked. Twenty steamers were 
running from Shreveport to New Orleans, carrying 108,000 bales of cot-
ton, 270,000 pounds of hides, 87,000 pounds of wool, 20,630 pounds of 
cotton seed cakes, 5,500 pounds of beeswax, and 18,000 pounds of tallow. 
In addition, 35,000,000 feet of lumber were shipped downriver from 
Shreveport. For the entire river, more than 160,000 bales of cotton 
were carried downstream. Partially as a result of this trade, Shreve-
port had grown from a town of less than 5,000 people in 1850 to 12,000 
by 1884. 13 
During the fiscal year ending in June of 1886, shipping on the 
200 
river decreased from the figures for fiscal year 1884. However, the 
traffic remained steady. Thirteen boats were engaged in the trade on 
the river, four on the upper Red above Shreveport, and nine on the 
lower river. The boats on the upper river ranged in size from one 
hundred to four hundred tons, whereas the boats which traded below 
Shreveport ranged between two hundred and eight hundred tons. During 
this year the river was navigable to Kiamatia, Texas (near the Kiamichi 
River), for two months; to Fulton, Arkansas, for four months; and to 
Garland City, Arkansas (near the Louisiana-Arkansas border), for the 
entire year. During this period 11,000 bales of cotton and more than 
48,000 sacks of cottonseed were shipped from the area above Shreveport. 
These figures demonstrate the effectiveness of the Corps of Engineers' 
k h . 14 wor on t e river. 
For this same period, more than 70,000 bales of cotton were shipped 
from Shreveport, as well as 125,000 pounds of hides and 120,000 barrel 
staves. The steamers made 108 trips between New Orleans and Shreveport, 
bringing an estimated $2,500,000 worth of goods upriver. 15 
By 1890 competition from railroads had cut into the riverboat traf-
fie severely. Only eight boats were working between Shreveport and New 
Orleans, while two were engaged in the trade between Shreveport and 
Alexandria. 16 The Corps of Engineers reported: 
Red River is crossed by the St. Louis, Iron Mountain 
and Southern Railway at Fulton, Ark., and by the St. Louis, 
Arkansas, and Texas Railway (Cotton Belt Route) at Garland, 
Ark., and by the Vicksburg, Shreveport, and Pacific Rail-
road and a branch of the "Cotton Belt Route" at Shreveport. 
Two companies have applied for charters for bridges at 
Alexandria. The Texas, Pacific Railway, running nearly 
parallel to the river touches at Alexandria, Shreveport, 
and other points, and the Morgan's Louisiana, and Texas 
Railroad (Southern Pacific) has a branch running to 
Alexandria. All these lines divert a large percentage 
of the conunerce.17 
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The figures for fiscal years 1888-1889 and 1889-1890 support this as-
sertion. Whereas the trade in cotton by water for the former year had 
. . 18 been 12,368 bales, it decreased in the latter to 8,897. 
Despite this decline in trade, the work of the Corps revived trade 
between Jefferson and Shreveport. During the year ending in June of 
1890, two boats, the New Haven and Friendly, made thirty-three tound 
trips between these ports, carrying a total value of $304,325. However, 
the railroads, which originally missed Jefferson because of the town's 
failure to grant the roads large land concessions, realized the value 
of building feeder lines into the area. By 1890 a branch of the Texas 
and Pacific had reached Jefferson, as had a branch of the Missouri, 
Kansas, and Texas Railroad. These served to decrease the public demand 
for steamboat traffic to the town. 19 
By 1894 only seven steamers were trading regularly between Shreve-
port and New Orleans, although the river was open to navigation that 
entire year. Several small boats were engaged in local trade on the 
river, and five boats were trading between several ports on the lower 
river, such as Index and Panola, and New Orleans. Only one steamer, the 
Rose Bland, was trading between Shreveport and Jefferson, although the 
20 
route between the ports was open for seven months. 
Although shipments from Shreveport jumped in 1890 to 19,218 bales 
of cotton, they declined afterward. Shipments for the following years·: 
10,567 bales for fiscal year 1891-1892; 14,751 for 1892-1893; and 9,246 
for 1893-1894. Conversely, shipments via rail were markedly greater. 
For the four railroads carrying goods from Shreveport--the Texas and 
Pacific; Vicksburg, Shreveport, and Pacific; Houston and Shreveport; 
and St. Louis, Southwestern--the total number of cotton bales were 
99,436 in fiscal year 1891-1892, 58,220 in 1892-1893, and 66,811 in 
1893-1894. 21 
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The impact of the railroads was also felt on the upper river. Al-
though the river was open to navigation from July to August and from 
November to May, only three steamers, the ~· ~· Cunnnings, Gannna, and 
Florence, were engaged in trade on the river in 1897. These carried 
38,826 tons of goods on the river. The work of the Corps of Engineers 
had extended highwater navigation to Denison, Texas; however, the river 
was paralleled by a branch of the Texas and Pacific Railway from Fulton, 
Arkansas, to the mouth of the Kiamichi River. Also, a branch of the St. 
Louis and San Francisco Railway crosses the river at Arthur, north of 
Paris, Texas, and a branch of the St. Louis, Iron Mountain, and Soutern 
Railway crossed at Fulton, Arkansas. Thus competition for trade in the 
f . 22 area was 1erce. 
By 1900 only six steamers, the Sunrise, Valley Queen, Electra, 
!• !• Scovell, Hallette, and Gem, were trading between Shreveport and 
New Orleans. Although the total amount of goods shipped from Shreveport 
increased slightly between the years 1895 and 1900, the era of steam-
boating on the Red River obviously was ending. 23 
The report of the Chief of Engineers for 1909 noted the declining 
trade on the Red River: 
Notwithstanding the facilities for quick transporta-
tion afforded by railways, the connnerce of Red River until 
recent years has consisted of large shipments of cotton, 
cotton seed and its products, lumber, staves, timber, etc., 
with heavy return freights of general merchandise and 
plantation supplies. 
The connnerce and navigation reported for eighteen 
years showed great variations, due to changing crop 
conditions, occasional periods of extraordinary low 
water during the busy season, and other causes, ranging 
in quantity from 66,376 to 279,946 tons per annum, with 
estimated values of from $1,506,500 to $9,185,000. The 
average for the eighteen years was 123,244 tons, valued 
at $4,359,900, ••• 
In 1908, however, there was a marked decline of 
navigation above the mouth of Black River and the com-
merce reported in that stretch only amounted to 
36,288 tons, valued at $198,240.24 
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Although steamers occasionally ascended the Red River to take cargos 
of cotton, the days of black smoke, waiting on the levee, and steam 
whistles were soon gone forever, replaced by the chugging and wheezing 
of iron-horses. Soon the murky, changeable waters of the Red as a 
highway for commerce were replaced by gleaming, enduring rivers of 
steel. 
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CHAPTER X 
BORDER WAR IN THE COURTS 
From the mouth of the Kiamichi River to its confluence with the 
Mississippi, the Red River had been surveyed, widened, deepened, navi-
gated by boats, changed--"improved" said the Corps of Engineers. Until 
1860, geographic knowledge of the river west of the ninety-eighth meri-
dian had been small. Randolph Marcy's expedition in 1852 had discovered 
that the river rose in two forks rather than one, and a survey in 1857 
by Majors A. H. Jones and H. M. c. Brown to determine the extent of the 
lands of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians had established the point 
where the lOOth meridian crossed the South (or Prairie Dog Town) Fork 
of the Red. However, the exact limits of the State of Texas and the 
Indian Territory had yet to be determined. 1 
The northern boundary of Texas, as stated in the Adams-On~s Treaty 
of 1819, was a line following "the course of the Rio-Roxo [Red River] 
Westward to the degree of Longitude, 100 West from London and we from 
Washington ••• as laid down in Melishe's Map of the United States, pub-
lished at Philadelphia, improved to the first of January 1818 •112 
Problems over this boundary arose because the Melish map showed only 
one fork of the Red River. The existence of two forks of the river, 
discovered by Marcy, opened the question of which fork the Melish map 
had indicated. Inasmuch as the area between the confluence of the two 
forks and the lOOth meridian consisted of more than 50,000 acres of 
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land, the designation of the proper fork to be the boundary was signifi-
cant. 
Jones' and Brown's designation of the South Fork of the river as 
the boundary of the Indian Territory might have settled the dispute, 
giving.the area to the United States. However, by the agreement which 
brought Texas into the Union in 1845, the state was granted the right 
to participate in the settlement of its boundaries. Exercising this 
right, Texas opposed the designation of the South Fork as the principal 
branch of the Red. 3 
In 1860 a joint conunission, containing members appointed by the 
United States and Texas, was formed to settle the problem. Governor 
Sam Houston of Texas was informed that the head of the delegation from 
the United States, John C. Clark, intended to use the boundary desig-
nated by Jones and Brown as a starting point for the survey. Houston 
protested that surely the North Fork was the1 one indicated by the Melish 
map, for Marcy had marked the headwaters of the North Fork with a 
bottle which seemed to indicate that Marcy believed it to be the main 
channel. Also, the Melish map indicated that the Rio-Roxo flowed near 
a range of mountains. Houston noted that the North Fork passed near 
the Wichita Mountains, while the South Fork did not flow near any 
mountain range. Therefore Houston asserted that the boundary should 
follow the North Fork. 4 
The work of the joint conunissions proved futile. The Texas leader, 
William H. Russell, considered the two delegations separate entities, 
demonstrating considerable hostility toward the members of the American 
conunission. Therefore little progress was made, and the boundary sur-




While the boundary conunissions were feuding, officials in Texas on 
February 8, 1860, decided to take the initiative, designating the dis-
puted territory Greer County, Texas. The coming of the Civil War de-
layed the actual organization of this county until 1868 when it was at-
tached to nearby Montague County for administrative purposes. In 1879 
the United States Congress created the Northern Judicial District of 
Texas, placing Greer County under the jurisdiction of the courts of 
Texas. Believing that Texas would eventually win the dispute of the 
area, officials of the state assumed ownership of the public lands in 
the region, and in 1881 allotments of land in the county were given to 
veterans of the Texas Revolution. 6 
Also in 1881, Congressman Olin Welborn of Texas introduced a bill 
in the House of Representatives which designated the North Fork of the 
Red River as the boundary of Texas. Although this bill died in com-
mittee, Senator Samuel B, Maxey of Texas the next year introduced a 
bill calling for the creation of a joint boundary conunission to settle 
the dispute and, hopefully, to award the territory to his state. How-
ever, this bill also died. The majority of the legislators believed 
that the information obtained by the survey made by Jones and Brown in 
1857 ff . . 7 was su 1c1ent. 
Since the joint conunission of 1860, the United States had made no 
effort to maintain its claim to the disputed area, nor had it attempted 
to counteract the actions of Texas. However, in 1884 soldiers from 
Fort Sill in the Indian Territory were dispatched to eject any settlers 
from the disputed area. Finding several families and more than fifty 
thousand head of cattle from Texas in the area, the conunander of the 
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force, Lieutenant C. J. Crane, issued a warning that the settlers must 
8 
leave or be ejected. 
A month after Crane 1 s warning, President Chester Arthur on July 1, 
1884, issued a similar statement. The dispute which had been ignored 
by the United States for almost twenty-five years, suddenly had become 
important. To settle the dispute, Congress in January of 1885 created 
h . . i . 9 anot er Joint comm ssion. 
The commission met in Galveston, Texas, in February of 1886. The 
delegation from Texas was led by John T. Brackenridge, while the Ameri-
can party was chaired by Major Samuel N. Mansfield. Other members of 
the commission from Texas were William S. Herndon, G. R. Freeman, and 
William H. Burgess. Members from the United States were A. R. Liver-
more, Thomas Casey, and Lansing Beach. All connnissioners appointed by 
the United States were members of the Army, whereas the members from 
Texas were a conglomerate of politicians, businessmen and governmental 
ff . . 1 10 0 1Cl.a So 
The primary purposes of this connnission were to determine where 
the lOOth meridian crossed the Red River and which fork of the Red River 
was the main branch referred to by the Melish map. To attain these 
goals, the connnissioners collected twenty-three maps, various reports 
from explorers, and called several witnesses, including Randolph Marcy, 
the man who had created the controversy by discovering the two forks 
of the Red in 1852. 11 
Seventy-four years old and a retired general, Randolph Marcy was 
the first witness to testify. On February 26 he appeared before the 
connnission begging the connnissioners' forgiveness for his lapses of 
memory. He referred them to his report of the exploration; as to the 
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relationship between his knowledge of the area and the Melish map. He 
noted that "I have this morning for the first time, seen a copy •••• 1112 
However, after studying the map he made extensive comments: 
Upon this map only one large fork of the Red fork of Red 
River is delineated, with one more northerly small affluent, 
which is not named, but may have been intended for the 
Washita River or Cache Creek. But none of the important 
southern tributaries, such as the Big Witchita [sic], 
Pease River, and the Prairie Dog Town River are delineated 
thereon, unless the stream marked as the 'Rio San Saba,' 
is designated for the Prairie Dog Town branch, and as the 
real Rio San Saba of Texas is 500 miles or thereabouts 
distant from this locality, it does seem improbable that 
if the maker of the map had any vague conception of the 
existence of such a stream as the Prairie Dog Town River, 
he might have intended this as such. It certainly runs 
as far as the section of the map shows it nearly in the 
direction of that branch of the Red River, and is put 
down as rising near the eastern border of the Staked 
Plain, but the ~mall section of the map does not show 
where it runs.l 
After establishing the vaious faults of the map, Marcy stated his 
opinion as to the main branch of the river: 
I regarded the Prairie Dog Town branch as the main Red 
River, for the reason that its bed was much wider than that 
of the North Fork. Although the water only covered a small 
portion of its bed, and as the sandy earth absorbed a good 
deal of the water it debouched from.the canon through which 
it flows, it may not contribute any more water to the lower 
river than the North Fork. The Prairie Dog Town branch and 
the North Fork of Red River from their confluence to their 
sources are of about equal length, the former being 180 
miles and the latter 177 miles in length.14 
Despite his statement that he had "regarded the Prairie Dog Town branch 
as the ma.in Red River," Marcy continued that on seeing the Melish map 
he had concluded that the North Fork "was what is designated upon 
Melish 1 s-map as 'Rio Roxo. 1 I doubt if the Prairie Dog Town River was 
ever known to civilized men prior to my exploration in 1852, and if it 
was ever mapped before than I am not aware of it •1115 
After his somewhat confused beginning, Marcy listed his reasons for 
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assuming that the North Fork was the branch ref erred to in the Melish 
map. He noted that the country along the South or Prairie Dog Town 
Fork was harsh and forbidding. Remembering his days of thirst and hard-
ship there, he noted that the waters of the South Fork were "so bitter 
16" . 
and unpalatable that many of my men became sick from drinking it. 11 
Thus he was not surprised "that little if anything should have been 
known of this repulsive region" before his exploration. Furthermore, 
the name of the river itself indicated to Marcy that the South Fork had 
not been explored or mapped previous to his journey. He stated: 
It is very certain that the Prairie Dog Town River, 
was never delineated upon any of our maps or designated by 
any Spanish, French, or English name, as were most of the 
other streams in that country, and it was only known to the 
Indians, and possibly to some Mexican traders, as the 
1Keche-ah-qui-ho-no, 1 a Comanche appelation, 7he signifi-
cance of which the qelawares informed me •••• 1 
Marcy also noted that Mexican traders probably did not travel across 
the area "with their carts in their trading expeditions from Santa Fe to 
Nacogdoches, especially when there was so good a route a little further 
north possessing all the requisites for prairie traveling.1118 Marcy's 
final reasons for considering the North Fork the branch indicated on the 
Melish map were: 
The Rio Rojo or Roxo upon Melish's map is almost en-
tirely south and west of the Witchetaw [sic] Mountains but 
in close proximity to them, which is in accord with my 
determination of the position of the North Fork, while 
there are no mountains upon the Prairie Dog Town Branch. 
The head of the Rio Roxo upon Melish's map is put 
down as in about latitude 37 while upon my map the true 
latitude is 25%; while the Prairie Dog Town River rises 
in about latitutde 34%0 ; so that if his Rio Roxo was in-
tended to represent the 'Prairie Dog Town River,' it 
would be 2%0 of latitude too far north.19 
After hearing Marcy's comments the commission adjourned until 
20 
March 3. At the next meeting of the commission, which was delayed 
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until March 4 by illness in the family of one of the members from Texas, 
the American delegation issued a statement declaring that the South 
Fork of the Red was the main fork and should be designated as the branch 
referred to by the Melish map, noting that the surveys made in 1857 and 
in 1860 had accepted this conclusion. The Texans responded by denying 
this supposition, and on March 11 suggested that the tools needed to 
determine the meaning of the Melish ~ap were not available to the com-
21 missioners •. 
After this exchange the meetings of the commission were spent re-
viewing historical documents, such as correspondence between John 
Quincy Adams and Lu!s de onls, the reports of Zebulon Pike and Stephen 
H, Long, and the writings of George Bancroft and Alexander von Rumbolt. 
Several more witnesses, such as Hami 1 ton P. Bee and John S. "Rip!' Ford, 
were heard. Finally, the commissioners agreed to disagree, the Ameri-
can delegation issuing a statement on July 14 which concluded: 
It is maintained by the Commission on the part of Texas 
that the North Fork is the main Red River of the treaty, be~ 
cause this stream was at that time well known to the farmers 
thereof, while the Prairie Dog Town Fork was wholly unknown. 
We [the commissioners from the United States], on the con-
trary, have shown that nothing was known of either of these 
streams at the time alluded to, and that for this reason the 
physical features of the question must be our only criterion 
in a true interpretation of the treaty. 
Hence ••• we are of the opinion that this [the South 
Fork] should be considered as the true Red River of the 
treaty.22 
The commissioners from Texas responded that the evidence offered in sup-
port of the North Fork had not been refuted, but still the Americans. 
persisted in designating the South Fork as the boundary. Therefore a 
conclusion could not be reached. On July 16, 1886, the commission ad-
journed, noting that the problem would have to be passed to some other 
"b 1 23 tri una • 
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The connnission had met for five months, heard numerous witnesses, 
and reviewed hundreds of historical documents, but it could not reach a 
decision. At the root of the problem were the interests of each party. 
Texans wanted Greer County, and the United States wanted Greer County. 
Neither was willing to yield the disputed area on such flimsy evidence 
as sworn testimony or historical fact. Another method of settling the 
case was necessary, a judgment by the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 
By an act of Congress in May, 1890, the newly opened Territory of 
Oklahoma was organized. Included in the bill were provisions for the 
judicial settlement of the Greer County dispute. On October 27, 1890, 
Attorney General W. H. Miller filed suit in the Supreme Court against 
the State of Texas, asking that Greer County be judged part of the 
United States and that the Prairie Dog Town Fork of the Red River be 
24 
named the main branch of the river. 
Counsels for the State of Texas, Augustus Garland, Charles A. Cul-
berson, John Hancock, George Clark, and H. J. May, responded that the 
Supreme Court had no authority to accept the case because it was po-
litical in nature. The case involved settlement of a boundary dispute 
which had arisen from the Treaty of 1819. They argued that such mat-
ters were the province of the executive and legislative branches; con-
stitutionally, the courts had no control over foreign relations of the 
United States, nor its boundary disputes. Furthermore, they said, the 
Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction in cases between the United 
States and individual states, noting that the constitution did not 
25 
specifically grant this power to the court. 
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The court disagreed with all the Texans' assertions, noting that 
it inherently had jurisdiction over cases involving individual states. 
The fact that the case had arisen from an international agreement did 
not alter the nature of jurisdiction in the case. Finally, the Court 
rules in accepting the case brought by the United States that if it did 
not have jurisdiction of the case there were only three alternatives: 
mutual agreement, which had already failed; war, which was unacceptable 
to either side; or trial in a state court, which would abridge the 
sovereignty of the United States by placing it at the mercy of some 
26 
state court. 
The case of United States of America versus the State of Texas be-
gan on October 23, 1895 and ended on March 16 the following year. The 
court heard arguments, testimony, and statements, and it reviewed docu-
ments, maps, and reports, obtaining the same information which had been 
presented to the Boundary Connnission of 1886. Representing the United 
States were Judson Harmon, Attorney General, Holmes Conrad, Solicitor 
General, and Edgar Allan, counsel for the plaintiff. For Texas, counsels 
were George Clark, M. M. Crane, A. H. Garland, J. H. May, Charles A. 
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Culberson, and George Freeman. 
Counsel for both parties argued the merits of each fork of the 
river before the court, beginning on October 23 and concluding on Octo-
ber 25. In giving the decision of the court on February 29, 1896, 
Associate Justice John M. Harlan reviewed the historical background of 
the dispute, concluding: 
.,.it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the territory 
east of the lOOth meridian of longitude, west and south of 
the river now known as the north fork of Red river, and 
north of a line following westward, as prescribed by the 
treaty of 1819 between the United States and Spain, the 
course, and along the south bank, both of Red River and of 
the river now known as the Prairie Dog Town fork or south 
fork of Red River until such line meets the lOOth meridian 
of longitude,--which territory is sometimes called Greer 
County,--constitutes no part of the territory properly in-
cluded within or rightfully belonging to Texas at the time 
of the admission of that state into the Union, and is not 
within the limits nor under the jurisdiction of that state, 
but is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United 
States of America.28 
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It appeared to the court that the intent of the Treaty of 1819 was most 
clearly fulfilled by designating the south fork as the main branch of 
the Red River. All subsequent actions, such as the organization of the 
county by Texas, the placing of the county under the jurisdiction of the 
courts of Texas, and claims to ownership of lands in the county by indi-
viduals, did not alter the facts of the original case. Thus the court 
found for the plaintiff, the United States; Texas, having for many years 
believed it was the rightful owner of the area, was deprived of the re-
gion north of the south fork and east of the lOOth meridian. Undoubted-
ly, had Lu(s de on{s been alive in 1896 he would have been both pleased 
and amused by the confusion and difficulty, which the treaty he so un-
willingly had made, had caused the pushy and disrespectful Americans. 29 
All that remained to settle the long-standing dispute was the 
designation of the point where the lOOth meridian crossed the Prairie 
Dog Town Fork--now the main fork--of the Red River. On January 15, 
1901, Congress directed the Secretary of Interior, E. A. Hitchcock, to 
cause "to be established and fixed the intersection of the true meridian 
with Red River, or what ••• was known as the South Fork of Red River 
"30 To fulfill this directive, Secretary Hitchcock dispatched .... 
Arthur D. Kidder, Examiner of Surveys, to locate the point in ques-
. 31 
tion. 
Several attempts had been made previously to locate the lOOth 
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meridian, including those of Jones and Brown in 1857, John H. Clark in 
1858, C. L. Du Bois in 1873, O. T. Morrill also in 1873, H. c. F. Hack-
busch in 1875, and Ehud N. Darling also in 1875; however, the accuracy 
of all these was suspect. Thus Kidder set out in 1903, after studying 
the findings of the previous surveys, to locate the exact point of 
intersection. Also, he was to determine the boundary of Texas with 
New Mexico and Oklahoma from the Red River to the Rio Grande. In 1904 
he reported that his work was concluded, noting that the previous survey 
of the lOOth meridian's intersection with the Red had been less accurate 
than his because of recent improvements in astronomical instruments. 
Also, he noted that the Red River was subject to meandering which made 
exact surveys of its course difficult. Thus the Greer County dispute 
ended, not with gunfire and sword, but with a court decision and a 
32 
surveyor's report. 
However, the end of the Greer County affair did not terminate the 
controversy over the Red River. While the Supreme Court had ruled that 
the boundary ran along the South Fork, the exact location of the bound-
ary of the two states along the Red River had never been determined. 
Surely it followed the Red; but it was one thing to draw lines on paper 
and another to draw lines across the face of the earth, especially 
along a river that shifted and meandered like the Red. 33 
Yet there seemed no urgent need to clarify the boundary, at least 
at that time. Then in 1918 the situation changed drastically. Oil was 
discovered in Oklahoma, and large deposits were located under the bed 
of the Red River. Both states wanted some of it--or all of it. Im-
mediately after the discovery of this black gold, the State of Okla-
homa, which asserted ownership to the entire bed of the Red because of 
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the Supreme Court's judgment of 1896 that· the boundary followed the 
South Fork of the river, began to lease portions of the river bed. How-
ever, Texas, which had not overtly disputed this assertion until the 
discovery of oil contended that the boundary followed the middle of the 
river, and that the southern half of the river bed, along with the oil 
under it, belonged to Texas. Also complicating the issue was a claim 
by the Comanche tribe that the northern half of the river rightfully 
was theirs because the treaty of 1867 had granted the tribe territory 
extending to the middle of the river. And some citizens claimed that 
the river bed was open to placer mining because the area had become 
Federal land after the opening of the Big Pasture Indian Reservation in 
1906, asserting that the Indians had forfeited all rights to the river 
bed by accepting the reservation. Also, land owners along the river 
claimed ownership of the river bed adjacent to their property. 34 
The legislature of Texas moved to end the dispute by passing an 
act providing for a suit to be brought against Oklahoma. This was to 
be done in the Supreme Court or in any court legal officials of the 
state determined suitable. Quickly the matter deteriorated into a 
farce. The courts of both states assumed jurisdiction, and the nation-
al guards of both states eventually were called out, not to keep the 
35 
peace but to support the claims of their respective states. 
In 1919 Oklahoma moved to clarify--and hopefully end--the dis-
agreement by filing suit in the Supreme Court, asking that the court 
state that the boundary followed the south bank of the river. The 
court immediately appointed a receiver to maintain oil and gas wells 
already in operation until the dispute was settled. Also, to protect 
the rights of Indian climants as well as its own interests, the United 
36 
States entered the case by permission of the court. 
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In December of 1920 the case, State of Oklahoma versus State of 
Texas, United. States of America, intervene·r, opened before the Supreme 
Court. Arguments were heard on the 14th and 15th of that month. 
Representing the various claimants were S. P. Freeling, Attorney Gener-
al of the State of Oklahoma; .C. M. Cureton, Attorney General of the 
State of Texas; Garnett, Assistant Attorney General of the United 
States; and Joseph W. Bailey and A. H. Carrigan, attorneys for land-
37 
owners. 
Oklahoma's legal representative contended that the boundary had 
been determined by judgment in the case concerning Greer County in 1896 
when the court had ruled that the boundary followed the course of the 
38 
Red River "along the south bank •••• 11 However, the attorneys for 
Texas argued that the judgment had not been final because it had ap-
plied only to Greer County, and that the Treaty of 1819, which was the 
basis for the ruling, had been misconstrued. This contention arose 
from the vague wording of the treaty. The Third Article of the Treaty 
of 1819 read in part~ 
The Boundary line between the two Countries, West of 
the Mississippi, shall begin on the Gulph [sic] of Mexico, 
at the mouth of the River. Sabine in the Sea, continuing 
North, along the Western Bank of that River, to the 32d 
degree of Latitude, where it strikes the Rio Roxo of 
Natchitoches, or Red-River, then following the course of 
the Rio-Roxo Westward to the degree of Longitude, 100 
West from London and 23 from Washington, then crossing 
the said Red-River, and running thence by a Line due 
North to the River Arkansas, thence, following the 
Course of the Southern bank of the Arkansas to its 
source in Latitude, 42. North, and thence by that parallel 
of Latitude to the South Sea ••• all the islands in the 
Sabine and the said Red and Arkansas Rivers, throughout 
the course thus described, to belong to the United 
States •••• 39 
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According to this treaty, the boundary did indeed follow the west bank 
of the Sabine and the south bank of the Arkansas, but no such designa-
tion was made regarding the Red. The statement that all islands in the 
Red belonged to the United States implied that the entire bed of the 
river had been ceded to the Americans. Nonetheless, Texas contended 
h h di f h 1 f h d . 40 t at t e wor ng o t e treaty e t t e matter open to ispute. 
The Court issued its opinion on April 11, 1921. The ruling noted 
that the Court was faced with two questions: was the ruling of 1896 
valid for the entire course of the river between Oklahoma and Texas, and 
did the treaty of 1819 intend the line to follow the south bank or the 
middle of the Red River. If the answer to the first question was posi-
tive, the second was moot. The findings of the court, in part, were: 
••• that, in elucidation of the matter, the treaty, 
and much historical evidence of the negotiations that led 
up to it, were introduced, discussed by counsil in argu-
ment, and referred to in the opinion of the court [in 
1896]; and that the point was directly determined by the 
court and the determination made part of its final decree. 
By every test that properly can be applied, the matter 
is res judicata [determined by legal precedent].41 
Therefore the State of Texas had no claim to any part of the river bed~ 
However, the matter still was not settled. The United States con-
tested the claim of Oklahoma to the entire bed of the river, claiming 
ownership of the southern half for itself and partial ownership of the 
northern half for itself and for members of the Comanche, Kiowa, and 
Apache tribes. Also, the question of determining the meaning of the 
word "bank" regarding the Red River was unanswered. Was the bank the 
high water mark? the low water mark? What of the meanderings of the 
river? When the river formed a cut-off, moving the channel north or 
. 42 
south, did the boundary follow the river? 
The claims of placer mines were discounted on May 1, 1922. The 
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court held that the portion of the river in question had never been 
subject to mining claims because of its ownership by the Indian tribes 
43 
under the Treaty of 1867. 
The State of Oklahoma argued that its ownership of the river bed 
arose from two factors: riparian right of the state as the owner of 
public lands along the river granted to the state on its entrance into 
the Union, and retention of ownership of the river bed because the Red 
was a navigable stream. Counsel for Oklahoma argued that several acts 
by the Federal government, such as authorizing briclges to be built on 
the Red River, appropriation of funds to improve the river, and surveys 
of the river, as well as the assumption by Adams and Onis in making the 
Treaty of 1819 that the Red River was navigable, demonst.rated a previous 
acceptance of the navigability of the stream. Also, documents relating 
the frequent navigation of the river during the nineteenth century was 
offered as evidence of the historical navigability of the Red. 44 
Oklahoma's evidence for the navigability of the Red was impressive. 
However, the court rule that, while the government had attempted to im-
prove the navigability of the Red above Fulton, Arkansas, and that while 
for a time the trafffc on the river had been heavy, the situation had 
changed by 1920. The Corps of Engineers had ceased work on the river 
and commerce was negligible. Therefore the Red no longer was a naviga-
ble waterway. The United States owned the lower half of the. river bed. 
However, the court did allow the claim of the state to ownership of 
certain parts of the northern half of the river bed because of riparian 
right. Additionally, the court recognized the rights of various indi-




The only matter left before the court was the settlement of the 
definition of "banks. 11 The United States and the State of Oklahoma con-
tended that the intention of the treaty-makers was the high water mark 
of the river. Texas, however, claimed that the bank was the low water 
mark, contending that the high water mark would give the United States 
and Oklahoma almost one half million acres of Texas soil, soil that 
had been cultivated and kept by Texans without dispute until the dis-
46 
covery of oi 1. 
Referring to the Treaty of 1819 once more, the Court rules that 
the drafters had specifically noted the boundary as running on the "re-
spective Banks" of the rivers involved; thus the boundary followed the. 
most easily recognizable bank of the Red River. This was, in the 
opinion of the court, the ''cut-bank" where the water had eroded the 
earth. This was the high water mark. These banks confined the waters 
of the river except during floods. As for changes in the course of the 
river, the boundary followed the river. For instance, when the river 
divided its waters, forming an island, the boundary ran along the nor-
thern edge of the island.47 
Arthur D. Kidder and Arthur A. Stiles were appointed by the court 
to survey the "south bank" of the Red, marking the boundary as it was 
in 1921. The survey was to begin at the "Big Bend" of the river and 
h . 48 progress westward, ending at the lOOt meridian. 
A supplement to this ruling was allowed by the court on March 12, 
1923, providing for protection of the riparian right of landowners to 
the middle of the river unless specifically limited by the court. Also, 
owners whose rights had been non-riparian when the survey was made by 
Kidder and Stiles, and which since had become riparian, were granted 
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ownership to the middle of the river. Finally, the receiver was or-
dered to surrender all patents and allotted tracts as quickly as pos-
sible. 
In June of 1924 the court ordered the received to audit his ac-
counts and to pay the necessary taxes on the profits earned. A year 
later, ·on June 1, 1925, the receivership ended, and all tracts were re-
turned to their rightful owners. 49 
The only matter still undecided was the final marking of the bound-
ary by Stiles and Kidder. Working from late 1923 until the summer of 
1926, these men marked the designated boundary, and in April of 1927 the 
50 court approved the report. 
Thus the dispute over ownership of the Red River finally ended af-
ter approximately one hundred years. For more than two centuries na-
tions and states had argued over the boundary of the Red. First it had 
been France and Spain, then Spain and the United States, later the 
United States and Texas, and finally Texas and Oklahoma, and the settle-
ments of the boundary had ranged from pragmatic agreements, such as 
those made by St. Denis and Aguayo in 1719 and Wilkinson and Herrera in 
1806, to judicial decrees such as those by the Supreme Court in. 1896 
and 1921. Two hundred years had altered the method of settlirig dis-
putes about the Red River, but not its nature; however, by the time the 
court approved the final boundary, Congress was devising plans to tame 
the river. 
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,CHAPTER XI 
THE TAMING OF THE RIVER 
.For countless centuries the Red River had swelled with rain water, 
rising each spring and falling each autumn. Occasionally this gentle 
pattern of nature was disruped by particularly heavy or light rainfall 
causing the river either to flood or remain too low for commercial use., 
Sometimes there was just enough water, frequently there was too little, 
and sporatically there was too much. Man was the seemingly helpless 
victim of nature •·s moods. However, in the latter part of the second 
decade of the twentieth century Congress acted to relieve. the plight of 
people in the Red River valley. 
The River and Harbor Act of 1927 provided for a study of the ad-
visability of improving the various rivers of the United States for 
purposes of navigation. In 1928 the Flood Control Act ordered studies 
to be made regarding the construction of flood control activities. The 
Red River was specifically mentioned in both bills. Additionally, 
prospects for power generation facilities were to be studied. 1 
There were three major areas involving the Red where flood control 
projects were needed: the low lands surrounding the mouth of the 
river, which frequently were flooded by b~ckwaters from the Mississippi; 
the area near the mouth of the Ouachita River, which flooded when the 
Red and Ouachita crested; and low lying regions along the Red which 
flooded during periods of high water. In 1934, as a result of these 
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acts of Congress requesting information and recommendations concerning 
flood.control in the United States, the President's Committee on Water 
Flow responded regarding the Red by suggesting a series of dams and 
locks on the river at fifty-two locations on the river. These projects, 
the committee asserted, effectively would control flooding on the Red 
River below Denison, Texas. However, the committee also noted that the 
total cost of the projects would be prohibitive at that time. There-
fore, the opinion of the committee was that only two projects should be 
considered immediately: dams at Columbia and Jonesville, Louisiana. 
The estimated cost of these projects was $395,000 and $443,000 re-
spectively. For the region near the mouth of the Red, projects were to 
be delayed until work on the Mississippi River had been completed. As 
for projects on the upper Red, the committee found that cost made them 
"not appear to be justified at this time.11 Despite the committee's 
suggestion, Congress failed to approve any projects until the late: 
1930s. 
In compliance with these acts the Army Corps of Engineers reported 
to the Congress in January of 1936. The report of the Engineers dealt 
extensively with the physical make-up of the Red River, and included 
recommendations concerning hydrology, navigation, flood control, irri-
gation, possibilities for power development, and estimated costs. By 
the time of the report the need for work on the Red River had been 
demonstrated by the destruction of thousands of dollars worth of property 
by floods in 1908, 1927, and 1930. Also, commerce on the river had been 
restricted to the portion below Alexandria because of insufficient 
water. With passage of time the size of boats had outgrown the shallow 
2 
waters of the Red. 
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After 1909 work on the Red by the Corps of Engineers had been 
limited to maintaining a six food channel below Alexandria; in the re-
port of 1936 the Corps advised the Congress that the cost of extending 
this channel beyond Alexandria would be prohibitive, asserting that: 
"The maximum value of a 6-foot project to Shreveport would not exceed 
$5,400,000. The lowest cost of such a project would be $40,000,000 or 
26 times the value.113 In light of this information the Corps concluded 
that further work at that time was unadvisable. Especially because 
there was little demand for water borne transportation in the area along 
4 
the Red. 
Regarding flood control projects, the Corps' suggestions were sim-
ilar. Floods were a constant problem; however, the cost of providing 
adequate flood control facilities for the area on the Red River were 
far more than the maximum value that would be realized in savings. For 
example, the Corps estimated that "no project is justified unless the 
cost per acre providing flood protection is somewhat ~ess than approxi-
mately $25 •••• 115 In the area of the Rapides Islandes near Alexandria 
the cost per acre was $40.10. No area along the Red River was suitably 
situated or contained property sufficiently.yalued to indicate the con-
struction of flood control facilities. Flood control on the Red River 
6 
would be delegates to the states. 
Recommendations concerning water power and irrigation projects were 
similarly negative. ·Of the former, the Corps noted that "The develop-
ment of hydroelectric power in the basic would cost more than develop-
7 
ment of equivalent power from steam plants." Again the cost-profit 
ratio was prohibitive. The average cost of constructing water-power 
facilities on the Red were ,8.10 mills per kilowatt-hour. In that time 
of plentiful and relatively inexpensive fuels for steam plants, the 
Corps concluded that the development of hydroelectric power was non-
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essential. As for irrigation, the Corps noted, "The present value of 
agricultural land does not justify such irrigation developments as 
are physically feasible. 118 
As a result of these reports, no new work on the Red River by the 
Corps of Engineers was approved in 1936. However, because of increased 
public pressure and increased demand for power, the Flood Control Act 
of 1938 was approved, authorizing the Corps to construct a dam on the 
Red near the city of Denison, Texas to aid in controlling floods on the 
Red and Washita rivers. Work began on the project early in 1939 and 
was concluded in 1944. The dam, measuring 15,200 feet in length and 
165 feet in height, was located five miles above Denison just below the 
mouth of the Washita River. A year after the' dam was finished, crea.ting 
Lake Texoma, the first hydroelectric turbine was fitted into the struc-
ture, and four years later another generator was installed, bringing 
the total output of the unit to seventy thousand kilowatts per hour. 
The total cost of the project was almost $80,000,000. 9 
Meanwhile Congress had acted again. During the period from 1938 
to 1944, the national legislature approved several acts requesting the 
Corps of Engineers to reevaluate the potential for further flood con-
trol and hydroelectric facilities on the Red River. Also, the Corps 
was directed to study the feasibility of opening a waterway from 
Jefferson, Texas, to Shreveport, Louisiana, as well as the advisability 
of improving the navigability of the Red to Denison, Texas. 10 In 1946 
the Corps responded to these requests with two reports, one concerning 
navigability and the other regarding flood control and hydroelectric 
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facilities. The latter suggested the construction of a series of dams 
on the Red and several of its tributaries, costing in excess of 
$70,000,000. The former proposed radical modifications in existing 
plans for improving the navigability of the Red River: 
••• modification of the existing project ••• to provide for 
a channel 9 feet deep and 100 feet wide, extending from 
the Mississippi through ••• Red River, thence by a lateral 
canal leaving Red River through its right bank, at or 
near mile 31, and extending through land cuts and exist-
ing waterways, across the Mississippi-Red River backwater 
area and along the south bank of the Red River flood plain 
to Shreveport, by the cynstruction of locks and dams and 
channel excavation •••• l 
The total cost of this project was estimated at $42,000,000 for the 
initial construction, and $600,000 annually for maintenance. 12 
Congress reacted favorably to the proposal for construction of 
flood control and hydroelectric dams on the Red. However, action con-
cerning the proposed waterway to Shreveport was delayed. The amount of 
connnerce in the area along the Red did not, in the view of a majority 
of national legislators, warrant the expenditure of $40,000,000, at 
least not at that time. However, $77,500,000 was appropriated for 
construction of the proposed dams in the Flood Control Act of 1946. 
Additionally, more than $100,000,000 was appropriated for flood con-
trol and river improvement below Shreveport by the Mississippi River 
Connnission. This appropriation resulted in the continued construction 
of jetties, dams, and levies on the lower river to prevent erosion of 
soil and to prevent destruction of property by backwater from the 
Mississippi. 13 
The Flood Control of 1946 was the beginning of serious efforts by 
the Federal Government to chain the forces of nature in the Red River 
Valley, to prevent the destruction of property by the whims of the 
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river, and to harness the seemingly limitless power of the river. Yet 
it was only a first step. In 1950 Congress approved an additional flood 
control act similar to the previous bill but larger in scope, asking for 
individual studies of the rivers of the nation and providing for indi-
.d 1 . . 14 vi ua appropriations. 
After passage of the Flood Control Act of 1950, which in reality 
was a comprehensive act providing for studies and projects in a wide 
area of improvements, including hydroelectric, irrigation, navigation, 
water quality, and flood control, the work of the Corps of Engineers on 
the Red River was constant and extensive, with more than one hundred 
and fifty large projects proposed, in progress, or completed by 1957. 
Above Denison Dam the projects of the Corps were designed mainly 
for four purposes: irrigation, municipal water supply, hydroelectric 
production. Such d:ams were constructed on the Washita, Pease and Wichi-
ta rivers. Additionally, smaller dams and other water-flow retardation 
devices, such as spillways and jetties, were placed in areas where soil 
erosion was excessive. By 1957 almost five hundred such projects 
15 
either were proposed or in progress. 
Below Denison Dam the majority of the Corps' work was to effect 
flood control and water storage, with irrigation and prevention of soil 
erosion as adjuncts to these larger projects. Also, in the early 1950s 
the Corps revived the proposed canalings of the Red River below Shreve-
port to reopen navigation on the river to that city. This project was 
approved in 1965 by Congress. However, actual construction of the fa-
cility was delayed indefinitely. Nonetheless the Corps proposed in 
1957 an enlargement of the project, extending the canal and lock system 
to Jefferson, Texas, Lone Star, Texas, and Texarkana, Texas. Proposed 
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as a long range project, one that would not be instituted until con-
ditions such as population, industrial growth, and commercial activity 
in the affected areas warranted extensive outlays of money, the plan 
was devised to utilize related projects to hold costs to a minimum. 
The extension of the canal would be made via Twelve Mile, Black, and 
Kelly bayous, Caddo Lake, and Cypress Creek to reach Jefferson and Lone 
Star, an industrial center in East Texas. The connection to Texarkana 
would be made via the Sulphur construct. The problem of maintaining a 
constant water level in the canal system was to be solved by utilizing 
proposed reservoirs as water storage facilities. Regarding the channel 
to Jefferson and Lone Star, a proposed project, called Ferrell's Bridge 
Reservoir (later known as the Lake 0 1Pines), was to be used "for storing 
water to maintain pool levels •••• " Regarding the channel to Texarkana, 
16 
Texoma and Texarkana lakes would be used to regulate water flow. 
During the 1950s and 1960s Congress continually approved appropri-
ations for construction of dams and reservoirs on the Red River and its 
tributaries. Additions to the Flood Control Act were made both spe-
cifically, as in the case when the act in July of 1955 was modified to 
include the Ferrell's Bridge Reservoir project, and generally, as Rivers 
17 
and Harbors Acts of 1958 and 1962. The former, passed in July of 
1958, provided, "The general plan for flood control on Red River ••• as 
authorized by the Flood Control Act of 1946, is now modified and ex-
panded, at an estimated cost in addition to that now authorized of 
$53,235,000 •••• 1118 Including minor additions between 1946 and 1958, 
this appropriation raised the total amount of funds authorized by the 
Congress for improvements on the Red River to almost $150,000,000. 
Four years later, in October of 1962, Congress approved an additional 
233 
appropriation of $76,058,000 to be used to improve flood control capa-
bi lities of the Corps on ten tributaries of the Red River in Texas, 
Louisiana, Arkansas, and Oklahoma. Also included in this act was an 
appropriation of $300,000 to construct two experimental water-quality 
study projects in the Red River Basin. 19 
By 1970 several of the C'orps major projects, such as Broken Bow 
and Farrell's Bridge reservoirs, had been completed; others, such as 
Hugh and Boswell reservoirs, were under construction; yet others, such 
as the proposed navigation channel to Shreveport, remained idle. 20 
One of the most successful Corps' projects was Lake Texoma, 
created by Denison Dam. This reservoir was designed to hold 5,382,000 
acre-feet of water, including more than two million acre-feet of star-
age space for flood waters. In 1970 the Corps of Engineers estimated 
that the total savings gained from flood prevention since the dams had 
been completed in 1944 was $28,979,000. In addition, the two turbines 
at these facilities had produced 162,000,000 kilowatt-hours of elec-
tricity during fiscal year 1970, supplying power to a majority of sur-
1 
rounding towns. Also, the reservoir supplies water to the city of 
Denison, the Texas Power and Light Company, Texaco Incorporated, the 
21 
Red River Authority of Texas, and the Atlantic Richfield Company. 
The Denison Dam-Lake Texoma project was also an example of another 
function of the Corps' work on the Red River to provide recreation fa-
ci lities. In 1955 more than five million people visited the area, and 
in 1970 the lake attracted 9,700,000 visitors as well as more than ten 
22 
thousand pleasure boats. Additionally, hundreds of thousands of 
water fowl have used the waters of Lake Texoma. 
From 1930 to 1970 millions of dollars were spent for improvement 
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of the Red River and its tributaries. The result was a sharp decrease 
in the loss of property due to floods, plentiful water supplies1 
adequate supplies of electricity, and countless hours of recreation. 
The Red River valley would never again be the same. 
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CHAPTER XII 
TODAY AND YESTERDAY 
Today small children play beside the Red River, sailing toy boats 
and searching for lunkers. Looking across its waters they see powerful 
boatsmade of plastic and steel skimming over the surface. The river 
is a plaything to be enjoyed. But if they listen to the sounds of the 
river, they may still hear the echo of some long-dead Frenchman singing 
of far-off places, or along the banks they may find a long-forgotten 
rut made where an Indian canoe came ashore. And if the river could 
speak, what a wonderous tale it would tell--a tale of wars and friend-
ships, of floods and droughts, of brave men and cowards, of life and 
death. When man first crept from the darkness of caves, daring for the 
first time to see the light, the Red River was old--"as old as the 
wind," said the Caddo. 
The Red River, at some places beautiful and sparkling, luring to 
the body and soul, and at other turbid and unhandsome, uninviting to 
the eye or palate, was a highway of commerce for more centuries than 
man can remember. Men--red and white, great and small, good and evil--
have plied the waters of this river, carrying goods to be traded. And 
when waves of Europeans swept across the continent, many pioneers 
traveled the Red River. 
Settlement and ciyilization have brought a taming of the Red. 
Large cities now are found where once the lodges of Indians stood. 
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Where St. Denis found a small gathering of Caddo in 1714 now stands 
Natchitoches, Louisiana, a town of more than twenty thousand people. 
Where once the land was open and teeming with wildlife now stands Shreve-
port, a modern and bustling city. Where once the buffalo searched for 
grass now stands Wichita Falls, Texas. Where once the Red River mated 
with the Washita to flow unfettered to the Mississippi now lies Lake 
Texoma. 
The Red River today bears little resemblance to the untamed and 
quarrelsoire stream that delayed Lu!'s de Moscoso's journey to Mexico more 
than four centuries ago. Dozens of bridges span its waters, great tur-
bines harness its. power to make electricity, and computers gauge its 
flow. Dams and jetties deter and restrict its wanderings; no longer 
can it change its channel. Huge reservoirs hold its waters 1 keeping it 
from its rendezvous with the Mississippi. But in the fuUness of time, 
the river continues, pulled ever downward by the determined, relentless 
power of gravity. After uncountable millennia, after thousands of man-
made changes, the river still flows. It is a succ·essful river--still 
fulfilling its function of carrying water to the sea. 
Despite the changes which have taken place on and along the Red 
River, despite the passage of time and the death of men, the river re-
mains constant. Its waters are used by men to ease the burdens of life. 
Whether used to transport furs or to light the streets of some city, 
the waters of the river endure, permanence in a changing world. 
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